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1
Introduction
Wei-Chiao Huang
Huizhong Zhou
Western Michigan University

After three decades of rapid economic growth, China has become
the second-largest economy in the world. Its rise has driven its search
for resources, opportunities, and outside influences, and economic
expansion will inevitably be followed by political influences and potentially overbearing military strength. In just four years, 2014–2017,
China’s outward investment and construction combined exceeded $800
billion. China has also established the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank, which rivals the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
Its economic expansion has inevitably brought about conflicts with its
neighboring countries, including South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, and
it has recently shifted from being conciliatory to being more assertive
toward territorial disputes. The ripples created by China’s first aircraft
carrier are bound to travel across the Pacific and reach the shoreline
of the United States. One of the contributors to this volume, Murray
Scot Tanner, quotes former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dr.
Tom Christensen: “China’s return to great power status is perhaps the
most important challenge in twenty-first century American diplomacy”
(Christensen 2015, p. 1). This assessment of the relationship between
the two nations has been epitomized by recent events that have occupied the center stage of the U.S. trade and foreign policy, including tensions in the South China Sea and diplomacy toward North Korea and its
nuclear and missile activity.
With this background, the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series
featured six prominent experts who shared their insights on China and
U.S.-China relations. Their lectures help put in perspective China’s rise
and its impact on the Pacific region, and the relationship and potential
conflicts between the United States and China. This collection presents
the edited version of their lectures.
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In Chapter 2, Tanner explores five underlying factors in the U.S.China relationship that pose challenges for the United States: 1) China’s
rapidly expanding national interests and its increasing power to assert
and protect them, 2) China’s governance problems and their lack of
commitment to cooperation, 3) China’s view of security and the complexity of building U.S.-Chinese “strategic trust,” 4) mobilizing the
United States’ allies and partners, and 5) the challenge at home.
China’s leadership remains committed to an established set of longstanding, key security interests—most notably its core interests of protecting Chinese Communist Party rule, maintenance of social stability,
sustained economic and technological growth, and protection of China’s national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The frontlines
of these existing interests, however, are expanding beyond East Asia
and to extended arenas of national security. These include maintaining energy security, protecting its expanding overseas investments and
the millions of expatriate Chinese workers in unstable environments
abroad, asserting and protecting its expanding maritime security interests, advancing and protecting its communications security and military
security interests in the space and cyber realms, and helping to secure a
stable global environment conducive to the country’s sustained development. China’s expanding interests inevitably define many arenas in
which the United States and China share overlapping but not necessarily identical interests. While these overlaps make the U.S.-China
relationship increasingly complex and challenging, they also widen the
range of issues on which the two countries actively cooperate.
Another challenge that the United States faces in dealing with China
is deficiencies of China’s bureaucracy in implementing agreements.
With China’s prominent and extensive presence economically and
politically in the world, it needs China’s public support to address key
international problems. However, even if leading authorities in Beijing
nominally support certain international norms and agreements, China’s
capabilities to enforce, implement, or oversee its commitments often
may be inadequate. Tanner points out that Chinese local officials and
state companies often “control more than enough resources to undermine some international problem-solving efforts.” China’s international
partners, including the United States, must work with Beijing to urge
it to develop and strengthen its governance institutions and policyimplementing capacities, and get China to demonstrate sustained

Introduction 3

resolve in actively supporting and enforcing a wide array of international solutions.
The third challenge is so-called strategic trust between the United
States and China. For many years, the Chinese have often told their
U.S. partners that our two great powers need to overcome strategic mistrust or build strategic trust. However, according to Tanner, this call has
typically “been accompanied by lists of actions that the United States
should take that demonstrate respect for China’s core national security
interests.” These actions relate to reevaluating the U.S.-Asian alliance
structure, ending U.S. reconnaissance flights near China’s territory,
decreasing U.S. support to allies and partners locked in tensions with,
or lifting restrictions on U.S. technology sales to, China.
The fourth challenge relates to China’s role in the South China Sea
and U.S. relations with allies in that region. The United States will have
to strike a balance among three missions: 1) signaling a joint resolve
between the United States and its allies to protect our common interests
in response to Beijing’s assertive behavior; 2) attempting to reassure
Beijing that our continued alliance and partnership with Asian-Pacific
nations are not aimed at undermining or encircling China; and 3) continuing to search for new areas where the United States and its allies can
enhance nontraditional security cooperation with China in the region,
such as counterpiracy, antiterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief.
Finally, Tanner identifies a challenge here at home. To modify a
continual long-term policy toward a rising China, it will require “more
focused U.S. attention to China in our mass media, classrooms, and
elsewhere. Discussions need go beyond an oversimplified debate over
China as partner or China as adversary.” A good understanding of China
and its relationship with the United States by the public is required for
a stable long-term approach to budgetary politics that supports the policies toward China. According to Tanner, U.S. politics at home in turn
has a major impact on our capacity to engage, cooperate with, and compete with China, and work with our allies and partners to promote and
protect our interests in the region.
China’s foreign relations have become more assertive in recent
years, and its domestic politics has undergone drastic changes. The
change in position on foreign affairs is perhaps a result of changes
in China’s domestic politics. Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in
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2012, he has launched a series of political maneuvers to crack down
on corruption, amass his own political power, and suppress freedom
of speech. In addition to the overhaul of the bureaucratic machine, Xi
appears to have a different vision of the economy as well, which relies
more on governments than markets. In Chapter 3, Barry Naughton gives
a timely assessment of the prospects of the Chinese economy under its
newly established leader.
Xi Jinping laid out an ambitious program of reform in the Third Plenum Resolution of November 2013. However, since that time, progress
on economic reform has been slow and uneven. Naughton, relying on
his insightful understanding of the economy, explains why Xi’s model
may fail. His arguments follow three closely related steps. First, the
period of “miracle growth” in China ends; second, Xi Jinping’s policy
agenda generally relies on a strengthening of government and, especially, party intervention in the society and economy; and third, as a
result, Xi’s policy regime is marked by and mired in inconsistent and
sometimes contradictory objectives.
The Chinese economy grew at an average rate of just over 10 percent a year between 1978 and 2010. However, in 2010 the growth rate
fell below 8 percent and in 2016 it was around 6.7 percent. As China
moves into middle-income range it faces fundamental challenges.
“Cheap China” is not cheap any longer. Wages for unskilled workers have risen rapidly, particularly between 2008 and 2013. Producers
of garments, shoes, and sporting goods are beginning to move their
businesses to Vietnam and Bangladesh, where wages are lower than in
China. This change in labor costs strongly correlates with the end of
the miracle growth era in earlier developing economies such as Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan. However, the “one-child policy” has exacerbated
the labor cost increase in China.
Another challenge is the debt overhang that China has built up over
the past seven to eight years. China has been aggressively expanding
bank lending to cope with the global financial crisis and maintain high
rate of growth. For example, the debt accumulated by local government jumped from 17 to 35 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2014.
Naughton says that “while the overall debt level is not yet unsustainable, the trajectory certainly is. China needs to find a way both to slow
the increase in debt and to restructure the portion of debt that will never
be repaid.”
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In the face of such economic challenges, Xi Jinping’s administration adopted an approach that relied more on government intervention than markets. As an economy approached the world technological
frontier, it became less likely that bureaucrats had an advantage over
private actors in predicting technological or sectoral evolution. Both
Japan and Korea had successfully followed this approach. Naughton
writes, “Although China has a very different political and economic
system from Japan and Korea, the general direction in which China
has evolved since 1978 seemed consistent with the earlier evolution of
Korea and Japan. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has stepped
back from many aspects of society, and as China became richer, Chinese society became more diverse and tolerant. However, to a remarkable extent, Xi has sought to reverse this direction. He has consolidated
his own individual power more rapidly than anyone expected, and he
has established his own personal dominance of the political process
more thoroughly than most believed possible.” In particular, he took
over a new “leadership small group” (LSG), which had direct authority
over the economic reform process. This group represented a significant
departure from past Chinese practice, by which economic policy was
run directly out of the State Council by the premier. Xi’s direct control of economic policy meant that the success or failure of economic
reforms in China today would be a reflection on the validity of the “Xi
Jinping model.” Naughton then examines three major reform initiatives
during 2015: restructuring local government debt, opening the stock
market, and reforming state enterprise.
Beginning in 2014, the minister of finance laid out an ambitious
program of local debt restructuring. The plan was to cap debt at the
2014 level and then begin to transform debt into new, local government
“municipal bonds.” However, this initial program of debt restructuring
failed. Buyers and sellers were unable to agree on an interest rate. The
government was forced to withdraw the offer.
Chinese policymakers also laid out an ambitious reform of equity
markets. The Chinese stock markets are highly “political”; that is, stock
prices swing with intended, perceived, or rumored changes in policies.
Anxious to revitalize the markets, some policymakers and government
media zealously promoted a rosy picture of the markets. The entire
political leadership, including Xi Jinping, had been complicit in state-
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ments that directly or indirectly encouraged the stock market bubble. As
a result, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Index soared in June and then
crashed in July, leaving China’s leaders anxious. After the plummet,
Premier Li Keqiang presided over a series of meetings designed to bail
out the stock market. The China Securities Finance Corporation was
provided with unlimited liquidity to buy up “red chip” stocks. After the
bailout, new listings were once again suspended. Interest by overseas
investors quickly evaporated. Not only was the market still in a bear
mode, but the added risk of unpredictable government policy was too
great for most foreign investors to take.
Attempts to further reform state-owned enterprises (SOEs) did not
fare well either. The Resolution of the Third Plenum (November 2013)
introduced several innovative approaches, such as an expanded role for
“mixed ownership,” new investment funds that would manage government wealth, and a role for employee share owning. The efforts to turn
these ideas into reality quickly froze. Then, as Naughton explains, “in
the summer of 2014, the Reform LSG made several decisions that thoroughly upended the stalled SOE reform process. Most strikingly, the
LSG approved a limitation on the salaries of SOE managers, which
was designed to bring SOE managers’ salaries in line with those of
bureaucrats at a similar level. The abrupt adoption of these salary caps
underlined the extent to which Xi Jinping was seeking to achieve mixed
objectives in his approach to state-owned enterprises.” Another case of
confusion of policies and setback of SOE reforms was a decision to set
up a new specialized “SOE Reform LSG,” which gave the economic
bureaucracy more control over SOEs.
Naughton summarizes that by the end of 2015, all three of these
reform initiatives of the Plenum had failed. He further points out that
“there may be a deeper contradiction between the requirements of this
stage of economic reform and the exercise of authority by a single
individual. An authoritative leader may be helpful in the first stage of
reform, adapting to crises and throwing off old constraints. However, at
a certain point, market-oriented reforms require that leader to step back
and allow market forces to work without constraint.” China today has
developed into a satisfactorily functioning market economy. It needs at
this stage independent regulatory and financial institutions, which have
not been a prominent part of the Xi Jinping reform package. The year
2015 thus “provides little support for the idea that an authoritative Xi
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Jinping leadership can contribute effectively to the economic reform
process.”
In Chapter 4, Wing Thye Woo notes that China has been experiencing or may encounter in the near future three classes of failures that
will interrupt the miraculous growth that China has achieved in the past
30 years: 1) a hardware failure from the breakdown of an economic
mechanism, 2) a software failure from flaws in governance that create frequent widespread social disorders, and 3) a power supply failure
from hitting either a natural or an externally imposed limit. He then
elaborates and illustrates these failures by citing important cases and
factors.
Of the hardware failure, Woo stresses state banks’ solvency and the
central government’s fiscal health. The state-owned banks (SOBs) had
in the past accumulated enormous bad debts to the point of insolvency.
The central government previously had rescued the banks by injecting
new capital. If the state is perceived to be able and willing to bail out
the SOBs, depositors would retain their confidence in the banks regardless of the actual state of their balance sheets. The important question
is, how many more rounds of bank recapitalization can China afford
without generating a fiscal crisis? Woo claims that the government can
hardly afford to recapitalize the SOBs without upsetting confidence in
the financial markets about the soundness of China’s fiscal regime. The
task then is to stop losses in the SOBs in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. The solution lies in imposing a hard budget constraint on the
SOBs.
Woo suggests that the operations of SOBs could be improved by
bringing in foreign strategic investors who would be part of the management team, and by removing the influence of the local governments
on bank operations. He writes, “Another way to harden the budget constraint faced by the SOBs is to privatize some of their branches and use
the performance of the new private banks to gauge the performance of
the remaining SOBs. The privatization of some branches will also help
convince the SOB managers that the government is indeed determined
not to recapitalize SOBs in the future.”
Citing two cases, Woo deems government corruption and dereliction as major factors of software failures. In one, the former director of
China’s Food and Drug Safety Agency took bribes from pharmaceutical
and food companies in exchange for approvals of drugs and produc-
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tion licenses. The market was flooded with counterfeit products and
tainted and substandard food and drugs, and tens of thousands of people
were sickened or killed every year as a result. The other case pertains
to government failure to protect workers. Child labor and slaves were
not uncommon in rural and remote regions, especially in the mining
businesses.
For power supply failures, Woo’s main concerns are trade conflicts
and environmental disasters. China’s chronic and growing overall trade
surplus reveals a serious problem in China’s economy—its dysfunctional financial system. The banking system favors SOEs to the extent
that the returns of investment have been extremely low and eventually created huge excess capacity. High ratios of nonperform loans in
the state banks and excess capacity have triggered a slowdown in bank
loans. This cutback has created an excess of savings because the SOBdominated financial sector does not rechannel the released savings to
finance the investment of the private sector. Woo suggests that the optimum solution to the problem of excess saving is not for the government
to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit, but to establish an improved
mechanism for coordinating private savings and private investments.
While the nonstate sector has risen tremendously in China throughout the reform process, the state-owned and state-controlled enterprises
have remained an important aspect of the Chinese economy. In fact,
despite three decades of aggressive enterprise reforms involving privatization of some state firms and retaining/restructuring of others, the
remaining state enterprises continue to dominate some major sectors of
the Chinese economy and have also emerged as global titans. In Chapter 5, Mary E. Lovely and Yang Liang address the issue of state enterprise reform that Naughton touches on in Chapter 3. They examine the
characteristics of firms that were retained by the Chinese state and those
that were released to the private sector between 1998 and 2006. Their
empirical analysis is conducted using microdata from China’s National
Bureau of Statistics, specifically, China’s Annual Survey of Industrial
Production.
Lovely and Liang begin their analysis by tracking the evolution
of enterprises away from China’s state sector over time. They first
describe the inherent difficulties encountered by researchers to identify
the state-owned and state-controlled firms. The difficulties stem from
various definitions of state control, limited data, and opaque owner-
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ship arrangements. They then explain their approach to defining a firm
as state owned and state controlled when it is registered as an SOE,
when the share of registered capital held directly by the state exceeds
or equals 50 percent, or when the state is reported as the controlling
shareholder. Using this classification, they contribute to the literature
by providing new estimates of the size of the state sector. Specifically,
they find that about 5 percent of total enterprises were state owned and
controlled in 2006, and that these enterprises supply more than 30 percent of industrial output.
Lovely and Liang’s major contribution to the literature, which also
constitutes the main part of this chapter, is the insight gained from their
econometric analysis examining the characteristics of those enterprises
chosen by the state to be released and which it chose to grasp. Based on
the various perspectives in the literature on how the state chose which
assets to grasp and which to release to private owners, they formed
hypotheses about the relationship between initial firm characteristics
and the likelihood that they remained state controlled. They test these
hypotheses using a linear probability model for two time periods, 1998–
2002 and 2002–2006. Their main findings are that in both periods, firms
that were larger and more viable financially, but had lower revenues
relative to assets, were more likely to be retained by the state. Firms
with low labor productivity, an indication of legacy burdens, were also
more likely to be retained. Additionally, after 2002, firms affiliated with
higher levels of governments were much less likely to be privatized.
After presenting their regression results, Lovely and Liang review
recent assessments made by several groups of researchers on the performance and productivity gaps between the state and nonstate sectors.
They summarize the findings of recent analyses of the success of the
restructured state enterprises in reducing factor misallocations and,
hence, in contributing to productivity growth. Considering their estimates, the lower productivity of state-controlled firms appears to be
a natural consequence of how enterprises were grasped and released.
Therefore, it is not surprising that average state sector productivity continued to lag behind the private sector, despite innovation in the form
of state control. Finally, they use their analysis of the grasp-or-release
decision to highlight some of the challenges of continued SOE reforms
in the future.
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In Chapter 6, Guanzhong James Wen advocates for a significant
reform in the land tenure system in China. Despite the phenomenal
growth of China’s economy, which is an unprecedented achievement and probably cannot be surpassed by other nations, its income
disparity has become the worst in East Asia. In particular, its urban/
rural income ratio has become one of—if not the—worst in the world.
Unlike the experience of China since 1979, developed economies and
more recently East Asian economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan,
have been able to achieve growth without suffering from substantially
worsening rural/urban disparity. Why can they achieve that? According
to Wen, it is because the farmers in those economies were allowed to
freely trade their land, and freely migrate to and settle in urban areas.
Why can’t China also achieve that? Wen explains that China’s rural
population is constrained by two institutional barriers depriving them to
legally share urban prosperity and to accumulate wealth on equal footing: the hukou system and the land tenure system. China’s hukou system has made urbanization almost exclusively inaccessible to the rural
population, turning urbanization into urbanizing mainly land instead of
rural population. The hukou (family registration) system was officially
promulgated in 1958 by the Chinese government to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals were broadly
categorized as a rural or urban worker. A worker seeking to move from
the country to urban areas to take up nonagricultural work would have
to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers
allowed to make such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers
still need to obtain several passes to work in provinces other than their
own. People who work outside their authorized domain or geographical
area do not qualify for employer-provided housing, health care, or other
urban amenities. Even their children are not eligible to attend municipal
schools where their parents are working since they don’t have urban
hukou. As a result, there are an estimated 60 million children left behind
in rural areas, separated from their parents working in urban areas. The
poor educational condition in rural areas dictates that most of them will
have limited human capital and will acquire low social mobility and
low income in the future. This vicious cycle dampens the prospect for
China to improve its urban-rural income distribution, even though the
central government is now moving to gradually dismantle the hukou
system. Big cities are given some autonomy to decide on their own
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hukou policy, and the towns and small cities are also urged to open up to
rural migration. Only time will tell how effective and how soon China
can ultimately eliminate control over free migration and free settlement.
According to Wen, the prevailing land tenure system is an even
bigger barrier than the hukou system, as it provides “local governments either a legal basis or an excuse to take rural land for urban
development. Under this system the government becomes a monopsony in buying farmers’ land and a monopoly in auctioning off the
leaseholds to developers.” The land price is thus seriously distorted,
either inflated or suppressed. Wen articulates the impossibility of
developing a true land market under the current constitution, particularly Article 10, which stipulates that land in the cities is owned by the
state and land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives.
Rural collectives are not allowed to trade land among themselves, let
alone the individual farmers. Even if a collective is inefficient or corrupt, or its leaders are abusive, members cannot exit with their share
of land to regroup a new collective on a truly voluntary basis. Wen
points out that in the absence of a truly functioning land market, inefficiencies and distortions abound, manifested by the contrasts of “on
one side, ghost towns, idling apartment buildings, and deserted industrial parks are emerging everywhere, especially in China’s vast inland,
but in its coastal areas, housing prices are skyrocketing; on the other
side, most of the 2.6 hundred million migrant workers are living in shelters, slums, ghettos, or urban villages, which are being bulldozed by
the local governments, aggravating the shortage of affordable housing.”
Wen concludes his chapter with a proposal of how to reform the
land tenure system in China. The key, he says, is that farmers should be
given the exit rights from the compulsory collective land ownership and
that land trading should be legalized as long as the land use (zoning) is
not changed. Wen also advocates that China should abolish its Hukou
system as soon as possible. He expects that with these two reforms
implemented, China can accelerate the absorption of rural surplus labor
and significantly improve its urban-rural income disparity.
In Chapter 7, Xiaodong Zhu provides convincing evidence of the
benefits of reducing restrictions on movements of goods and people
in an economy, using China’s experience between 2000 and 2005 as a
case study. This chapter corroborates with Chapter 6, as Zhu’s findings
provide quantitative endorsement of Wen’s proposal to lift restrictions
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and facilitate rural to urban migration by granting farmers exit rights
from compulsory collective land ownership and dismantling the Hukou
system.
Zhu begins by discussing the state of the Chinese economy in
year 2000 and then motivates the study by describing some important
changes that happened between 2000 and 2005, particularly those that
reduced migration and trade costs. Next, Zhu reports findings from a
previous working paper (Tombe and Zhu 2015) on the extent of migration and trade cost reductions. Specifically, Tombe and Zhu find that
overall, migration costs declined to 84 percent of their initial level, and
that costs to switch provinces fell the most, from 32.6 to 19.8 percent.
They find that trade costs within China declined by 11 percent, and trade
costs between China and the world on average declined by 8 percent.
Also, China’s costs of importing from the rest of the world declined
more than China’s costs of exporting to the rest of the world.
Zhu then reports the quantitative impacts of these changes in migration and trade costs on aggregate productivity and welfare. Specifically,
because of lower internal trade costs, aggregate welfare increased significantly, by nearly 11 percent, whereas external trade cost reductions
resulted in a smaller gain of only 3.1 percent. Further, the reductions
of migration costs (mostly due to relaxation of the stringent Hukou
system restrictions) increased the number of interprovincial migrants
by more than 80 percent. Increased migration flows were also beneficial for China as a whole; real GDP and welfare rose by 4.8 percent
and 8.5 percent, respectively. Lastly, Zhu highlights the results from
their growth decomposition exercise that decomposed China’s overall
growth between 2000 and 2005 into four components: 1) productivity
growth, 2) lower internal trade costs, 3) lower international trade costs,
and 4) lower internal migration costs. Overall, reductions in trade and
migration frictions together accounted for about one-third of China’s
aggregate growth. Specifically, reductions in internal and migration
costs contributed roughly one quarter of growth, whereas international
trade cost reductions accounted for only 7 percent of the overall growth.
This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that the main reason
for China’s rapid growth is external trade liberalization associated
with China’s entry in the WTO. Tombe and Zhu’s (2015) study shows
that, at least for the period from 2000 to 2005, internal policy reforms
undertaken by the Chinese government that lowered internal trade and
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migration costs contributed more to China’s growth than external trade
cost reductions (27 percent versus 7 percent). Thus, Professor Zhu concludes that if China continues to pursue reforms to dismantle the Hukou
system and further internal liberalizations, we can expect increases in
China’s aggregate GDP and welfare to continue in the future.
China has been rising rapidly since the late 1970s, when it launched
market-oriented reforms and opened gradually to the world economy.
Thirty years later, in 2010, China surpassed Japan in GDP and became
the second-largest economy of the world. The attainment of this status was regarded as a milestone of the reform movement; it has since
been referred to as the reforms of 30 years. The editors of this volume published a collection in 2012, titled Dragon versus Eagle: The
Chinese Economy and U.S.-China Relations (Huang and Zhou 2012),
which summarizes and evaluates the achievements and problems of
the 30 years. Now the reform is quickly nearing its 40 years. Can we
call it a reform of 40 years, implying that it follows the same direction and spirit of the previous 30 years? The term has not appeared
yet, perhaps for a good reason. Recent policies and measures appear
to have deviated from the previous path, especially since 2013, when
Xi Jinping assumed leadership. In the name of anticorruption, Xi has
not only concentrated power in his own hand within the Party but also
tightened control over society by cracking down on freedom of speech.
The leadership has shown distrust toward the private economy and
markets. Private enterprises are required to set up Party branches, and
financial markets asked to “place politics ahead of profits.” Now that
the twice-a-decade Party Congress has ended and Xi Jinping further
consolidated his power, the economic and political changes that were
cultivated in the past five years will take a more definite direction and
shape. The Party documents declared it was a beginning of a new era.
While the Chinese populace at large acclimates and becomes desensitized to the rhetoric, scholars, policymakers, and businessmen, in China
and abroad, are anxiously watching what these changes will lead to
and how they may impact the Chinese economy. The China experts in
this collection have touched on some of the concerns and shared their
insights on possible consequences. We believe that this volume will
provide a backdrop for anticipating and understanding developments
and changes in China in the near future.
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2
The United States and
the China Challenge
Murray Scot Tanner
CNA Corporation

It is hard to dispute the judgment of Princeton scholar and former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Tom Christensen that “China’s
return to great power status is perhaps the most important challenge
in twenty-first century American diplomacy” (Christensen 2015, p. 1).
Because of China’s decades of rapid economic growth, and its investment of that growth in expanding its diplomatic and military power,
there are now very few issues in U.S. diplomacy in which China does
not play a major role. During meetings between Chinese Communist
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Obama, notably their
2015 Washington Summit and their 2016 meeting during the Nuclear
Security Summit, the two leaders have wrestled with important issues
of cooperation—such as climate change and responding to North
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile tests—while confronting equally
important issues of competition and confrontation—such as territorial
disputes in the South China Sea and threats to cyber security (Tanner
2016).
This chapter explores five underlying factors in the U.S.-China relationship that pose particularly strong challenges for the United States:
1) China’s rapidly expanding national interests and its increasing
power to assert and protect them,
2) China’s governance problems and their challenge to cooperation,
3) China’s thinking about security and the challenge of building
U.S.-Chinese “strategic trust,”
4) the challenge of mobilizing U.S. allies and partners, and
5) the challenge at home.

15

16 Tanner

CHINA’S RAPIDLY EXPANDING NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND BEIJING’S POWER TO ASSERT THEM
Driving the emergence of many new or deepening challenges in
U.S.-China relations has been China’s expanding national security
interests—both within its region and globally—and Beijing’s growing capacity to assert or protect them. China’s emerging interests result
mainly from its three decades of sustained economic growth and expanding economic, diplomatic, and military power. China’s leadership, at
its core, remains committed to an established set of long-standing, key
security interests—most notably protecting Chinese Communist Party
rule, maintaining social stability, sustaining economic and technological growth, and protecting China’s national unity, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity. But the front lines of these existing interests are
expanding beyond East Asia, and China has increasingly demonstrated
its growing concern over at least six emerging arenas of national security interest (Tanner and Mackenzie 2015):
1) Maintaining energy security, especially access to petroleum
and natural gas through the Indian Ocean region and Russia
and Central Asia.
2) Protecting China’s expanding overseas investments and the
millions of expatriate Chinese workers in unstable environments abroad.
3) Asserting and protecting China’s expanding maritime security
interests—its territorial and resource claims in the South China
Sea and East China Sea, and its access to trade, investments,
and resources in “distant seas” regions via strategic lines of
communication, such as Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Horn
of Africa, and increasingly the Arctic.
4) Protecting China’s increasing economic, security, and domestic stability concerns along its west-southwest borderland
regions, which are predominantly populated with ethnic and
religious minority groups. These interests include China’s concerns over long-running waves of Uyghur and Tibetan social
discontent, but also China’s strategic relations with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia, and China’s ongo-
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ing plan to establish a new “Silk Road” of trade and investment ties.
5) Advancing and protecting its communications security and
military security interests in the space and cyber realms.
6) Helping to secure a stable global environment conducive to
China’s sustained development.
For the past decade, China has been engaged in a major internal
discussion of how it conceives and prioritizes these interests, including debates over which interests the country can now afford to assert
and protect, something it has never been able to promote in the past.
Related are discussions of how to develop and employ new strategies,
tactics, and resources to assert and protect these interests—including
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, administrative, cyber/informational, intelligence, and military resources. As one part of this, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrinal writers have been hard at work
with China’s leaders establishing what the role of the military should
be, and how and in what ways the PLA should extend its previous missions of deterrence, border defense, and internal security to assert and
protect China’s emerging interests abroad.
Many of the most sensitive issues that have taken center stage in
recent U.S.-China summits, bilateral dialogues, and multilateral meetings have been driven not only by enduring Chinese security interests
but also by China’s desire to assert and protect these emerging security
interests. These include
• reported Chinese cyber espionage cases, most prominently, the
reported massive theft of data from the Office of Personnel Management records;
• China’s increasing use since 2009 of maritime law enforcement,
administrative, military, land reclamation, investment, and other
means to assert its still not well-defined sovereignty and resource
claims in the disputed areas of the South China Sea;
• the increasingly difficult environment for U.S. businesses in
China, especially the legal pressure on foreign high-tech firms to
permit government access to proprietary technology and client
records; and
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• human rights issues, including widespread detentions of human
rights attorneys and the arrests of Chinese Uyghurs as part of a
crackdown on ethnic separatism, extremism, and social violence.
China’s expanding interests also define a large and growing number of arenas in which the United States and China share overlapping
but not necessarily identical interests that also make the relationship’s
challenges increasingly complex. The range of issues on which the two
countries actively cooperate continues to widen along with China’s
global presence. In the past several years, as part of the countries’ signature cooperative dialogue—the Strategic and Economic Dialogue—the
U.S. State Department has released a list of more than 100 dialogues
and other joint projects or endeavors in which China and the United
States consult and cooperate. The list truly runs the full range of security, environmental, trade, financial, homeland security, and other areas,
and involves engagement across nearly every consequential government agency in both countries. Two noteworthy firsts from 2015 illustrate this trend:
1) The PLA Navy, at the invitation of the U.S. Pacific Command,
for the first time took part in the world’s largest biennial naval
exercise, the Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC), along
with the United States, Japan, India, and many other countries.
2) Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson became the first
Department of Homeland Security secretary to visit China,
where he met with Chinese representatives and spoke at the
Chinese People’s Public Security University, China’s leading
police staff college.

CHINA’S GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS AND THE
CHALLENGE TO COOPERATION
Another complex challenge for the U.S.-China relationship is that
China’s economic and political linkages around the world are so expansive that, for many global issues, it is not sufficient just to have China’s
public support to address key international problems. Increasingly, China’s international partners, including the United States, must also work
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with Beijing to urge it to develop and strengthen its governance institutions and policy-implementing capacities, and get China to demonstrate
sustained resolve in actively supporting and enforcing a wide array of
international solutions.
U.S. officials who deal with China find that all too often, even if
leading authorities in Beijing nominally support certain international
norms, agreements, or arrangements, China’s capabilities to enforce,
implement, or oversee its commitments may be inadequate. These governance and implementation problems may be sufficient to hold back
or undercut international security or enforcement arrangements or other
agreements. Notwithstanding the acquiescence of national authorities
in Beijing, Chinese local officials, state companies, or Chinese market trends often control more than enough resources or capabilities to
undermine some international problem-solving efforts, as long as Beijing does not, or cannot, actively and effectively enforce its international
commitments. This is a challenge with respect to a wide range of issues
in U.S.-Chinese cooperation and can occur through many channels.
For example, Chinese corporate actors knowingly—or even unconsciously—may sell technology and components to troublesome international actors in disregard of international efforts to cut off these
flows. In 2015, the United States and China resumed their dialogue on
counterterrorism. One of the central U.S. concerns was urging China to
study and pursue international best practices in controlling the precursor chemicals, materials, and technologies for manufacturing improvised explosive devices, in part to prevent the possibility that China’s
vast computer and chemical industries might become conduits for these
items finding their way to extremist groups in countries on or near
China’s borders. Despite strict on-paper regulations for the handling
of dangerous chemicals, Chinese authorities do not believe that these
regulations are often enforced adequately—a fact that was horrifically
underscored by the tremendous chemical warehouse explosion that
took place in the port of Tianjin on August 12, 2015, claiming at least
173 lives. Chinese local officials, moreover, often have far less powerful incentives to enforce regulations on goods that merely exit, or transit
through, their areas of jurisdiction.
In another example, Chinese state companies have the financial
capacity to undermine international sanctions regimes through their
continued purchase of a target country’s exports. In 2015, for example,
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a critical step in enforcing the economic sanctions against Iran and its
nuclear program was persuading China and its state petroleum companies to temporarily cut their purchases of petroleum from Tehran. Lurking behind the recent U.S. debate over whether to support the nuclear
weapons deal with Iran is the issue of whether China (as well as Russia, India, and other major economic actors) would actively support
renewed economic sanctions in the event that U.S. officials called for
resuming negotiations with Iran.
The United States and other Chinese partners continue to work with
China to “foster the growth of the ineffectual Chinese inspection safety
bureaucracies” regarding food, consumer products, pharmaceuticals,
and many other products exported from China (Christensen 2015, p. 1).
The United States lacks the capacity to inspect all incoming products
from China, which raises the importance of building Chinese bureaucracies that can strengthen inspections at the factory.
The United States and China’s other economic partners also have a
stake in China developing more secure, transparent, and stable financial
markets. In this respect, a disturbing aspect of China’s summer 2015
stock market collapse was Chinese authorities’ reported use of police
investigations, threats, harassment of traders, and attacks against journalists for “rumor mongering” to quell the market downturn.
Active Chinese central government support for, and creation of, better intellectual property institutions in China are essential for protecting
not only U.S. patent holders but also Chinese inventors and innovators.
And while these issues are some of the oldest and most enduring U.S.
institutional interests in governance reform, they have been pushed into
the background by mounting reports of systematic theft of U.S. foreign
corporate intellectual property by state organizations, including Internet
theft.
Finally, China’s passage in 2016 of a law regarding the management of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is also likely
to undermine some of the most important private institutional means
for actors from the United States and China’s other partners to promote improved governance in China on environmental and many other
issues. In 2015, U.S. officials on multiple occasions had called for Chinese officials not to adopt tough new regulations that would harm the
ability of U.S. and other foreign NGOs to promote better governance
and social services in China.
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THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING U.S.-CHINESE
“STRATEGIC TRUST”
For many years, Chinese interlocutors—when asked how best to
strengthen the U.S.-China relationship—have often told their U.S. partners that the two great powers need to “overcome strategic mistrust” or
“build strategic trust.” Typically, this call for developing strategic trust
has been accompanied by lists of actions that the United States should
take that demonstrate respect for China’s core national security interests. These proposed actions often relate to rethinking the U.S.-Asian
alliance structure, ending U.S. reconnaissance flights near China’s territory, decreasing U.S. support to allies and partners locked in tensions
with China (recently, in the South China Sea), or lifting restrictions on
U.S. technology sales to China.
Notwithstanding these calls for U.S. actions to promote “strategic
trust,” Chinese officials and analysts, in their writings and interactions
with U.S. experts, often mix together at least three schools of thought
about the United States’ strategic motivations for U.S. actions in the
region. These philosophies suggest to this author that many in China’s
elite will likely struggle to embrace a sense of strategic trust toward the
United States, even if it were to make a number of the requested concessions to Chinese interests.
The first school of thought draws on China’s sense of historical
grievance about its mistreatment by Western powers, including the
United States, during its century of semicolonial humiliation.
The second comes from realist or neorealist thinking about international relations theory—a very strong version of “power transition theory,” which assumes that established powers such as the United States
will be strongly committed to preventing the emergence of rising powers. Some Chinese analysts appear to see this forecast of power transition theory not merely as a theoretical cautionary tale, but as an inevitable historical-empirical fact that has a major impact on U.S. thinking
and strategy toward China. Many appear quick to interpret a wide array
of U.S. activities—from the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the U.S. rebalance to Asia, to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and
human rights advocacy—as being about China, and as tools in a U.S.
effort to contain China in a network of adversaries. These assumptions
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about transitional tensions are certainly a motive for one of Xi Jinping’s
signature policy initiatives—U.S. approval of what China calls a “new
type of great power relationship” between the two countries.
The third school of thought reflects some enduring aspects of
Leninist thinking: these include a strong faith that the Chinese Communist Party as an organization is uniquely qualified to strengthen
China and its governance and achieve the “China dream.” A concern
remains that the United States and the world’s liberal democratic powers are not merely aspiring to keep China strategically contained as a
power—they ultimately aspire to weaken China by bringing down its
party-state system, and return China to its self-perceived “sheet of loose
sand” weakness of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, this thinking has been discernible in China’s reaction to waves
of uprisings against authoritarian governments in many other regions of
the world—most notably during the 1989–1992 collapse of European
Leninism, during the Eurasian “colour revolutions” of 2000–2005, during the Arab Spring uprisings since 2011, and also in U.S. policy toward
authoritarianism in countries such as Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.
The Arab Spring in particular caused a surprisingly strong “flinch”
among Chinese Communist Party leaders, who were concerned that
social media could further heighten unrest in China, and who responded
with a strong assertion of “social management” systems.
These three schools of thought raise questions about whether the
challenges of building strategic trust with China are going to be significantly more different and difficult than might be the case with other
emerging powers—powers whose visions of international relations
are more narrowly entrenched with traditional realist competitions
over greater and lesser international power, and less so with their own
individual historical-cultural concerns or global competitions between
regime types.
Beyond its potential impact on strategic trust, this third Leninist
turn of thought among Chinese leaders and analysts also appears likely
to raise challenges to smooth future U.S.-China relations in another
area. This concerns the rise over the past 10–15 years of China’s efforts
to protect the stability of the Chinese Communist system not only on
Chinese soil but also increasingly on the sovereign soil of other countries, including the United States. There have been several reported
manifestations of this trend: 1) Beijing’s insistence that other countries
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repatriate, extradite, or deport Chinese citizens or noncitizens facing
politically tinged charges such as corruption, as well as ethnic and religious minorities fleeing China; 2) China’s pressure on other countries
not to meet with Uyghur or Tibetan rights activists (including of course
the Dalai Lama); and 3) China’s apparent increase in the past 15 years
of political security investigations abroad by public security and state
security officers, such as investigation and research outside the border,
or “Operation Foxhunt.”

THE TASK OF MOBILIZING U.S. ALLIES AND PARTNERS
A colleague of mine identifies two opposite approaches to U.S.
policy toward China and its position in Asia: 1) to get policy toward
Asia right, you first need to get policy toward China right, and 2) to get
policy toward China right, you first need to get policy toward Asia right.
Mobilizing U.S. relationships with regional allies and strengthening
relations with emerging regional partners are the most important challenges facing the United States in its dealings with China—especially
allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, nonally partner Taiwan, and partnerships such as India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Recent Chinese behavior in the South
China Sea—notably its land reclamation efforts, oil exploration, and
maritime law enforcement operations inside and beyond the Nine-Dash
Line—have all created great new opportunities to enhance cooperation
with many of these allies and partners in responding to assertive or
aggressive Chinese behavior. But managing tensions in the relations
between allies or partners remains a challenge—for example, bilateral
tensions between Tokyo and Seoul over territorial disagreements and
historical issues relating to World War II and Japanese occupation.
Being strategic and selective in the management of these partner relations remains a challenge for U.S. policy. U.S relations with Japan, for
example, involves continuing to reaffirm U.S. treaty commitments to
Tokyo, lauding Japan’s positive role as a force for peace, development,
and security in the region since WWII, and supporting its potential for
expanded security cooperation under the Abe administration policies.
But U.S. officials have also judged that effective management of its ties
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with Japan as part of the United States’ East Asia strategy has at times
required distancing itself from, for example, some Japanese leaders’
views of Japan’s WWII conduct, which are still major sources of tension in relations with China, South Korea, and other Asian countries.
The United States will also have to continue to strike a balance
between signaling a joint resolve among the United States and its allies
and partners to protect common interests in response to Beijing’s assertive behavior, attempting to reassure Beijing that the continued alliances
and partnerships are not aimed at undermining or encircling China,
and continuing to search for new areas where the United States and its
allies can enhance nontraditional security cooperation with China in the
region on issues such as counterpiracy, antiterrorism, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.

THE CHALLENGE AT HOME
Finally, when considering U.S. policies toward China and East Asia,
it is necessary not only to “get China right” and “get Asia right” but also
to get right several major policy issues here in the United States. A solid
long-term policy toward a rising China will also require more focused
U.S. attention to China in mass media, classrooms, and elsewhere—
discussion that goes beyond an oversimplified debate over “China as
partner/China as adversary.” U.S. policy has long noted explicitly that
the China-U.S. relationship will inevitably combine cooperation and
competition. How the United States pursues politics at home has a
major impact on its capacity to engage, cooperate with, and compete
with China, and to work with its allies and partners to promote and protect regional interests. As one important example, the long-term modernization and development of U.S. Navy capabilities, which are critical to securing U.S. and allied interests in the region, require a stable,
long-term approach to budgetary politics. Chinese analysts make note
of tensions and obstruction in U.S. governance, and there is evidence
to indicate that they interpret it as an important indicator of future U.S.
capacity and commitment as a power in the Asia-Pacific.
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Note
This chapter is based on remarks made at the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series
at Western Michigan University, September 23, 2015. As with the original talk, the
views in this chapter are entirely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the
CNA Corporation, its corporate officers, or its sponsors. The author is deeply grateful to the WMU Economics Department and the Light Center for Chinese Studies for
sponsoring this work.
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Is There a Xi Jinping
Model of Economic Reform?
Barry Naughton
University of California, San Diego

Since becoming president of the People’s Republic of China in 2012,
Xi Jinping has shaken up every aspect of Chinese policy. In the economic
realm, Xi laid out an ambitious program of reform in the Third Plenum
Resolution of November 2013. However, since that time, progress on
economic reform has been slow and uneven. While reform is certainly
not dead, there is real reason to question the consistency and effectiveness of Xi’s economic policies. This analysis is based on three short steps.
First, China is currently undergoing a growth transition. As the period of
“miracle growth” ends, nearly every aspect of policy must adapt to a
new economic environment. Second, contrary to what we would normally expect under such conditions, Xi Jinping’s policy agenda generally
relies on a strengthening of government and, especially, party intervention in the society and economy. This orientation is very different from
what we would expect for a country moving into middle-income status
whose society is far richer and more successful than ever before. Third,
the result is a policy regime marked by inconsistent and sometimes contradictory objectives. Xi has attempted to overwhelm these inconsistencies by developing a centralized policy process that gives him very direct
control over specific policy outcomes. However, it is unlikely that this
approach will succeed in a country as big and complex as China.

THE END OF MIRACLE GROWTH
Between 1978 and 2010, the Chinese economy grew at an average
rate of just over 10 percent a year. However, in 2010 the growth rate
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fell below 8 percent and was 6.7 percent in 2016. This slowdown is not
a short-term, cyclical slowdown but, rather, the reflection of a historical
turning point. China’s miracle growth period was quite similar to that
which was experienced earlier by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. China’s
growth lasted longer, to be sure, perhaps because some processes of
structural change had been delayed during the Cultural Revolution and
ended up contributing to the miracle phase of 1978–2010. We learned
from the forerunner economies that when the end of the miracle growth
era comes, it is often surprisingly abrupt and difficult to manage. This is
the case with China as well.
China’s economic policy was uniquely well adapted to the highgrowth era. Government policy stressed investment, and infrastructure was built out ahead of demand. Since there was a huge reservoir
of underutilized labor in the countryside eager to move into the cities,
building the roads, factories, airports, and railroads at maximum speed
was effective in maintaining high-speed growth. After China entered the
World Trade Organization in 2001 with a network of export-oriented
factories and regions already in place, there was virtually no limit to
the speed with which exports could grow and industrialization could
proceed. China could follow the precedents of earlier developing economies, copying and adapting hard and soft technologies, and reproducing
systems of infrastructure.
Those days are over. As China moves into middle-income range
it is immediately confronted with three fundamental challenges. The
first is the end of “Cheap China.” As the pool of underutilized labor
in the countryside has been drawn down, wages for unskilled workers
have risen rapidly. As Figure 3.1 shows, unskilled wages increased particularly rapidly from 2008 to 2013. Since 2014 and 2015, the pace of
wage growth has slowed but still remains at 7–8 percent. Despite higher
wages, the pace of migration from the countryside has slowed dramatically in recent years. The lower line in Figure 3.1 shows the growth in
migrants working outside their home communities. In 2015, the number
of cross-country migrants increased only 0.4 percent from the previous
year. The increase in wages inevitably means that China’s competitiveness in labor-intensive manufactures is eroding. Producers of garments,
shoes, and sporting goods are beginning to find that cheaper wages in
Vietnam and Bangladesh make it worthwhile moving there, even though
overall productivity is still far below that in China. Most importantly,
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Figure 3.1 Migrant Worker Earnings and Numbers (real annual
growth rates)
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these changes in relative costs will likely only strengthen in the future.
This fundamental change in labor costs is strongly correlated with the
end of the miracle growth era in earlier developing economies such as
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. China, in that sense, is no different.
In one respect, however, China has a distinctive labor force problem. Because of the country’s “one-child policy,” cohorts of young
people entering the labor force today are unusually small. Figure 3.2 is
a 2014 population age pyramid. It shows that the age groups graduating
from high school and college are already much smaller than the age
cohorts just above them, which are the mainstay of the current labor
force. Indeed, the cohorts entering the labor force are slightly smaller
than the age groups retiring from active labor. The second challenge is
thus that since 2010 China’s total labor force has plateaued and actually
shrunk slightly. The really large decline in China’s labor force will not
begin until after 2020, but the process has already begun. It is worth
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Figure 3.2 2014 Population Age Pyramid: Urban and Rural
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emphasizing how different this is from the experience of Japan and
Korea. In those economies, the end of low-cost labor and the decline
in total labor force size were two distinct events separated by decades.
For example, Japan’s first growth slowdown occurred in 1972, but the
Japanese labor force only began to decline in the late 1990s, more than
25 years later. In China, both these changes are occurring at the same
time, which means that the two effects reinforce each other, and the
adaptation is bound to be especially challenging.
The third challenge is the debt overhang that China has built up over
the past 7–8 years. China managed to sustain growth through the global
financial crisis. Moreover, since the crisis, policymakers have attempted to keep the growth rate from falling too abruptly. In both cases, one
of the primary tools they have used has been to aggressively expand
bank lending to keep investment high. For example, one aspect of that
debt overhang has been the debt accumulated by local government
“funding vehicles.” Between 2007 and 2014, that debt jumped from 17
to 35 percent of GDP (Figure 3.3). Debt loads have been increasing in
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Figure 3.3 Local Government Funding Platform Debt—Share of GDP
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other areas of the economy as well. While the overall debt level is not
yet unsustainable, the trajectory certainly is. China needs to find a way
to both slow the increase in debt and restructure the portion of debt that
will never be repaid. In a broader sense, sustaining rapid growth by continuously increasing credit simply cannot work indefinitely. Economic
policy needs to be adapted to be consistent with an economy growing
in the 5–7 percent range.

THE POLICY OBJECTIVES
As described above, the end of China’s miracle growth phase echoes
and recapitulates what happened earlier in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
Policymakers in each of those previous miracle growth economies
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responded in a distinctive fashion, but their responses shared a common feature: they all moved to a lower-investment and a “lighter touch”
pattern of government intervention. For Japan and Korea, the heyday
of government industrial policy occurred before the slowdown, during
the latter half of the miracle growth era. In those countries, industrial
policy arguably sustained high growth rates by making sure that the
economy could move smoothly into large, capital-intensive heavyindustry sectors. Then, as the miracle growth era ended, both Japan
and Korea shifted to a less interventionist industrial policy stance. The
logic was that as these countries approached the world technological
frontier, it was less likely that government bureaucrats would have an
advantage over private actors in foreseeing the next stage of technological or sectoral evolution. Rather than trying to tell businesses how to
invest, bureaucrats in Japan and Korea shifted to provide support for
private businesses in whatever choices they made. Government investment in research and development, for example, remained high but was
increasingly carried out by universities and government research institutes, and it sought to improve society’s general knowledge base. Of
course, this transition also corresponded with a transition to democracy in both Korea and Taiwan, and in general to more permissive and
diverse societies.
Although China has a very different political and economic system
from Japan and Korea, the general direction in which China has evolved
since 1978 seemed consistent with the earlier evolution of Korea and
Japan. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has stepped back from
many aspects of society, and as China became richer, Chinese society
became more diverse and tolerant. However, to a remarkable extent, Xi
Jinping has sought to reverse this direction. This is most evident in the
purely political aspects. Xi Jinping has consolidated his own individual
power more rapidly than anyone expected, and he has established his
own personal dominance of the political process more thoroughly than
most believed possible. The result has been a qualitative change from
what had been called the “collegial enlightened dictatorship” of the
Deng-Jiang-Hu era toward a more personal rule. Moreover, Xi seeks to
infuse the political system with a kind of revivalist spirit and a stronger, top-down discipline. He seeks to project his own charismatic rule
to nearly every corner of the system. We can see this objective in Xi’s
crusade against corruption, in his focus on strong party leadership, and
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in the ongoing ideological crackdown that is affecting many areas of
Chinese society.
In a sense, Xi’s policies can be seen as the opposite of those adopted
in Japan or Korea, but for structurally similar reasons. As Chinese society has become middle income, the urgency of political goals has faded
and materialism and corruption have increased. Rather than acceding to
those changes, Xi seeks to reverse them. He has laid out an ambitious
agenda that includes Chinese nationalism, assertive and charismatic
authoritarian rule, and also economic reform. The question is, do these
elements fit together?
Xi Jinping has consistently positioned himself as the architect of a
significant economic reform program. The Third Plenum, in November
2013, laid out an economic reform agenda that was bold and broad.
Although many parts of the reform resolution were vague—as is normal in top-level China policy documents—a number of concrete commitments were built into the document in order to establish credibility.
Moreover, Xi Jinping himself took over a new “leadership small group”
(LSG) that had direct authority over the economic reform process. The
LSG was an implementation device: the overall reform resolution was
broken down into 336 “initiatives” that were farmed out to specialized subgroups under the LSG. The most important of these subgroups
from an economic standpoint was the “Economic System and Ecological Civilization Specialized Group.” (Paradoxically, it is the only one
not headed by a Politburo member.) This specialized group was given
the responsibility for 118 out of the 336 total initiatives. Headed by
Xi Jinping’s close economic counselor, Liu He, this specialized group
serves as a kind of economic secretariat, charged with implementing
Xi’s policy preferences.
This implementation process is a significant departure from past
Chinese practice. Since the early 1980s it has been standard practice for
economic policy to be run directly out of the governmental State Council by the premier. Successive premiers Zhao Ziyang, Zhu Rongji, and
Wen Jiabao all controlled day-to-day economic decision making and
placed their own personal stamp on economic policy. Under Xi Jinping,
however, most of the crucial economic decisions relating to economic
reform have been pulled back into the specialized group.
These changes mean that Xi Jinping’s personal stamp is inevitably
on the economic reform process. Xi has laid out a set of goals that shape
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and constrain the economic reform process. He has identified his own
personal leadership with economic reform. The policy process has been
changed in important respects that reflect Xi’s wishes. The success or
failure of economic reforms in China today, therefore, depend directly
on whether the “Xi Jinping model” of economic reform is a reality or
an illusion.

2015: THE ANNUS HORRIBILIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM
Reforms came out of the gate quickly after the Third Plenum in
November 2013. There was a great deal of activity during 2014 that
seemed to be focused on moving the reform process ahead in productive ways. However, during 2015, these initiatives met with unexpected
problems. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that in 2015 economic reforms
failed. We can see this in three major reform initiatives:
1) restructuring local government debt,
2) opening the stock market, and
3) state enterprise reform.
Each of these initiatives went off track in 2015. Whether they can be
revived is an open question.
Restructuring Local Government Debt
Beginning in 2014, the Minister of Finance, Lou Jiwei, laid out an
ambitious program of local debt restructuring. Even more impressive, in
Lou’s vision, debt restructuring was merely the first phase of a broader
fiscal system reorganization. After weaning local governments off their
dependence on debt, Lou believed he would be able to create appropriate conditions for an across-the-board overhaul of the fiscal system. In
his original vision, this overhaul would be carried out in three years,
from 2014 to 2016.
Following Lou’s program, overall government debt was audited
and officially registered as of December 2014. The intention was to
cap debt at this year-end level and then begin to transform debt into
new, local government “municipal bonds,” which would be sold into
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the marketplace at an interest rate that reflected the relative creditworthiness of different local governments. This bold vision not only comprised restructuring fiscal relations but also the creation of a new fixedincome market that would contribute to China’s financial reforms as
well. However, this initial program of debt restructuring failed. When
the first batch of bonds created by Jiangsu Province was offered to the
market in April 2015, buyers and sellers were unable to agree on an
interest rate. If this were to be a truly market-based sale of debt, buyers
wanted substantially higher rates as compensation for their risk than the
Jiangsu government was willing to pay. The government was forced to
withdraw the offer.
The program was reformulated and converted essentially into a
bailout. The mechanism was that the banks, which held the existing
debt, were now pressured to buy the new municipal bonds. While a fiction was maintained that the interest rate was to be “mutually agreed,”
banks were led to understand that the appropriate interest rate should
be similar to that of central government bonds—that is, extremely low.
The banks were given some sweeteners to induce their compliance, but
of course these predominantly state-owned banks could not refuse a
central government policy initiative in any case. Under these new circumstances, local debt restructuring proceeded quickly. An initial quota
of 1 trillion RMB was rapidly converted and, over the course of 2015,
slightly more than 3 trillion were sold. Further debt restructuring continued, and even accelerated, and in 2016, an additional 5 trillion RMB
in debt was converted.
Debt restructuring achieved some partial objectives, since it lowered interest rates and reduced the debt servicing burden on local governments. In that sense, it was not a complete failure. However, the
objective of debt restructuring is not simply to reduce financial burdens
but also to place the system on a new, more sustainable basis. A restructuring that is little more than a bailout sends a message to local governments that fiscally reckless behavior will be accepted and, indeed,
may be costless. Of course, the Ministry of Finance has argued that
local governments are no longer allowed to take on any new debt, but
it remains to be seen whether this prohibition is credible. Moreover, the
broader Ministry of Finance program of fiscal restructuring is in shambles. Major new taxes have not been introduced, and the restructuring
of central-local relations is still far over the horizon.
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Stock Market Reform
Beginning in 2014, Chinese policymakers laid out an ambitious
reform of equity markets. Two measures exemplified this reform. First,
all qualified firms were allowed to be listed on the market. This was
a dramatic departure from past procedure in which only a select few
firms, individually approved by the securities regulator, could list on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The old system had unduly favored
state-owned enterprises and led to delays, inefficiency, and corruption.
Moreover, the old system had repeatedly tempted the government to
use the pace of new listings as a tool to manipulate the stock markets’
overall level. When the market was sluggish, policymakers would suspend new listings, so market participants could be confident that there
would be no liquidity shocks. Indeed, new listings had been suspended
for years before 2014. By taking steps to open up the listing process,
the government was committing to a much more market-driven stock
market, even at the risk of allowing short-term downward pressure on
the market. Second, the Chinese stock market was de facto opened up
to international investors for the first time. The creation of the Hong
Kong–Shanghai Capital Connect allowed Hong Kong brokers to buy
and sell shares on the Shanghai market up to a certain relatively generous quota. Since any international financial institution can maintain
a Hong Kong subsidiary, this was a tentative and gradualist, but still
unmistakeable, opening of the Shanghai market to foreign investment.
The impact of these initial reform measures was swept away by a
huge boom and bust in the Chinese stock market. The Chinese market
soared to a peak of 5,166 on June 12, 2015. From there, it wobbled
and then crashed, amid something close to panic, to a low point of
3,507 on July 8. When the market plummeted, China’s leaders lost their
nerve. Beginning on July 5, Premier Li Keqiang presided over a series
of meetings designed to bail out the stock market. An existing organization, the China Securities Finance Corporation, was provided with
unlimited liquidity to buy up blue-chip (or, rather, red-chip) stocks.
Remarkably, despite this massive intervention, the market continued to
drop for another three days before finally stabilizing. With substantial
direct government ownership now complementing already large state
enterprise holdings, the stock market ended up further away than ever
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from genuine marketization. Moreover, public funds had once again
been used to bail out politically influential groups.
From this account, it might seem that Premier Li Keqiang was the
crucial actor in the stock market fiasco, but that is not the case. The
entire political leadership, including Xi Jinping, had been complicit in
statements that directly or indirectly encouraged the stock market bubble. Xi Jinping was widely quoted in Weibo (Chinese Twitter) as having
advocated much higher market valuations. While there is no official
source for these comments, the Chinese government could easily have
denied or deleted them, had it chosen to do so. It is inconceivable that
Xi Jinping did not either instruct Li Keqiang to intervene or at least
signal his support for such intervention. After the bailout, new listings
were once again suspended. The Hong Kong–Shanghai stock connect
was still intact, but interest from overseas investors quickly evaporated.
Not only did the market still seem to be in a bear mode, but the added
risk of unpredictable government policy was too great for most foreign
investors to take. A later episode in January 2016 merely accentuated
these fears. As of mid-2016, government holdings in the stock market were still large, and the overall Shanghai index was languishing at
around 3,000 points, which is to say below what it was after the summer
of 2015 crash. The overhang of government holdings deters new investors from entering the market.
State Enterprise Reform
State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform started strong after the Third
Plenum (November 2013) resolution. It was given high priority in the
resolution, which also generated excitement because it introduced a
number of potential innovative approaches. These included an expanded
role for “mixed ownership,” new investment funds that would manage
government wealth, and a role for employee share owning. However,
the attempt to translate these innovative ideas into reality was quickly
stifled. Disagreements about basic definitions and philosophy prevented progress. Then, in the summer of 2014, the reform LSG made
several decisions that thoroughly upended the stalled (but gradual) SOE
reform process. Most strikingly, the LSG approved a limitation on the
salaries of SOE managers. This policy, designed to bring SOE manag-
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ers’ salaries in line with those of bureaucrats at a similar level, reduced
salaries in listed state-owned enterprises and dramatically lowered the
salaries of managers at Chinese state-owned banks. The abrupt adoption of these salary caps underlined the extent to which Xi Jinping was
seeking to achieve mixed objectives in his approach to SOEs.
Perhaps as a result of this confusion, at the same meeting a new specialized “SOE Reform LSG” was created to hammer out a compromise.
However, this group—whose composition must have been endorsed by
Xi Jinping—was headed by a long-time veteran of the economic bureaucracy, Vice-Premier Ma Kai. Moreover, it was staffed by the head of the
existing agency that controlled SOEs, namely, the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This choice was
unfortunate, to say the least. The whole purpose of SOE reform was to
replace SASAC, which had evolved out of earlier government agencies,
with a mixed mandate of incremental improvements to state firm management. However, if there were to be a substantial improvement in the
way state ownership was exercised, it would almost certainly have to
involve the creation of new kinds of investment funds. By handing the
design of SOE reform over to SASAC leaders, Xi Jinping effectively
ensured that the creation of new investment funds would be controlled
by the insiders in charge of existing institutions. SASAC leaders would
understandably seek to limit change, or at least make sure that any reorganization occurred under their own direct control.
It took one year for the SOE Reform LSG to draft its program.
When that program finally emerged in September 2015, it was marked
by contradictions and compromises and was met with a general sense
of disappointment. Underlying this disappointment was the realization
that SASAC had opted for an extremely gradual process of insidercontrolled change. The 2013 reform resolution had called for the creation of new “State Capital Investment and Operation Companies.”
Much of the previous deadlock had been due to competing conceptions
of what those companies should do. One version of the investment companies, proposed by the Ministry of Finance, held that those companies
should manage state firms as purely financial assets. The investment
funds would seek to maximize the financial returns of their holdings,
potentially by having competing managers evaluated by the return they
generate. This conception evoked comparisons with successful sovereign wealth funds, such as Singapore’s Temasek. The alternative ver-
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sion of the investment companies, proposed by SASAC, stressed their
utility as development agencies. After the SOE reform document was
published, SASAC announced that it would convert two of its existing
companies into “State Capital Investment and Operation Companies.”
These companies were designed to have specific developmental objectives and engage in hands-on restructuring. Thus, from the standpoint
of the firms, the new ownership agencies that emerged from the SOE
reform process were really not much better than the old SASAC control.
It was clear that Xi Jinping’s vision of SOE reform included many
competing objectives. Related to his anticorruption drive, Xi clearly
wanted to improve oversight of SOE management. Paralleling his overall stress on Communist Party leadership, Xi insisted that Communist
Party committees in the enterprise should have first right to discuss
important strategic decisions on the enterprise. Overall, this meant that
Xi Jinping was asking for SOEs to be given new tasks and to be subject
to new oversight, even while telling them they should be given more
autonomy to work as market-oriented entities.
The above account oversimplifies the complex process of SOE
reform. On the positive side, the long, stalled agenda of converting all
SOEs into corporations, with an established board of directors, has been
given new momentum. In addition, firms are to be categorized according to whether they are in a competitive market environment or primarily a public service operation. In addition, many different provinces are
experimenting with accelerating SOE reform. These positive elements
may well improve the conduct and performance of China’s SOEs in the
medium term. But in 2015 it was clear that dramatic progress in SOE
reform had not been achieved, and this was because of the conflicting goals and obligations placed on SOEs by top political leadership
without a dramatic push toward a stronger market orientation. The SOE
reform that emerged from this jumble of objectives is unlikely to be a
real reform at all.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
By the end of 2015, all three of the reform initiatives described
in the previous section had failed. While the government continues
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to give verbal support to the goals of the Third Plenum, it has tacitly
acknowledged the failure of the program by shifting emphasis to a new
reform initiative called “Supply-Side Structural Reform.” First floated
at the end of 2015, this complex new initiative clearly represents a new
approach. Policymakers have shown some inclination to resume progress in equity and fiscal system reform, and 2016 was designated as the
first year of implementation of SOE reform (taking the September 2015
document as the definitive elaboration of the program). However, as of
2016, progress in these areas has been extremely modest.
What can we conclude from this situation? First, there is a Xi Jinping model—a model of economic reform that follows from his commitment to top-down, personalized rule. Xi declares a bold set of objectives, but they are not in the form of a broad, philosophical commitment
to a new type of system; rather, they represent a wish list of objectives
Xi would like to achieve from the existing system. In order to achieve
those objectives, Xi sets up a new top-down implementation process.
At the beginning of the Xi administration, a number of analysts
suggested that Xi Jinping’s efforts to concentrate political power on
its own hands were a necessary prelude to dramatic economic reforms.
According to this view, entrenched interest groups had made incremental reform increasingly difficult in China. Therefore, an authoritative policymaker would need to concentrate power first and then push
through with reforms. The experience of 2015 indicates that this view
has very little explanatory power. On the contrary, concentration of
power in the hands of just a few may even retard the reform process.
Xi’s personalized style leads him to impose contradictory demands on
the reform process. This in turn leads to sometimes abrupt about-faces
in the tasks set for other policymakers, which is exemplified in each of
the reform areas discussed in this chapter. Xi’s sudden moves to cap
SOE salaries, abandon high-quality municipal bond markets, and intervene to save the stock market all had dire implications for the overall
reform process.
The new organs Xi set up to implement these policies have also not
worked well. These new agencies do not themselves have direct implementation capabilities—they can talk about bold reforms, but when it
comes to actually designing a reform process, they end up falling back
on the same government agencies that cater to interest groups. This
is shown by the fate of SOE reform in 2015–2016. There really is no
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benefit to concentrating power if that newly concentrated power needs
to compromise with existing interest groups to achieve institutional
change.
Finally, there may be a deeper contradiction between the requirements of this stage of economic reform and the exercise of authority by
a single individual. To be sure, an authoritative leader may be helpful
in the first stage of reform, adapting to crises and throwing off old constraints. However, at a certain point, market-oriented reforms require
the authoritative leader to step back and allow market forces to work
without constraint. China today has developed a vigorous market economy—the greatest need at this stage is for independent regulatory and
financial institutions, which have not been a prominent part of the Xi
Jinping reform package. Therefore, the year 2015 provided little support for the idea that an authoritative Xi Jinping leadership can contribute effectively to the economic reform process.
With the failure of reform initiatives in 2015, China has been left
without a good strategy to cope with the end of the miracle growth
period. In a general sense, everyone understands that the “new normal” requires greater innovation, stronger orientation to domestic consumers, and the shift to a service economy. Economic reform is ideally
suited to facilitate those structural shifts. Without a successful program
of economic reform, Xi’s China will be forced to rely on endless programs of government investment supported by an ultimately unsustainable increase in credit and debt.
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Predictions of gloom and doom for China have a long tradition
among economists. In the mid-1990s, Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson
Institute for International Economics started highlighting the de facto
insolvency of the Chinese banking system with the implication that
a bank run leading to financial sector collapse (which would then be
likely to send the economy into a tailspin) was a strong possibility in the
medium term.1 The twenty-first century began with the claim by Gordon Chang (2001) that China’s imminent accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) would cause such widespread unemployment
within China’s already alienated population that China’s economic and
political systems would collapse.
These two dire predictions have turned out to be wrong. China, in
fact, accelerated its annual GDP growth to double-digit rates after 2001.
Nicholas Lardy was wrong because while the banks were indeed bankrupt, the Chinese government, which owned them, was not and could
hence afford to bail out the banks when necessary. The fiscal strength of
the government made it irrational for depositors to contemplate a bank
run. Gordon Chang was wrong because the WTO membership quickened the pace of job creation in China by greatly increasing the volume
of foreign direct investment inflow. The WTO membership made China
more attractive to foreign direct investment because it guaranteed the
access of Chinese goods to the U.S. market by eliminating the need for
China to get the most-favored-nation (MFN) status annually from the
U.S. Congress (McKibbin and Woo 2003).
The literature on China’s future growth became pessimistic again
in the mid-2000s. One of the most astute analysts in China, Minxin Pei
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(2006), argues that China is now in a trapped transition that is described
as “a transformative phase in which half-finished reforms have transferred power to new, affluent elites” who are using crony capitalism to
generate high economic growth that is not sustainable. He believes that
meaningful reform to ensure continued high growth is improbable.2
Pei’s pessimism about the inevitable exhaustion of China’s growth
momentum has been shared by another leading China scholar, Yasheng
Huang (2008). In Huang’s contrarian assessment, China in 1999 was
actually less capitalistic than China in 1989. He asserted that the administration of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, which ended in March 2003,
had reversed the march toward capitalism by systematically promoting
the growth of large state-owned firms in the urban areas and suppressing the activities of the privately owned small and medium firms in the
countryside. Huang has attributed the deterioration in income distribution across classes and across regions to this reoccupation of the commanding heights of the economy by state-controlled companies (often
in cahoots with foreign private companies), and the intensification
of discrimination against the domestic private firms. Because Huang
believes (very reasonably, based on international experience) that the
state-controlled firms are intrinsically less innovative than the domestic
private firms, he concludes that China will be unable to move on to
the next stage of economic development in the near future (at least not
before India does so).3

THE ROUGH ROAD TO PROSPERITY
China’s economy has been like a speeding car—in just 30 years,
China has gone from one of the world’s poorest countries to the secondlargest economy. It is not surprising, then, to hear more glowingly
optimistic assessments of China’s future than dismissively pessimistic
ones. For example, O’Neill et al. (2005) of Goldman Sachs predict that
China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States in 2040 even after
assuming that China’s GDP growth rate will slow down steadily from
its annual average of 10 percent in the 1979–2005 period to 3.8 percent
in the 2030–2040 period.4
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A good guide on how one should regard the competing optimistic
and pessimistic literature is found in the discussions of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China (CPC) that concluded on October 11, 2006. The Sixth Plenum
passed a resolution to commit the CPC to establish a harmonious society by 2020. The obvious implication from this commitment is that the
major social, economic, and political trends within China might not
lead to a harmonious society or, at least not fast enough.
Among the disharmonious features mentioned in the fifth paragraph
of the “resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on major issues
regarding the building of a harmonious socialist society” were the serious imbalance in the social and economic development across (and
within each of) China’s 31 provinces, worsening population and environmental problems, grossly inadequate social safety nets and medical
care system, and serious corruption. The harmonious socialist society
proposed by the Sixth Plenum would encompass a democratic society
under the rule of law; a society based on equality and justice; an honest
and caring society; a stable, vigorous, and orderly society; and a society
in which humans live in harmony with nature.
What is the origin of the CPC’s decision to change its primary
focus from “economic construction” to “social harmony”? And why
include a target date of 2020? I believe that this switch in emphasis
from “economic construction” to “social harmony” occurs because the
Hu-Wen leadership understands that the political legitimacy of CPC
rule rests largely on maintaining an economic growth rate that is high
enough to keep unemployment low, and also a growth pattern that diffuses the additional income widely enough. Specifically, the Hu-Wen
leadership recognizes that without accelerated institutional reforms and
new major policy initiatives on a broad front, the 1978–2005 policy
framework, which had produced an average annual GDP growth rate
of almost 10 percent, is at odds with environmental sustainability and
with international concerns about China’s persistent trade imbalances.
More importantly, unless their new policies could produce significant
improvements in social harmony by 2020, social instability would
reduce China’s economic growth and thus make the leadership of CPC
in Chinese politics unsustainable.
Returning to the analogy of China’s economy being like a speeding
car, the Hu-Wen leadership saw that the car could crash because there
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were three high-probability failures that might occur and cause an economic collapse: 1) hardware failure, 2) software failure, and 3) power
supply failure.
A hardware failure refers to the breakdown of an economic mechanism, a development that is analogous to the collapse of the chassis of
the car. Probable hardware failures include a banking crisis that causes
a credit crunch that, in turn, dislocates production economy-wide, and a
budget crisis that necessitates reductions in important infrastructure and
social expenditure (and possibly generates high inflation and balance of
payments difficulties as well).
A software failure refers to a flaw in governance that creates frequent widespread social disorders that disrupt production economywide and discourage private investment. This situation is like a car
crash that resulted from a fight among the people inside the speeding
car. Software failures could come from the present high-growth strategy creating so much inequality and corruption that it generates severe
social unrest, which dislocates economic activities, and from the state
not being responsive enough to rising social expectations, hence causing social disorder.
A power supply failure refers to the economy being unable to move
forward because it hits either a natural limit or an externally imposed
limit—a situation that is akin, respectively, to the car running out of gas
or to the car smashing into a barrier erected by an outsider. Examples
of power supply failures are an environmental collapse, such as climate
change or a collapse in China’s exports because of a trade war. In a
sense, the repair of a power supply failure is more difficult than either
the repair of a hardware failure or the repair of a software failure because
a large part of the repair has to be undertaken in collaboration with other
countries. For example, the lowering of trade barriers requires China to
negotiate with other countries, and the reversal of environmental damage could require an advance in scientific understanding—an outcome
that is more likely to occur when the entire scientific talent in China and
the rest of the world is focused on the task.
A discussion of the many events that could make China’s high
growth unsustainable is beyond the scope of this chapter. This analysis
will focus on one or two of the most likely precipitating events in each
class of failures. The following section identifies the weakening of China’s fiscal position by nonperforming loans (NPLs) in the state banks
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as the likely type of hardware failure that would occur. The next section
discusses the outbreak of social disorder as the likely type of software
failure. For power supply failures, the two most likely ones are the erection of trade barriers against China’s exports (discussed in the next three
sections), and an environmental collapse, especially a shortage of water
(discussed in the final section).
Hardware Failure
Among doomsayers, one favorite mechanism for the forthcoming
collapse of an economy is the inevitable fiscal crisis of the state. It is
noteworthy that this fiscal mechanism is used by doomsayers of all
stripes. The Marxist economist James O’Connor (1973) predicted that
the dynamics of capitalist America would precipitate a fiscal crisis that
would destabilize the economy completely. In turn, the capitalist lawyer Gordon Chang (2001) predicted that a fiscal crisis could trigger the
event in the unavoidable disintegration of socialist China.
This fixation on a large negative fiscal shock as a totally destructive systemic shock is understandable because fiscal imbalance is the
proximate cause in most crises. The reason is that the state budget is
often faced with the task of defusing the cumulative tensions unleashed
by deeper, more fundamental social processes. To a first approximation, fiscal capacity is a fundamental determinant of system stability
because economic sustainability depends on the ability to cover production costs, and political viability depends on the ability to reward one’s
supporters and to pay off one’s enemies.
The reality in many cases is that fiscal sustainability is the prerequisite for both economic sustainability and political viability, and that
economic sustainability and political viability are intricately linked and
mutually reinforcing. To see the mutual interdependence of the two,
one only has to recall the many times that near-bankrupt governments
have been driven out of power after raising the prices of a subsidized
item like food, petrol, or foreign exchange.5 One could indeed go so
far as to say that the degree of economic and political resilience of a
state can be measured by the state’s ability to cover an unexpected, prolonged increase in expenditure or an unanticipated, protracted shortfall
in revenue.
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An OECD (2006) report has raised grave concerns about China’s
fiscal management.
China’s officially reported spending figures reflect only about threequarters of total government spending. Extra-budgetary spending,
social security outlays and central government bond financing of
local projects are not part of the official budget. Notwithstanding
recent reforms, the government remains overly exposed to extrabudget and off-budget activities, which make public expenditures
difficult to plan and control and which impair their accountability
and transparency. Contingent liabilities have been a major source
of unplanned spending and pose perhaps the greatest risk to the
controllability of future expenditure. (p. 10)

Fiscal sustainability is central to economic management. This can
be seen in the two fiscal targets that the original Growth and Stability
Pact of the countries in the eurozone specified for its members to meet:
1) the consolidated government budget deficit should not exceed 3 percent of GDP except in case of unusually severe downturn, and 2) the
debt-GDP ratio should be brought down to 60 percent or lower.
The very aggressive fiscal-monetary policy mix undertaken by the
government to combat the global financial crisis that hit China at the
end of the third quarter of 2008 has now created an NPL ratio that the
investment house CLSA has put in the range of 15–19 percent, compared to the official estimate of 1.6 percent. A recapitalization of the
banking system is inevitable.
The important question is, how many more rounds of bank recapitalization can China afford without generating a fiscal crisis? The simple fact is that fiscal sustainability lies at the heart of whether a banking
crisis would actually occur. As long as the state is perceived to be able
and willing to bail out the state-owned banks (SOBs), depositors would
retain their confidence in the SOBs regardless of the actual state of their
balance sheets. The current value of the debt-to-GDP ratio is not a good
indicator of the sustainability of the existing fiscal policy regime; a better indicator would involve working out the evolution of the debt-toGDP ratio over time.
To put the issue formally, the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio as
given by
d (ln[Debt/GDP]) / d t = r + [GDP/Debt] × [f + b] – y
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where
r = real interest rate on government debt
f = primary fiscal deficit rate [(state expenditure excluding debt service
– state revenue) / GDP]
b = NPL creation rate [(change in NPL in SOBs) / GDP]
y = trend growth rate of real GDP
As long as y > r, then the debt-to-GDP ratio will have a steady-state
value that is nonzero when sum of (f + b) > 0. Specifically,
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = (f + b) / (y – r) when y > r
China appears to belong to this case because its post-1978 annual
growth rate has averaged 9.4 percent, its growth rate in the next 10 years
is likely to be above 8 percent; and the real interest rate has been about
4 percent. For the generation of likely future scenarios, I will make the
conservative assumptions that y is 8 percent, f is 1 percent, and r is 6
percent.6 It is difficult to predict b, the rate that banks would generate
NPLs, because it depends on the type of banking reform undertaken. If
no meaningful reforms are undertaken, then b is likely to remain at the
historic value of 6 percent.
So, conditional on the effectiveness of reforming the SOBs, the
steady-state ratio is
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = 350 percent when b = 6 percent

(Debt/GDP)steady-state = 200 percent when b = 3 percent
(Debt/GDP)steady-state = 100 percent when b = 1 percent

The noteworthy finding from the above scenarios is that China will
produce a level of (Debt/GDP)steady-state that is high by international experience despite the optimistic assumptions that long-run growth rate is
8 percent, that b will be lowered from 6 percent of GDP to 1 percent.
The most optimistic outcome is still two-thirds larger than what the
European Union has set to be the “safe” debt-GDP target (60 percent)
for its members. The banking system has made China vulnerable to a
fiscal crisis, even though there is a theoretical steady-state level for the
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debt-to-GDP ratio. Of course, the creation of NPLs cannot be attributed
entirely to the SOBs; their chief customers, the embezzlement-ridden
and inefficiency-ridden state-owned enterprises (SOEs), deserve an
equal share of the blame (see Woo [2001]; Woo et al. [1994]).
The important point from this second fiscal feature is that the present ongoing recapitalization of the SOBs is the last time that the government can afford to recapitalize the SOBs, and possibly the last time that
the government can do so without upsetting confidence in the financial
markets about the soundness of China’s fiscal regime.
How difficult is it to stop losses in the SOBs in order to ensure fiscal
sustainability? The solution lies in imposing a hard budget constraint on
the SOBs. SOB managers must be convinced that the present recapitalization is indeed the last free supper (which the 1998 recapitalization
was announced to be), and that their compensation and promotion will
depend only on the profitability of the SOBs relative to the profitability
of private banks.
At the same time, the prudential supervision and monitoring of bank
operations will have to be strengthened to prevent asset stripping and
discourage reckless investments fostered by the asymmetrical reward
system under the soft budget constraint.7 The operations of SOBs could
be further improved by bringing in foreign strategic investors who
would be part of the management team, and by removing the influence
of the local governments on bank operations.
Another way to harden the budget constraint faced by the SOBs
is to privatize some of their branches and use the performance of the
new private banks to gauge the performance of the remaining SOBs.
The privatization of some branches will also help convince the SOB
managers that the government is indeed serious about the present SOB
recapitalization.
Software Failure
A successful market economy requires its regulatory institutions to
have the prerequisite scientific understanding to determine whether a
patent case involves real technological innovation. China’s strategy of
incremental reform, combined with the fact that institution building is
a time-consuming process, means that many of its regulatory institutions are either absent or ineffective. The results have been governance
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failures on many fronts, of which the most well-known recent governance failures are the violations against the welfare of consumers and
workers.
There have been significant regulatory failures in keeping China’s
food supply and pharmaceutical products safe. The misuse of chemicals to lower production costs has resulted in the addition of poisonous
substitutes into toothpaste (Barboza and Bogdanich 2007; Bogdanich
2007), cough medicine (Bogdanich and Hooker 2007), and animal feed
(Barboza 2007a; Barboza and Barrionuevo 2007); the application of
lead paint to children’s toys (Barboza and Story 2007; Financial Times
2007; Lipton and Barboza 2007);8 and the overemployment of antifungals and antibacterials in fish farming (Barboza 2007b; Martin 2007a).
Most of these abuses received enormous attention because these
items were exported to other countries, and their harmful effects were
reported widely in the international press.9 Clearly, Chinese consumers
have been suffering much more from such types of malfeasance, the
scope of which has not been realized because of the considerable press
censorship in China (Barboza 2007c).
Dereliction in duty by government officials is the fundamental reason for such governance failures. The most well-known recent case was
the conviction of Zheng Xiaoyu, the former director of China’s food and
drug safety agency, for accepting bribes to approve production licenses
for pharmaceutical companies and food companies. Such dereliction in
official oversight has resulted in
tens of thousands of people [being] sickened or killed every year
as a result of rampant counterfeiting of drugs, and tainted and substandard food and drugs. For instance, last year 11 people died
in China with an injection tainted by a poisonous chemical. Six
people died and 80 others fell ill after taking an antibiotic that had
been produced . . . with a substandard disinfectant. Small drug
makers in China have long been accused of manufacturing phony
or substandard drugs and marketing them to the nation’s hospitals
and pharmaceutical companies. And mass poisonings involving
tainted food products are common. (Barboza 2007d)

There have also been significant regulatory failures in the treatment of labor, especially in the areas of occupational safety and wage
payments. One of the most recent horrifying accounts involved forced
labor of kidnapped children in the brick kilns of Shanxi and Henan
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provinces (Buckley 2007; China Daily 2007). Reuters (2007) reports
that “as many as 1,000 children may have been sold into slave labor in
central China.” This deplorable affair was exposed partly “because of
an open letter posted online by a group of 400 fathers appealing for help
in tracking missing sons they believed were sold to kiln boss” (New
York Times 2007). A parent visiting the brick kilns in her quest to find
her son found that the local police were not only unwilling to help but
also demanded bribes instead (French 2007). In one case, the brick kiln
was owned by the son of the village Party secretary (New York Times
2007).
Perhaps, the two most dismaying revelations from the news reports
on the brick kiln slavery are that this sad state of affairs had been going
on for a decade;10 and the “forced labor and sexual exploitation have
increased as the trend in human trafficking in China has taken a turn
for the worst” (Zhouqiong 2007). Yin Jianzhong, the senior official at
the Ministry of Public Security who identified the worsening trend in
human trafficking in China, recognized a reason for the negative development to be “the loopholes in the legal and labor systems. . . . [Specifically,] the Criminal Law on human trafficking protects women and
children only and leaves out grown-up and teen males. It doesn’t have
provisions for punishing those trafficking people for forced labor or
prostitution” (Zhouqiong 2007). The fact that such legal loopholes exist
supports our contention that the main cause behind the administrative
failures in China is the “dereliction of duty by government officials.”11
Inadequate institutions of governance are not the only cause of
social tensions in China, however. The present economic development
strategy, despite its ability to generate high growth, also generates high
social tensions because, in the last 10 years, it has had great difficulty
further reducing extreme poverty and significantly improving the ruralurban income distribution and the regional income distribution (see
Démurger et al. [2002] and Woo et al. [2004]). In the first half of the
1990s, the $1.00 poverty rate (i.e., the proportion of rural population
receiving a daily income of $1.00 or less) dropped rapidly from 31.3
percent in 1990 to 15.0 percent in 1996. But as Figure 4.1 shows, in
the following six years the decline was only 5 percentage points. The
$1.00 poverty rate stayed in the 10–12 percent rate in the 1998–2003
period, even though the GDP growth rate averaged 8.5 percent annually. It was only after the sustained large-scale effort to develop western
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Figure 4.1 Proportion of Rural Population under Different Specifications
of the Poverty Line
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NOTE: The 1990–1997 data are from World Bank (2001, Annex 1 Table 3), and the
post-1997 numbers are computed by Ximing Yue (private communication).

China began in 2001 and the post-2002 rise in the GDP growth rate to
10 percent or higher that the $1.00 poverty rate dropped to 7.9 percent
in 2004 and then to 7.2 percent in 2005.
However, the progress in poverty alleviation in the last decade is
considerably much less impressive when the poverty line is lowered.
The $0.75 poverty rate stayed unchanged from 1998 (4.6 percent) to
2005 (4.2 percent); and the $0.50 poverty rate actually increased from
1.9 percent in 1998 to 2.8 percent in 2005. In short, the higher growth
rate in the 2003–2005 period did not cause income to trickle down to
the poorest 5 percent of the rural population, and hence caused income
inequality to worsen.
In the 1985–1987 period, China’s Gini coefficient was below 0.3.12
According to a report in the official China Daily in 2005:
China’s income gap widened in the first quarter of the year [2005],
with 10 percent of the nation’s richest people enjoying 45 percent
of the country’s wealth. . . . China’s poorest 10 percent had only 1.4
percent of the nation’s wealth. . . . No precise Gini coefficient was
provided [by the state statistical agency], but state press reports in
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recent weeks said the value was more than 0.48 and approaching
0.5. . . . Most developed European nations tend to have coefficients
of between 0.24 and 0.36, while the United States has been above
0.4 for several decades. (China Daily 2005)

The Asian Development Bank (2007) recently conducted a study
of income inequality in 22 Asian countries over the 1992–2004 period.
For 2004, only Nepal had a Gini coefficient (47.30 percent) that was
higher than China’s (47.25). However, in 2004, China’s income ratio
of the richest 20 percent to the poorest 20 percent (11.37) was highest
in Asia—significantly higher than the next highest income ratio (9.47
for Nepal). China is probably the most unequal country in Asia today.
Table 4.1 presents the income inequality in China within the international context. China’s income inequality today is generally lower
than in Latin America but generally higher than in Africa. The steady
increase in China’s income inequality since 1985 raises the possibility that China is heading toward the Latin American degree of income
inequality.
The reason that doing more of the same economic policies in today’s
China will not produce the same salubrious results of quick reduction
in poverty and slow increase in inequality as in the early phases of economic reform is because the development problems have changed. In
the first phase of economic development, the provision of more jobs
(through economic deregulation) was enough to lower poverty significantly. Many of the people who are still poor require more than just job
opportunities; they first need an infusion of assistance (e.g., empowering them with human capital through education and health interventions) in order to seize these job opportunities. Effective governance for
equitable growth has now become even more challenging, and so the
probability of improving social harmony has been diminished.
Furthermore, the present mode of economic development generates immense opportunities for embezzlement of state assets, seizure
of farmlands for industrial development, and corruption because of the
absence of effective mechanisms to supervise government employees
(see Woo [2001]). These features certainly make social harmony hard
to sustain.
The data on social unrest are consistent with the hypothesis of rising social disharmony. First, the incidences of public disorder, or social
incidents, have risen steadily from 8,700 in 1993 to 32,500 in 1999 and
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Table 4.1 China’s Income Inequality across Time and Space

Nepal
China
India
Indonesia
Taipei, China
South Korea
Japan
Columbia
Brazil
Côte d’Ivoire
Nigeria
United States
United Kingdom

Period
1995–2003
1993–2004
1993–2004
1993–2002
1993–2003
1993–2004
1993
2003
2004
2002
2003
2000
2002

Gini coefficients
Initial year Final year
37.65
47.30
40.74
47.25
32.89
36.22
34.37
34.30
31.32
33.85
28.68
31.55
24.90
58.60
56.99
44.60
43.60
39.42
34.37

Income ratio of
Top 20% Bottom 20%
Initial year Final year
6.19
9.47
7.57
11.37
4.85
5.52
5.20
5.13
5.41
6.05
4.38
5.47
3.37
25.30
23.00
9.70
9.80
8.45
5.59

SOURCE: Asian Development Bank (2007) and United Nations (2006).

then to 74,000 in 2004. Second, the average number of persons in a
mass incident has also risen greatly, from 8 in 1993 to 50 in 2004.13 It
should be noted, however, that these numbers might not accurately portray the degree that social unrest has increased because the data include
disco brawls and gambling den raids as well as social protests (see EastSouthWestNorth [n.d.]).
Clearly, the number of mass incidents would have been lower if
China had better governance. There would have been more preemptive efforts at conflict mediation by the government and less abuse of
power if the government’s actions had been monitored closely by an
independent mechanism and if the government had also been held more
accountable for its performance.
One main source of recent social unrest in rural China has been the
conversion of farmland to industrial parks without adequate compensation to the farmers. It is interesting, therefore, that the No. 1 Document
issued jointly in January 2006 by the CPC Central Committee and the
State Council pledged not only to “stabilize and regulate the transfer
of land-use rights and accelerate land acquisition reforms” but also to
“expand channels to express public opinions in the countryside and
improve the mechanism to resolve social conflicts” (Ma 2007b).14
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The Hu-Wen leadership’s desire to improve the institutions of governance is also borne out by the following report from the South China
Morning Post (Xiangwei 2007) about what Premier Wen said when he
met a group of Chinese citizens in Japan in April 2007:
During 30 minutes of impromptu remarks, he said the key to pursuing social justice, the mainland’s most important task, was to
“let people be masters of their houses and make every cadre understand that power is invested in them by the people.”
. . . Although he did not deviate from the official line and spoke
informally on both occasions, Mr. Wen is known for being careful about what he says, whether in prepared remarks or speaking
off the cuff. The fact that he highlighted, in the presence of Hong
Kong and overseas journalists, the need for political reform is
uncharacteristic and interesting, particularly in the context of the
leadership reshuffle looming at the Communist Party’s 17th congress later this year.
There have been signs that the leadership under President Hu
Jintao is under increasing pressure to undertake drastic political
reforms to consolidate the party’s grip on power and stamp out
widespread corruption.

While there are reasonable grounds for an analyst to doubt either
the sincerity of Premier Wen’s words or his ability to act on them, the
analyst cannot doubt that Premier Wen is at least aware that democracy is one way to solve many of China’s problems of governance. The
embrace of the Harmonious Society program by the Hu-Wen leadership
reveals CPC’s acknowledgment that democracy, the rule of law, and a
stable income distribution make up an indivisible combination that is
necessary to ensure the social stability that will keep the economy on
the high-growth path to catch up with the United States (a vision that
acts as the bedrock of CPC’s legitimacy to rule).
Power Supply Failure
China’s emergence as a major trading nation has been accompanied
by increasing conflicts with the European Union (EU) and the United
States about China’s trading practices and its exchange rate policy. The
dissatisfaction over trade with China is evident from the following two
press reports:
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Peter Mandelson, the EU trade commissioner . . . called various
aspects of China’s trade policy “illogical,” “indefensible” and
“unacceptable” and accused [China] of doing nothing to rein in
rampant counterfeiting. . . . Mr. Mandelson also refused to grant
China market economy status . . . [because it has] fulfilled [only]
one of five criteria.” (Bounds 2007)
After years of inconclusive skirmishing, trade tensions between
the United States and China are about to intensify. . . . “We are
competing not only with a country with low wages but with very
high and heavy subsidies and a rigging of their currency . . .” says
Rep. Sander Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the House trade subcommittee. . . . “I hate the term trade war because it is always used
when you try to get a fair break . . . ,” he says: “Sometimes pressure works.” (Lynch 2007)

While the trade deficit is many times identified as the cause of the
trade tension, the true cause is the ongoing large shift in the international
division of labor that has been set in motion by the post-1990 acceleration of globalization and by the continued fast pace of technological
innovations. The next two sections argue that the trade tensions reflect,
one, the pains of structural adjustment in the United States because of
its very inadequate social safety nets, and, two, the dysfunctional nature
of China’s financial system.

CAUSES OF TRADE PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA
Defects in the U.S. Economy
It is not uncommon to encounter allegations that the bilateral U.S.China trade deficit represented the export of unemployment from China
to the United States, and that it lowered the wage for labor. These allegations are not supported by the facts, however. Table 4.2 shows that
the steady rise in the trade deficit from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1996 to
5.9 percent in 2006 was accompanied by a fall in the civilian unemployment rate from 5.4 percent in 1996 to 4.6 percent in 2006, and by a rise
in the total compensation (measured in 2005 prices) received by a fulltime worker from $48,175 in 1996 to $55,703 in 2005.15
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What is fueling the resentment toward imports from China when
the median U.S. worker is experiencing neither more unemployment
nor lower compensation? The U.S. worker is feeling more insecure in
the 2000s than in the 1980s because of faster turnover in employment.
Globalization and technological innovations have required the worker
to change jobs more often, and she finds that there are considerable
costs associated with the job change because of the inadequacies in the
U.S. social safety nets.
Table 4.2 documents the more frequent change in jobs by the declining trend in the length of the median job tenure for older male workers.
The median job tenure for males in the
• 33–44 age group decreased from 7.0 years in 1987 to 5.1 years
in 2006;
• 45–54 age group decreased from 11.8 years in 1987 to 8.1 years
in 2006; and
• 55–64 age group decreased from 14.5 years in 1987 to 9.5 years
in 2006.
In terms of social safety nets, Burtless (2005) reports that within the
G-7 in 2004, only the United Kingdom has a less generous unemployment benefits scheme than the United States. An unemployed person in
the United States received initial unemployment benefits that equaled
53 percent of previous income compared to 78 percent in Germany, 76
percent in Canada and France, 61 percent in Japan, 60 percent in Italy,
and 46 percent in the United Kingdom. The duration of unemployment
benefits was 6 months in the United States compared to 12 months
in Germany, 9 months in Canada, 30 months in France, 10 months in
Japan, and 6 months in Italy and the United Kingdom.
There are two major factors behind the more frequent changes in
jobs. The first factor is globalization, especially the post-1990 integration of the labor force in the former Soviet Union, India, and China
(SIC) into the international division of labor. Table 4.3 shows that the
number of workers already engaged in the international division of
labor in 1990 was 1,083 million, and the combined labor force of SIC
was 1,232 million. The international division of labor in 1990 was certainly an unnatural one because half of the world’s workforce had been
kept out of it by the SIC’s autarkic policies.
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Table 4.2 Trade Balance, Unemployment Rate, Total Compensation for
Labor, and Job Tenure in Selected Year
1987
1996
2000
2006
Trade deficit as a percent of GDP
3.1
1.2
3.9
5.9
Unemployment rate (%)
6.2
5.4
4.0
4.6
Total compensation for a full-time
46,041 48,175 52,728 55,703a
equivalent employee (2005 $)
Median tenure at job for male
workers by age group (years)
33–44
7.0
6.1
5.3
5.1
45–54
11.8
10.1
9.5
8.1
55–64
14.5
10.5
10.2
9.5
NOTES: Trade deficit and unemployment data are from the White House (2007). Data
on compensation in real terms and 1987 data are from Burtless (2007). Data on average job tenure in 1996–2006 are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls
.gov/news.release/tenure.t01.htm.
a
From 2005.

The economic isolation of the Soviet bloc started crumbling when
the new noncommunist Solidarity government of Poland began the marketization and internationalization of the Polish economy on January 1,
1990.16 For the Chinese elite, the end of the Soviet Union in August
1991 confirmed that there was no third way in the capitalism-versussocialism debate. In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping entrenched China firmly
on the path of convergence to a private market economy.17 In 1991,
India faced a balance of payments crisis, and it responded by going well
beyond the administration of the standard corrective macroeconomic
medicine of fiscal-monetary tightening and exchange rate devaluation
into comprehensive adjustments of microeconomic incentives.
Table 4.3 Distribution of the Global Labor Force (millions)

The non-SIC countries
The SIC countries
Global Non-SIC Developed Developing
SIC
Soviet
total
total
economies economies
total China India bloc
1990
2,315
1,083
403
680
1,232 687
332
213
2000
2,672
1,289
438
851
1,383 764
405
214
SOURCE: Freeman (2004). Our figure for “Global total” in 2000 is different from that
in Freeman.
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A decade after the start of the deep integration of the SIC economies
into the world economic system, the number of workers involved in the
international economic system in 2000 had increased to 2,672 million
(with 1,363 million workers from SIC); see Table 4.3. The HeckscherOhlin model would predict that this doubling of the world labor,
achieved by bringing in cheaper labor from SIC, would lower the relative price of the labor-intensive good and hence reduce the real wage
in the industrialized country.18 Furthermore, the fact that U.S. capital
could now move abroad to build production facilities in the SIC economies to service the U.S. market as well as third markets also gave globalization another channel to lower the U.S. wage.
However, the U.S. real wage has not fallen (Table 4.2). The reason is
that the remarkably high U.S. productivity growth since the late 1980s
(perhaps enabled in large part by the information and communications
technology [ICT] revolution) prevented the real wage from declining.
Furthermore, as the import competition is focused on the good that uses
low-skilled labor intensively, the wage gap between low-skilled labor
and high-skilled labor in the United States has widened. In short, the
economic impact of globalization in the United States is therefore manifested in a diminished labor share of GDP, rather than in a lower real
wage, and in an increased dispersion in U.S. wages.
While the Heckscher-Ohlin model does provide a coherent mechanism for globalization to have the above two wage outcomes, the inconvenient truth is that China might not be the most influential factor in
these developments even though China accounted for 764 million of the
combined SIC labor force of 1,383 million in 2000. China is unlikely to
be the most important culprit because there are three other independent
developments that have had important consequences for U.S. wages.
First, many technological innovations have substituted capital for
labor and have transformed many of what have been traditionally nontradable services into tradable services, allowing jobs to be outsourced
to foreign service providers. For example, the ICT revolution has
allowed offshore call centers to handle questions from U.S. customers,
offshore accountants to process U.S.-based transactions, and offshore
medical technicians to read the X-rays of U.S. patients. The empirical
literature suggests that technological innovations are likely to have had
a bigger influence on U.S. wages than import competition from China.19
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Second, institutional changes have attenuated labor share of income.
Union membership has declined, reducing the bargaining power of
labor. There has also been an upward shift in the compensation norms
for high-level executives. Third, there has been increased immigration into the United States (before 2001), especially a disproportionate
inward immigration of low-skilled labor. 20
In short, much of the popular outcry in the United States and the
European Union against China’s trade surpluses is misplaced. A widening of the U.S. trade deficit creates additional stress on U.S. labor
because U.S. imports are more labor-intensive than its exports. However, even if China’s trade balance were zero, the pains of structural
adjustment and income redistribution caused by technological innovations, institutional changes, globalization, and immigration would still
be there; and the amount of worker anxiety they generated collectively
would be much larger than the additional worker anxiety generated by
the widening trade deficit.
If the United States strengthens its social safety nets to lower the
cost of changing jobs, it could help reduce trade tensions between
the United States and China. Specifically, the U.S. Congress should
quicken the reduction in fiscal imbalance and expand trade adjustment
programs, especially those that upgrade the skill of the younger workers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program still functions
inadequately after its overhaul in 2002. Brainard (2007) reports that
participation has remained surprisingly low, thanks in part to confusing Department of Labor interpretations and practices that ultimately deny benefits to roughly three-quarters of workers who are
certified as eligible for them. TAA has helped fewer than 75,000
new workers per year, while denying more than 40 percent of all
employers’ petitions. And remarkably, the Department of Labor
has interpreted the TAA statute as excluding the growing number of services workers displaced by trade. . . . Between 2001 and
2004, an average of only 64 percent of participants found jobs
while they participated in TAA. And earnings on the new job were
more than 20 percent below those prior to displacement.

The TAA program clearly needs further improvement. Brainard’s
(2007) proposal for the establishment of wage insurance is an excellent
way to bring the U.S. social safety net more in line with the type of structural adjustments driven by globalization and technological changes.
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DEFECTS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY
China’s chronic and growing overall trade surplus reveals a deepseated serious problem in China’s economy, its dysfunctional financial
system. This problem is revealed by the aggregate-level accounting
identity that the overall current account balance (of which, in China,
the overall trade account is the biggest part) is determined by the fiscal
position of the government, and the savings-investment decisions of the
state-controlled enterprise (SCE) sector and the private sector, which
together make up the nongovernment sector.21 Specifically,
CA = (T − G) + (SSCE − ISCE) + (Sprivate − Iprivate ),

where CA = current account in the balance of payments.
CA = (X − M) + R
X = export of goods and nonfactor services
M = import of goods and nonfactor services
R = net factor earnings from abroad (i.e., export of factor services)
T = state revenue
G = state expenditure (including state investment)
SSCE = saving of the SCEs

ISCE = investment of the SCEs

Sprivate = saving of the private sector

Iprivate = investment of the private sector
The Chinese fiscal position (T − G) has for the last decade been
a small deficit, so it is not the cause of the swelling current account
surpluses in the 2000s. The current account surplus exists because the
sum of savings by SCEs and the private sector exceeds the sum of their
investment expenditures.
Why has China’s financial system failed to translate the savings into
investments? Such an outcome was not always the case. Before 1994,
the voracious absorption of bank loans by SCEs to invest recklessly
usually kept the current account negative and the creation of NPLs high.
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When the government implemented stricter controls on the SOBs from
1994 onward (e.g., removing top bank officials whenever their bank
lent more than its credit quota or allowed the NPL ratio to increase too
rapidly), the SOBs slowed down the growth of loans to SCEs. This cutback created an excess of savings because the SOB-dominated financial
sector did not then rechannel the released savings (which were also
increasing) to finance the investment of the private sector. This failure
in financial intermediation by the SOBs is quite understandable. First,
the legal status of private enterprises was, until recently, lower than that
of the state enterprises; and, second, there was no reliable way to assess
the balance sheets of the private enterprises, which were naturally eager
to escape taxation. The upshot was that the residual excess savings
leaked abroad in the form of the current account surplus. Inadequate
financial intermediation has made developing China a capital-exporting
country.
This perverse current account outcome is not new. Taiwan had
exactly this problem up to the mid-1980s, when all Taiwanese banks
were state owned and operated according to the civil service regulation that required loan officers to repay any bad loans that they had
approved. The result was a massive failure in financial intermediation
that caused Taiwan’s current account surplus to be 21 percent of GDP in
1986. The reason China has not been producing the gargantuan current
account surpluses seen in Taiwan in the mid-1980s is because of the
large amount of SCE investments.
Why is the nongovernment sector’s savings rate rising? The combined savings of the SOE and non-SOE sectors rose from 20 percent in
1978 to 30 percent in 1987, and then went above 45 percent since 2004.
In discussions about the increasing savings rate, a common view is that
the rise reflects the uncertainty about the future that many SOE workers feel in the face of widespread privatization of loss-making SOEs.
This explanation is incomplete because there also has been a rise in the
rural savings rate, even though rural residents have little to fear about
the loss of jobs in the state-enterprise sector because none of them are
employed there.22
We see two general changes that have caused both urban and rural
savings rates to rise significantly. The first is increased worries about
the future. The steady decline in state subsidies to medical care, housing, loss-making enterprises, and education, along with mismanage-
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ment of pension funds by the state, have led people to save more to
insure against future bad luck (e.g., sickness, job loss), buy their own
homes, build up nest eggs for retirement, and invest in their children.
The second change is the secular improvement in the official Chinese attitude toward market capitalism. Given the high rate of return to
capital, this increasingly business-friendly attitude of the Communist
Party of China has encouraged both rural and urban residents to save
for investment—that is, greater optimism about the future has spawned
investment-motivated saving.23
In our explanations of the existence of the current account surpluses and the growth of the surplus, there is a common element in
both—China’s financial system. The fact is that savings behavior is not
independent of the sophistication of the financial system. An advanced
financial system will have a variety of financial institutions that would
enable pooling of risks by providing medical insurance, pension insurance, and unemployment insurance, and transform savings into education loans, housing loans, and other types of investment loans to the
private sector. Ceteris paribus, the more sophisticated a financial system, the lower the savings rate. China generates the current account
surplus because of inadequate financial intermediation, and the surplus
grows over time because the dysfunctional financial system fails to
pool risks to reduce uncertainty-induced savings and fails to provide
loans to reduce investment-motivated saving.
What is to be done in China? The obvious short-run policy package
has two components. First, accelerate import liberalization (e.g., seriously implement the commitments made in negotiations for WTO membership, such as IPR protection) and expand beyond WTO specifications.
The second component of the short-run policy package is to have
an expansionary fiscal policy (e.g., rural infrastructure investments)
to soak up the excess savings, with an emphasis on import-intensive
investments (e.g., buying airplanes and sending students abroad). It is
important that time limits be put on the expanded public works and
SCE investments because, in the long run, the increased public investments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful
(e.g., building a second big bridge to a lowly populated island to benefit a politically connected construction company, as in Japan), and the
increased SCE investments could convert themselves into nonperforming loans at the SOBs.
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Clearly, the optimum solution to the problem of excess saving is not
for the government to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit but to
establish an improved mechanism for coordinating private savings and
private investments. The establishment of a modern financial system
will not only achieve the objective of intermediating all of domestic
saving into domestic investment; it will also enhance welfare and lower
the savings rate by pooling risks through vehicles like medical insurance and pension insurance. In a nutshell, China’s main challenge today
is to develop smoothly functioning financial, planning, and regulatory
systems that can employ the remaining rural surplus labor (as indicated
by an average wage of about $120 per month for 480 million rural and
migrant workers) and surplus capital, which now shows up as China’s
sustained current account surplus and rising foreign exchange reserves.
The important conclusion from this section is that U.S.-China trade
tension would be lowered much more if both countries undertake corrective policies rather than if China acted alone, and that a wider range
of policy instruments should be employed (e.g., wage insurance program in U.S. and financial market development in China) rather than
relying just on exchange rate adjustment alone.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE IN CHINA
The present mode of economic development has given China
the dirtiest air in the world, is polluting more and more of the water
resources, and is possibly changing the climate pattern within China.24
The reality is that CPC’s new objective of living in harmony with nature
is not a choice because the Maoist adage of “man conquering nature”
is just as unrealistic as creating prosperity through central planning.
China’s fast growth in the last two decades has done substantial damage to the environment. Economy (2004, pp. 18–19) summarizes the
economic toll as follows:
China has become home to six of the ten most polluted cities in the
world. Acid rain now affects about one-third of China’s territory,
including approximately one-third of its farmland. More than 75
percent of the water in rivers flowing through China’s urban areas
is [unsuitable for human contact] . . . deforestation and grassland
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degradation continue largely unabated. . . . The [annual] economic
cost of environmental degradation and pollution . . . are the equivalent of 8–12 percent of China’s annual gross domestic product.

Water shortage appears to pose the most immediate environmental
threat to China’s continued high growth. Presently, China uses 67–75
percent of the 800–900 billion cubic meters of water available annually, and present trends in water consumption project the usage rate
to be 78–100 percent in 2030 (Lee 2006). The present water situation
is actually already fairly critical because of the uneven distribution of
water and the lower than normal rainfall in the past 15 years. Right now,
“[about] 400 of China’s 660 cities face water shortages, with 110 of
them severely short” (Noi 2004).25
The extended period of semidrought in northern China combined
with the economic and population growth have caused an increased
amount of water to be pumped from the aquifers, leading the water table
to drop three to six meters a year (Becker 2003; Ma 2003). And a study
using measurements from satellites (the Global Positioning System)
has established that the part of China north of the thirty-sixth parallel
latitude has been “sinking at the rate of 2 millimeters a year” (Becker
2003).26 Specifically, “Shanghai, Tianjin, and Taiyuan are the worst hit
in China, with each sinking more than two meters (6.6 feet) since the
early 1990s” (Agence France-Presse 2004).
The overall water situation in northern China is reflected in the fate
of the Yellow River, “which started drying up every few years from
1972, did so for increasing periods of time over longer distances in
the 1990s until 1997, when it dried up for almost the entire year over a
stretch of several hundred kilometres” Noi (2004).
The utilization rate of Yellow River’s water is 60 percent, far
exceeding the internationally recommended utilization limit of 40 percent. All the mentioned factors have contributed to lowering the “amount
of Yellow River water feeding into the Bohai Sea” from an annual 49.6
billion cubic meters in the 1960s to 14.2 billion cubic meters in the
1990s to the present 4.65 billion cubic meters (Lee 2006).
Water shortage and the increasing pollution of current water supplies are not the only serious environmental threats to the economy of
northern China.27 The desert is expanding (possibly at an accelerating
pace), and human activities appear to be the chief culprit. The State Forestry Administration reported that 28 percent of the country’s land mass
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was affected by desertification in 1999, and 37 percent was affected by
soil erosion. The report identified about 65 percent of the desert as having been created by “overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, and
poor irrigation practices” (South China Morning Post 2002). The rate
of desertification is 3,900 square miles a year, an annual loss of a land
area twice the size of Delaware.28 One direct upshot is a great increase
in the frequency of major sandstorms, which plays “havoc with aviation in northern China for weeks, cripples high-tech manufacturing and
worsens respiratory problems as far downstream as Japan, the Korean
peninsula and even the western United States” (French 2004).29 In the
assessment of Chen Lai, vice minister of water resources, “It will take
nearly half a century for China to control the eroded land and rehabilitate their damaged ecosystems in accordance with China’s present
erosion-control capabilities” (South China Morning Post 2002).
While northern China has been getting drier and experiencing
desertification, nature, as if in compensation (or in mockery), has been
blasting southern China with heavier rains, causing heavy floods that
have brought considerable deaths and property damage almost every
summer since 1998.30 The sad possibility is that the northern droughts
and southern floods may not be independent events but a combination
caused by pollution that originates in China. I will have more to say
about this possibility later.
Clearly, without water, growth cannot endure. And in response,
the government began implementation in 2002 of Mao Zedong’s 1952
proposal that three canals—each over 1,000 miles long—be built to
bring water from the south to the north: 1) an eastern coastal canal from
Jiangsu to Shandong and Tianjin, 2) a central canal from Hubei to Beijing and Tianjin, and 3) a western route from Tibet to the northwestern
provinces (Phan 2002). Construction of the eastern canal (which would
be built on a part of the existing Grand Canal) started in 2002, and
the central canal in 2003. Work on the western canal was scheduled to
begin in 2010 upon completion of the first stage of the central canal.
The scale of this water transfer project is simply unprecedented
anywhere: “Together, the three channels would pump about 48 billion
liters of water a year—enough to fill New York’s taps for a quarter century. Only a tenth as much water flows through the next-largest water
diversion project, in California” (Phan 2002).
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This massive construction project will not only be technically challenging but also extremely sensitive politically and fraught with environmental risks. The central canal will have to tunnel through the foot
of the huge dyke that contains the elevated Yellow River, and the western canal will have to transport water through regions susceptible to
freezing. The number of people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam
was 1.1 million, and this water transfer scheme is a bigger project. The
enlargement of the Danjiangkou Dam (in Hubei) alone to enable it to
be the source of the central canal will already displace 330,000 people
(Cheung 2003).31 Moving people involuntarily is certainly potentially
explosive politically. The project could also be politically explosive
on the international front as well. One plan for the western canal calls
for “damming the Brahmaputra river and diverting 200 billion cubic
metres of water annually to feed the ageing Yellow River,” a scenario
that is reportedly “giving sleepless nights to the Indian government . . .
[which is concerned that this Great Western Water Diverson Project]
could have immense impact on lower riparian states like India and Bangladesh” (Bagchi 2006).
The potential environmental damages caused by this project are the
most serious for the central and western canals. In the case of the central
canal,
environmental experts [in Wuhan where the Hanjiang River flows
into the Yangtze] are worried about . . . [whether the annual extraction of 8 billion cubic meters of water could affect] the river’s
ability to flush out the massive pollution flows released by the
thousands of factories and industries along the tributaries. . . .
The reduced flows could increase the frequency of toxic red algae
blooms on the Yangtze near the confluence with the Hanjiang
River. There have already been three blooms . . . [by May of that
year, 2003]. (Cheung 2003)

The western canal has generated a lively controversy. Some scientists are contending that it “would cause more ecological damage than
good” (Oster 2006b) because it “could cause dramatic climate changes
. . . [and] the changed flow and water temperature would lead to a rapid
decline in fish and other aquatic species” (Simons 2006).
Many opponents of the water transfer project have argued that
water conservation could go a long way toward addressing this problem
because currently a tremendous amount of the water is wasted—only
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50 percent of China’s industrial water is recycled compared to 80 percent in the industrialized countries Noi (2004), and China consumes
3,860 cubic meters of water to produce $10,000 of GDP compared to
the world average of 965 cubic meters (Straits Times 2004). The most
important reason for this inefficient use of water lies in the fact that
“China’s farmers, factories and householders enjoy some of the cheapest water in the world” (Holland 2006), even though China’s per capita
endowment of water is a quarter of the world average (Straits Times
2004).
There is, however, the unhappy possibility that neither the price
mechanism nor the three canals can solve China’s water problem and
make its growth sustainable unless the present mode of economic
development is drastically amended. There is now persuasive evidence
that China’s voluminous emission of black carbon (particles of incompletely combusted carbon) has contributed significantly to a shift in the
climate pattern that produces northern droughts and southern floods
of increasing intensity (Menon et al. 2002; Streets 2005). The biggest
source of what has been called the “Asian brown cloud” in the popular
media is burning of coal and bio-fuels in China. If the pollution-induced
climate change analysis is valid, it means that
• China’s massive reforestation program will not succeed in reducing sandstorms in the north because trees cannot survive if the
amount of rainfall is declining over time;
• the number of south-north canals will have to be increased over
time to meet the demand for water in northern China; and
• China needs to significantly reduce its emission of black carbon
(presuming no new large emissions from neighboring countries
like India).
The general point is that effective policy making on the environmental front is a very difficult task because much of the science about
the problem is not known. For example, China must no longer separate
its water and energy strategies. A systems approach in policy making
is necessary because the interaction among the outcomes from the different sectoral policies can generate serious unintended environmental damage. If part of the shift in China’s climate is integral to global
climate change, then a sustainable development policy would require

70 Woo

a complete rethinking about the location of population centers and
types of enhanced international cooperation on global environmental
management.
The uncomfortable reality for China is that unless ecological balance is restored within the medium term, environmental limits could
choke off further economic growth. And the uncomfortable reality for
the rest of the world is that the negative consequences of large-scale
environmental damage within a geographically large country are seldom confined within that country’s borders. The continued march of
China’s desertification first brought more frequent sandstorms to Beijing and has sent yellow dust clouds not only across the sea to neighboring Japan and Korea but also across the ocean to the United States.
China’s environmental management is a concern not only for China’s
welfare but for global welfare as well.
In discussing the environmental aspects of the water transfer plan,
it is important to note that there is now an open controversy in China
involving a key government infrastructure project, and that this controversy is not limited to members of the technocracy. The very public
nature of the controversy and the involvement of more than just scientists, engineers, and economists in it reveal how very far social attitudes have progressed. The important point is that this change in social
expectations will require any government in China to live in harmony
with nature. However, any government will have great difficulties in
doing so even if it wants to, because a green growth policy involves
a systems approach, and scientific understanding of many ecological
subsystems and the nature of their interactions is still rather incomplete.
Proper management of the environment has now become critical
for China if it is to continue its industrialization process. The unexpurgated version of a 2007 World Bank reported that “about 750,000
people die prematurely in China each year, mainly from air pollution
in large cities” (McGregor 2007), and a 2007 OECD study estimates
that “China’s air pollution will cause 20 million people a year to fall ill
with respiratory diseases” (Anderlini 2007). Pan Yue, the deputy head
of the State Environmental Protection Agency, summed up the present
situation in China very well when he said, “If we continue on this path
of traditional industrial civilization, there is no chance that we will have
sustainable development. China’s population, resources, and environment have already reached the limits of their capacity to cope. Sustain-
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able development and new sources of energy are the only road that we
can take” (Kynge 2004).

CONCLUSION
In appraising whether the attainment of the October 2006 vision
of a Harmonious Society would be sufficient to sustain high economic
growth in China, the greatest inadequacy I see is the absence of a parallel objective to build a harmonious world. A harmonious society cannot
endure in China unless there is also a harmonious world, and vice versa.
China’s pursuit of such a society requires it to actively help provide
two global public goods that make a harmonious world possible: the
strengthening of the multilateral free trade system and the protection of
the global environmental commons.
China has benefited immensely from the GATT-WTO free-trade
regime, and yet up to this point it has played a passive role in pushing the Doha Round negotiations forward to completion. By default,
Brazil and India have assumed the leadership of the developing economies camp in the trade negotiations. According to Susan Schwab, the
U.S. Trade Representative, at the G4 (United States, European Union,
Brazil, and India) meeting in Potsdam in June 2007, Brazil and India
retreated from their earlier offers to reduce their manufacturing tariffs
in return for cuts in agricultural subsidies by the developed economies
because of “their fear of growing Chinese imports” (Beattie, Callan,
and Pilling 2007; Luce and Callan 2007). The Brazilian-Indian action
caused the Potsdam talks to fail and hurt the many developing economies that were agricultural exporters.
China should now seek a leadership role in the Doha Round negotiations that is commensurate with its participation in international trade.
Failure of the Doha Round could set in motion the unraveling of multilateral free trade because the present international atmosphere is right
for protectionism. The United States, which has traditionally been a
leader in expanding the multilateral free trade system, is now beset by
self-doubt for three major reasons.
First, the United States was willing to endure the pains of structural adjustments in the 1960–1990 period to accommodate the grow-
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ing imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN because
they were frontline allies in the Cold War. When the Cold War ended,
it was natural for the United States to reconsider the economic cost of
structural adjustment because the security and ideological benefits from
it went down.
Second, the amount of required structural adjustment in the United
States to accommodate the rise of the SIC bloc is far greater than the
earlier adjustment to the rise of its Cold War allies. As noted, the entry
of the former SIC economies has doubled the labor force participating
in the international division of labor.
Third, the strongest lobby for free trade in the United States has
been the economics profession, and the free trade doctrine has come
under strong internal criticism in the last few years. Paul Samuelson has
made many fundamental contributions to the development of the standard trade models that convinced mainstream economists that free trade
is the best policy, and it was therefore an intellectual earthquake when
he argued in 2004 that under free trade, where outsourcing accelerates
the transfer of knowledge to the developing country, there could be a
decline in the welfare of the developed country (see Bernstein [2004]
and Samuelson [2004]).
While the veracity of the Samuelson hypothesis is uncertain, the
hypothesis clearly reflects the widespread pains of structural adjustment that they witness around them—a phenomenon captured by the
decreasing length of median job tenure. In April 2007, the United States
bypassed multilateralism in free trade by agreeing to form a Free Trade
Area with South Korea. With the United States weakening in its resolve
to protect the multilateral free trade system, China should now become
more active in the Doha Round negotiations to further deregulate world
trade. Such a role will be very much in China’s interest because Brazil
is now bypassing multilateral trade liberalization by entering into Free
Trade Area negotiations with the European Union. The fact is that a
growing number of nations like Brazil “are increasingly wary of a multilateral deal because it would mandate tariff cuts, exposing them more
deeply to low-cost competition from China. Instead, they are seeking
bilateral deals with rich countries that are tailored to the two parties’
needs” (Miller 2007). It is time for China to show that it is a responsible
stakeholder by joining in the stewardship of the multilateral free trade
system.
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The global environment is the second area where China can help to
build a harmonious world system. Specifically, China should be mobilizing international consensus to form an international research consortium to develop ways to burn coal cleanly because China is now
building a power station a week and is hence able to facilitate extensive
experimentation on prototype plants to burn coal cleanly. If successful,
this global cooperation on clean energy research will unleash sustainable development in China as well as the rest of the world.
We realize, of course, that while the need to maintain high growth
could motivate China to become more active in supplying global public
goods, it might not be allowed to do so because of the usual reluctance
of the existing dominant powers to share the commanding heights of the
world political leadership. The sad experience of Japan being denied
permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations is
a case in point. Harmonious international relations are the omitted item
in China’s perception of a Harmonious Society in 2006, and it could
turn out to be a very soft spot in the Chinese growth engine.
Besides the adept management of international relations, the competent management of economic issues is also fundamental to maintaining China’s path to high growth. The most important realization on this
front is that in today’s China, doing more of the same economic policies
will not produce the same salubrious results on every front because the
development problems have changed. For example, in the first phase of
economic development, the provision of more jobs (through economic
deregulation) was enough to lower poverty significantly. Many of the
people who are still poor require more than just job opportunities; they
need an infusion of assistance (e.g., empower them with human capital
through education and health interventions) in order to take advantage
of these job opportunities.
On the fiscal management front, my analysis suggests that the management of state assets and the regulation of the financial sector should
be reformed to eliminate the phenomenon of repeated recapitalization
of the SOBs. The privatization of some units of the SOBs, and the emergence of large domestic private banks will help strengthen the budget
constraints perceived by the managers of SOBs.
The fact is, however, that the probability of a software failure and
the probability of a power supply failure are both higher than the probability of a hardware failure. This means that development policy mak-
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ing in China has become more challenging. There must now not only be
more adroit but also fuller accommodation of domestic social demands
in order to keep China’s growth rate high. The reality is that popular
satisfaction with the status quo depends inversely on the level of expectations, and the expectations of the Chinese people toward their government have risen dramatically along with income and, more importantly,
along with their growing knowledge of the outside world. A Chinese
government that consistently fails to produce results in line with the rise
in social expectations runs the increasing risk of being challenged by
another faction within the CPC, culminating in an open split with each
side seeking the support of nonparty groups.
Complicating matters is that there has not only been rising expectations but also diversification of expectations. In this new situation, the
greater use of democratic procedures, the establishment of an independent judiciary, and the restoration of a free press might be inevitable
if CPC is to successfully accommodate the rising social expectations
and mediate the emerging differences in social expectations. What will
happen will depend on whether the CPC is sufficiently confident that it
will be politically skillful enough to lead the democratic transition and
emerge afterward as the most important political force. History tells us
that the French and British monarchies reacted very differently to the
popular requests for reform, and the outcomes were very different in
each case.

Notes
I was deeply honored to deliver this paper as the Werner Sichel Lecture at Western
Michigan University on October 7, 2016. I am extremely grateful for the guidance I
received in the discussion for revising the lecture. The insightful comments of Professor
Huizhong Zhou and Professor Wei-Chiao Huang were most helpful.
1. Lardy (1998) wrote that “China’s major banks are even weaker than most official
data suggest. . . . On a realistic accounting, these banks’ capital adequacy is negative, and they are insolvent (p. 95). . . . The failure of China’s largest financial
institutions would disrupt the flow of credit and disrupt the payments system, leading to a collapse of economic activity. The failure of major banks also could have
long-term implications for the household savings rate. . . . A lower savings rate
would mean a lower rate of investment and slower growth, in turn depressing the
rate of new job creation, leading to sustained higher levels of unemployment” (pp.
143–144).
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2. According to Pei (2006), “In a ‘trapped transition,’ the ruling elites have little
interest in real reforms. They may pledge reforms, but most such pledges are lip
service or tactical adjustments aimed at maintaining the status quo.”
3. As Huang (2006) sees that India does not discriminate against its indigenous capitalists in favor of foreign capitalists, he predicts that “[u]nless China embarks on
bold institutional reforms, India may very well outperform it in the next 20 years.”
4. For a review of the debate on how to interpret China’s high growth in the 1978–
2000 and why China, unlike the economies of the former Soviet bloc, did not
experience a recession when it made the switch from a centrally planned economy
to a market economy, see Sachs and Woo (2000) and Woo (2001).
5. For example, President Soeharto of Indonesia was pushed out of office in May
1998, one month after raising fuel prices.
6. f has been above 1.5 percent for the past seven years; r was 4 percent in the past
only because the interest rate was regulated. I think that the implementation of
financial deregulation that is necessary for normal healthy development of the
financial sector will render r to be at least 6 percent because 1) according to Solow
(1991), the stylized fact for the real interest rate in the United States is that it is
5–6 percent; and 2) both the marginal rate of return to capital and the black market
loan rate have been more than 20 percent.
7. The asymmetry is from the absence of financial punishment when a loss occurs.
8. Lipton and Barboza (2007) also report the recall of a ghoulish fake eyeball that
was filled with kerosene, and of an infant wrist rattle that was a choking hazard.
9. For example, radial tires were manufactured without the gum strips that prevented
the tires from separating; see Martin (2007).
10. This point was made by the popular tabloid Southern Metropolis Daily; see
Buckley (2007).
11. This point was made by the Shanxi governor, Yu Youjun, who said, “For a long
time, relevant government departments did little to regulate rural workshops,
small coal mines and small factories, and they are basically out of control and are
not being supervised. . . . The dereliction of duty by civil servants and the corruption of individuals have made it possible for illegal labour to exist, particularly
the abductions of migrant workers, and forced labour of children and mentally
disabled people” (Ma 2007a).
12. The Gini coefficient has a value between 0 and 1, and the higher the value, the
greater the degree of income inequality.
13. The 1993 number is from Keidel (2006, p. 1), and the 2004 number is from Pei
(2005), who wrote that, in 2004, there were 74,000 “mass incidents” involving 3.7
million people compared to 10,000 such incidents involving 730,000 people in
1994. Possibly, because of the widespread attention in the Western media on the
marked rise in mass incidents, the post-2004 definition of mass incidents appeared
to have been changed, making post-2004 data not comparable with the 1994–2004
data; see discussion in EastSouthWestNorth (n.d.).
14. The No. 1 Document designation shows that this is the most important task in the
new year.
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15. This positive wage trend for the average worker is also seen in that for the average
blue-collar worker; see Woo (2008).
16. The economic transition and political disintegration of the Soviet bloc became
irreversible when Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev as the unambiguous leader of Russia in August 1991 and implemented market-oriented reforms in January 1992.
17. Today, under the heading of a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese constitution gives private property the same legal status as public
property, and the Chinese Communist Party accepts capitalists as members.
18. More accurately, the wage of the formerly isolated SIC worker would rise while
the wage for the worker in the industrialized country would fall.
19. There is a large empirical literature on the relative impact of technological changes
and globalization on the U.S. wage rate; see for example, Sachs and Shatz (1994)
and Feenstra and Hanson (1996).
20. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) offer a good discussion of this topic.
21. The SCE category covers companies, which are classified as SOBs, and jointventure and joint-stock companies, which are controlled by third parties (e.g.,
legal persons).
22. Economist Intelligence Unit (2004, p. 23) reported that “farmers’ propensity to
save seems to have increased.”
23. Liu and Woo (1994) and Woo and Liu (1995) contain formal modeling and econometric support for the investment-motivated saving hypothesis.
24. Air pollution is a serious problem. Of the 20 cities in the world identified by the
World Bank as having the dirtiest air, 16 of them are in China. It is shocking that
lead and mercury poisoning are more common than expected. See Financial Times
(2004) and Oster (2006a).
25. The shortage is reported to be most acute in Taiyuan in Shanxi and Tianjin (Becker
2003).
26. Some 60 percent of the land in Tianjin municipality is plagued by subsistence
(Becker 2003).
27. Examples of serious water pollution are Agence France-Presse (2006); Ma (2001);
Straits Times (2003); Yardley (2004, 2006).
28. This is average of the 3,800 square miles reported in Howard (2004) and the 4,014
square miles reported in the South China Morning Post (2002).
29. The number of major sandstorms in China was 5 in the 1950–1959 period, 8 in
1960–1969, 13 in 1970–1979, 14 in 1980–1989, 23 in 1990–1999, 14 in 2000, 26
in 2001, 16 in 2002, and 11 in 2003, according to Pumin (2005).
30. The National Development and Reform Commission (2007) reported: “The
regional distribution of precipitation shows that the decrease in annual precipitation was significant in most of northern China, eastern part of the northwest, and
northeastern China, averaging 20~40 mm/10a, with decrease in northern China
being most severe; while precipitation significantly increased in southern China
and southwestern China, averaging 20~60 mm/10a. . . . The frequency and intensity of extreme climate/weather events throughout China have experienced obvious changes during the last 50 years. Drought in northern and northeastern China,
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and flood in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and southeastern
China have become more severe.”
31. A lower estimate of 300,000 is given in Eckholm (2002).
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State Enterprise Reform in China
Grasp or Release?
Mary E. Lovely
Yang Liang
Syracuse University

Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese government moved
aggressively to close loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
to restructure underperforming state assets deemed central to economic
development. Over the next decade, the state laid off almost 50 million workers—40 percent of the public-enterprise workforce (Naughton
2007, p. 179). The adjustment of labor and other factors to this restructuring accommodated the rise of private enterprises and ushered in a
sustained period of productivity growth. The wealth of newly minted
entrepreneurs attested to the success of China’s “privatization” of its
industrial sector (Lardy 2014; Nee and Opper 2012).
While much attention has focused on the performance of China’s
private sector, its state sector is now coming under renewed international scrutiny. Even with the ascendancy of the private sector, China’s
state-owned and state-controlled enterprises have hardly disappeared
and are among the country’s largest firms. Geopolitically, this renewed
interest is partly due to trade conflict in industries dominated by state
enterprises, such as steel and shipbuilding, where shifts in global
demand following the Great Recession led to global overcapacity and
falling prices. Despite two decades of reform, state enterprises continue to dominate major sectors of the Chinese economy and have also
emerged as global titans. Kowalski et al. (2013) investigate the extent
of state ownership among the world’s 2,000 largest companies—the socalled Forbes Global 2,000—and their 330,000 subsidiaries worldwide.
Using an equally weighted average of shares of state-owned enterprises
in sales, assets, and market value of the country’s top 10 firms, they
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find that China tops the list of countries with the highest state presence
among its globally elite enterprises.
That state firms remain an important aspect of the Chinese economy
is not a surprise since, as Naughton (2007) notes, “there has never been
a clearly articulated rationale for privatization” (p. 324). Without a specific privatization policy, the nature of industrial restructuring must be
discerned from the historical record. In this chapter, we examine the
characteristics of firms that were retained by the Chinese state and those
that were released to the private sector. We begin our analysis by tracking the evolution of enterprises away from China’s state sector, a task
complicated by alternative definitions of state control, limited data, and
opaque ownership arrangements. An initial contribution of this chapter,
then, is the provision of new estimates of the size of the state sector,
with a comparison to other recent characterizations in the literature.
To better understand the factors that influenced state decision making, we review and categorize various descriptions of the objectives of
both central and local governments in enterprise restructuring. We then
formulate these views as hypotheses and test them using data from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Production. We employ a linear probability model to link firm characteristics to the likelihood of remaining
under state control. We undertake this exercise for two time intervals:
1998–2002, a period following massive urban state-owned enterprise
(SOE) restructuring and significant labor unrest; and 2002–2006, the
early years of the Hu administration.1 We then summarize the findings
of recent analyses of restructuring’s success in reducing factor misallocations and, hence, its contribution to productivity growth. Finally,
we use our analysis of the grasp-or-release decision to highlight some
of the challenges of continued SOE reforms.

OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING, ENTERPRISE
CLASSIFICATION, AND THE EXTENT OF STATE
CONTROL IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Identification and measurement of the Chinese “state sector” are
complicated by the variety of ways in which state-controlled firms are
organized. According to Gan (2009), SOE restructuring stems from
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policies initiated in the 1980s and early 1990 permitting changes to
enterprise governance structures rather than outright privatization. The
formal adoption of the Company Law in 1994 provided a legal framework into which different ownership forms could fit. The law permitted
the formal conversion of state-owned enterprises to joint stock companies, allowing for the option of selling off some or all shares of the new
organization (Naughton 2007, p. 301). Shareholding conversion, called
“corporatization” when the state retains a controlling interest, became a
broad-based initiative after 1997 when the Chinese Communist Party’s
Fifteenth Congress elevated the shareholding system as a vehicle for
enterprise restructuring. The changing ownership composition was also
shaped by the adoption at the Fifteenth Party Congress of the policy
known as “grasping the large, letting go of the small” (Gan, Guo, and
Xu 2015). This policy sought to protect and promote the largest, typically centrally controlled, state enterprises while spurring the privatization or exit of smaller, often loss-making, enterprises controlled by
lower levels of government. The policy quickly led to dramatic changes
in China’s industrial sector. Jefferson et al. (2005) find that from 1997
to 2001 the number of large and medium-sized SOEs declined by over
40 percent, and the number of large and medium-sized collective enterprises declined by 35 percent, while the number of shareholding firms
soared.
These policies resulted in a distinct blurring of boundaries between
state-controlled and privately held enterprises. Since 2001, the evolution of the Chinese industrial sector has continued, but tracking the
extent to which state control has receded is difficult. China’s National
Bureau of Statistics assigns each firm an ownership classification,
known as its “registration status.” State-owned enterprises include
those that are majority owned by the central government or a local
government, those registered to the state but jointly operated with a
nonstate entity, and those wholly state owned. Private firms, by registration status, include those registered to natural persons, whether solely,
in partnership, as limited liability enterprises, or shareholding firms.
Distinctions between ownership types become truly opaque in another
type of domestic registration status, legal persons. Firms registered as
legal persons include limited liability and shareholding limited liability
firms. Their relationship to the state is not indicated by their registration
status. An additional complication is that the state may control firms in

86 Lovely and Liang

which it has only a minority holding, firms that are correctly registered
as private or foreign owned. These complexities imply that measures
of the state-controlled industrial share drawn from aggregate statistics
based on registration type are misleading.
Enterprises registered as legal persons are mostly shareholding
firms, an organizational form integral to reform of China’s state-owned
enterprises (Jefferson et al. 2005). Shareholding firms may operate under
state control, may be privately controlled, or may simply be “hybrid
ownership.” Fortunately, progress in identifying firms not classified as
SOEs by registration status yet controlled by the state can be made by
accessing additional information contained in China’s Annual Survey
of Industrial Production (ASIP). This census of all state-owned enterprises and other industrial firms with revenues above 5 million RMB
is available to us for the period 1998–2006 only. The ASIP includes
information on the origin of the various sources of registered capital
in the firm—the state, collectives, legal persons, private persons, and
foreigners.2 This information on equity shares can be used to classify
firms based on majority ownership. If 50 percent or more of equity
originates from state, collective, private, or foreign sources, the enterprise can be reclassified accordingly. However, for many firms, legal
person is a significant source of capital, making it impossible to classify
these firms based on paid-in capital shares alone. Indeed, of the 54,320
firms officially registered as legal person, 21,910 enterprises cannot be
reclassified using equity information because the majority of their capital originates from a legal person. In other words, equity shares do not
allow us to completely peer around the veil of legal-person status.
Other researchers have faced this problem. Dollar and Wei (2007)
add legal-person capital to private capital before calculating majority
ownership. While subsequent researchers have followed the same procedure, this method ignores Huang’s (2008) observation that categorizing legal-person firms as private can be misleading because “(e)ven a
casual glance at the data reveals that many of these legal-person shareholding firms are among the best-known and quintessential SOEs in
China” (p. 16). Huang concludes that “(t)he majority of the shareholding firms, especially the large ones, are still state-controlled” (p. 46).
His observation suggests that an alternative grouping of firms, in which
legal-person capital is treated as state-owned capital before calculating
majority ownership, is also reasonable.3 Kamal and Lovely (2013) take
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a middle approach in their study of labor misallocation: they separate
legal-person enterprises from both SOEs and firms registered as privately owned.
Fortunately, the ASIP contains additional information that defines
the firm’s controlling shareholder as either the state, a collective, a foreigner, or a private person. Together with data on equity shares, the ASIP
allows us to define state-owned and state-controlled (SOSC) firms. We
define a firm as SOSC when it is registered as an SOE, when the share
of registered capital held directly by the state exceeds or equals 50 percent, or when the state is reported as the controlling shareholder. The
method captures those firms registered as SOEs and those in which the
state holds a controlling interest, whether directly or through a holding
company. Hsieh and Song (2015) use a similar method to identify statecontrolled firms, and they report that this method resulted in correct
categorization when they manually checked the results using information directly from firm websites.4
To identify enterprises that remain under state control from those
that transition to another type of ownership, we need to trace firms over
time. However, linking firms across years can be problematic because
firm IDs may be changed or missing when there are revisions in legal
registration status. We follow Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang’s
(2012) method of constructing complete firm histories. We supplement
matching via the firm’s Legal Person Entity Code with matching based
on five additional identifiers: firm name, industry code, geographic
code, founding year, and name of main product. After completing this
multistep procedure, we can match over time more than 95 percent of
the firms in the data set.
The state sector appears to recede far less when corporatized yet
state-controlled firms are included in the definition of state enterprises
rather than considered private firms. Figure 5.1 shows trends in the share
of total enterprises by type of ownership. When ownership is defined
using NBS registration status, the number of state-owned enterprises
falls by more than 90 percent between 1998 and 2006, accounting for
only about 3 percent of all above-scale firms by 2006.5 However, using
information on equity shares to define ownership allows us to observe
another 1 percent of firms as being state majority owned in 2006. We
also find an additional 1 percent of firms for which ownership cannot be
determined directly from paid-in capital shares but which are identified
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Figure 5.1 Shares of Total Enterprises, by Type of State Control
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as state controlled by the NBS. In total, we find that about 5 percent of
total enterprises are state owned and controlled in 2006.
If these adjustments seem too small to bother with, Table 5.1 shows
that the state controls a much larger share of industrial output than the
number of firms might suggest. As seen in Figure 5.2, firms registered
as SOEs account for 15 percent of gross industrial output, even though
they make up only 3 percent of all enterprises. Similarly, corporatized
firms controlled by the state punch above their numbers due to their
larger than average size. Firms in which the state owns 50 percent or
more of registered capital provide 5.4 percent of gross output, while
firms controlled by the state without having registered majority state
ownership account for fully 11 percent of gross output. Altogether, as
shown in Figure 5.2, SOSC enterprises provided 31.4 percent of gross
industrial output by 2006, more than double the share produced by registered SOEs, and that the decline in state share appears to level out by
2005.
Figure 5.3 shows trends in output shares for SOSC firms, distinguished by their official registration type. While about 60 percent of
state-controlled firms are registered as SOEs, the share of SOSC firms
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Table 5.1 Enterprise Size and Performance: Linear Probability Model of
Firm Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 1998–2002
and 2002–2006
1998–2002
2002–2006
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
ln Output value
0.0506***
0.0472***
0.0606***
0.0481***
(normed)
(0.00299)
(0.00541)
(0.00241)
(0.00740)
ln Viability
0.0491***
0.0329***
0.0352***
0.0275***
(0.00475)
(0.00456)
(0.00661)
(0.00611)
ln Return on
−0.0326***
−0.0258***
−0.0340***
−0.0157***
assets
(0.00428)
(0.00465)
(0.00544)
(0.00480)
Observations
55,502
55,502
35,719
35,719
Industry fixed
No
Yes
No
Yes
effects
NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if firm
remains state owned or state controlled over full-time period. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

registered as limited liability corporations grew dramatically after 2001.
Recognizing that firms officially registered as legal-person enterprises
are larger than average, properly classifying these organizational forms
is integral to tracking the extent of state control in China’s industrial
sector. Proper classification leads to quite different conclusions about
the extent of “privatization” from that drawn using registration type
alone. We conclude that the Chinese state continues to control firms
supplying more than 30 percent of industrial output and that earlier
downward trends in the state share appear to level off by 2005.

GRASPING AND RELEASING
Large-scale restructuring of China’s state-owned firms began in the
late 1990s. As we have shown, this process resulted in a smaller share
of firms owned by the state. With about a third of gross industrial output still under state control, however, we now examine the characteristics of those enterprises chosen by the state to be released and which it

90 Lovely and Liang
Figure 5.2 Shares of Gross Industrial Output Value, by Type of
State Control
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Figure 5.3 Shares by Registration Type among State-Owned,
State-Controlled Enterprises
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chose to grasp. Such an analysis provides insight into both the process
of sculpting the modern state sector in China, and also the problems that
continued to face the state industrial sector after 2006.
The slogan “grasp the large, let go of the small” suggests that
enterprise performance was a major determinant of decisions about
industrial restructuring. Naughton (2007) reports that “In ‘grasping the
large,’ policymakers sought to focus their attention on the largest, typically centrally controlled firms” (p. 31). In addition to size, the financial
status of the firm likely contributed to the retention decision. An impetus for selling assets, especially at the local level, was the negative budgetary impact associated with loss-making and insolvent enterprises.
Firms with debts in excess of the value of their assets were essentially
bankrupt. Because of “soft budget constraints” in the period before
restructuring, enterprises could lose money for a prolonged period yet
continue to receive financing and investment. These injections of funds
sapped the resources of local governments and contributed to concerns
about government indebtedness. As reported by Gan, Guo, and Xu
(2015, p. 7), by the late 1990s, “the deteriorating performance of SOEs
put increasing pressure on the fiscal conditions of local governments
because they are the residual claimants of the SOE earnings and some
were on the verge of insolvency following the losses of their SOEs.”
While selling off the shares of insolvent firms may have solved the
government’s problem, finding buyers for such firms would be difficult
without some indication that the firm could be profitable. Consequently,
profitability may also have been a factor in determining which enterprises the state retained, with better-performing firms being sold while
others were held under various organizational forms. We can summarize these enterprise performance criteria for retaining a firm under state
control in the following hypothesis:
H1: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enterprise that, ceteris paribus, was larger, financially viable, and less
profitable. These factors matter in both time periods, 1998–2002 and
2002–2006.
To test this hypothesis, we measure the size, viability, and profitability of each firm in the initial year of each time period. Table 5.2
provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in our regression
analysis. We measure enterprise size as the gross value of industrial

92 Lovely and Liang

output of the firm relative to the average output value of private firms
in the same three-digit industry. Viability is measured as the ratio for
the firm of total current assets to total current liabilities. Lastly, we use
sales revenue divided by total assets of the enterprise as a measure of
firm profitability.
Some observers express the view that privatization was shaped by a
desire to continue to guide economic development through the allocation of resources to sectors with strategic importance. Naughton (2007)
states that the central government concentrated its focus on energy,
natural resources, and other industries with large economies of scale.
These upstream industries provide inputs into many different industrial
activities and thus have strategic importance in driving economic development. The state may then have sought to retain control of firms in the
upstream industries.
While local governments were given de jure control rights for local
SOEs in 1997, the pressures they faced to restructure were associated
with their own resources and assets. Lower levels of government held
assets that may have been deemed less strategically important and more
tempting to use as a source of revenue. Gan, Guo, and Xu (2015) find
that direct sales of firm assets to insiders was the method of privatization
used most often by local governments to release local SOEs from state
control. This method of privatization is the most controversial because
it lacks transparency and may result in the underpricing of state assets.
Thus, local governments may have found SOEs under their jurisdiction
less strategically important to retain and more tempting to sell off. We
can summarize these strategic importance perspectives on state control
in the following hypothesis:
H2: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enterprise that, ceteris paribus, was further upstream in the industrial sector
and was affiliated with a higher level of government.
To measure strategic importance, we control for the degree of
“upstreamness” of the three-digit industry to which the enterprise
belongs. We measure this industry characteristic using the upstream
index for two-digit sectors created by Tang, Wang, and Wang (2016)
for China using the method of Antras et al. (2012). The index essentially measures the number of industries between a producer and the
final consumer, with a higher number indicating that the firm has a
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Table 5.2 Description of Variables Used in Regression Analysis

State owned or
state controlled

Description
=1 if start as SOSC and remain
SOSC to end of period (see text
for definition of SOSC)

Mean
1998–2002
0.45
(0.50)

Mean
2002–2006
0.39
(0.49)

ln Output value
(normed)

Log of output value divided by
averaged private firm’s output
value in same 3-digit industry

−1.38
(2.10)

−1.31
(2.09)

ln Viability

Log of total current assets divided
by total current liabilities

−0.16
(0.82)

−0.13
(0.94)

ln Return on assets

Log of industrial sales revenue
divided by total assets

−1.04
(1.24)

−0.95
(1.31)

Social burden

Log of the ratio of firm’s industrial
sales per worker to the averaged
industrial sales per worker in the
same 3-digit industry

−1.44
(1.36)

−1.25
(1.37)

Strategic burden

Log of ratio of industry’s total
export values to industry’s total
domestic sales

−2.84
(1.63)

−2.91
(1.61)

Upstream index

From Tang, Wang, and Wang
(2014)

3.30
(0.55)

3.33
(0.56)

Central affiliated

Enterprise affiliated with
central government

0.07
(0.25)

0.09
(0.28)

Province affiliated

Enterprise affiliated with a
provincial government

0.13
(0.33)

0.17
(0.38)

City affiliated

Enterprise affiliated with a city
government

0.25
(0.43)

0.25
(0.43)

Private competition

Share of output in 3-digit industry
from private enterprises

0.04
(0.03)

0.13
(0.10)

Foreign-invested
enterprise
competition

Share of output in 3-digit industry
from foreign-invested enterprises

0.11
(0.09)

0.12
(0.11)

Central state-owned
enterprise
competition

Share of output in 3-digit industry
from state-owned enterprises

0.09
(0.16)

0.08
(0.16)

NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Data drawn from China’s NBS Annual Survey of Industrial Production.

94 Lovely and Liang

more upstream location in the production chain. We also include a set
of dummy variables indicating the level of government with which the
enterprise is affiliated. The ASIP contains this information, distinguishing between central, provincial, city, or town government affiliation.
The last set of explanations for privatization decisions refers to
what we can term “legacy burdens.” These burdens reflect the use of
state enterprises to achieve goals other than production and take three
forms: social burdens, strategic burdens, and competitive burdens.
Because these burdens reduce the efficiency and profitability of state
enterprises, they distinguish firms that may be difficult to sell off without prior restructuring and that fill an important and continuing social
obligation.
Prior to the mid-1990s, state enterprises often served to ensure full
employment in urban areas, a responsibility for social stability termed
the “social burden” by Lin (2012). Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008) explain
that SOE managers were prohibited from firing urban workers and that
municipal governments continued to place workers into state-sector
jobs well into the 1990s even when they were not required. We hypothesize that excess staffing would contribute to the desirability of privatizing a firm to increase productivity, but the problem of uninsured and
unemployed workers would remain. Indeed, Lin argues that much of
this responsibility remains today with SOEs, who still shoulder a social
burden.
Another burden identified by Lin (2012) is what he terms the
“strategic burden.” This handicap resulted from the presence of state
enterprises in sectors deemed strategically important for economic
development but not in line with China’s comparative advantage.
These enterprises would not be viable without significant state support,
including competitive restrictions. To the extent that the state continues
to seek industrial upgrading, they may have retained control of enterprises in these “comparative-advantage-defying” industries.
A final burden for state enterprises flows from a competitive squeeze
experienced by local SOEs operating in sectors dominated by foreigninvested firms and large, centrally controlled SOEs. These enterprises
may not be able to withstand the pressure of more advanced competitors and, thus, may be allowed to go bankrupt or be sold.
We can summarize these legacy-burden considerations in the following hypothesis.

State Enterprise Reform in China 95

H3: The Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enterprise if, ceteris paribus, it bore a larger social burden; it bore a strategic
burden related to comparative disadvantage; it was subject to a competitive squeeze from foreign firms and large SOEs.
To measure the social burden borne by a firm, we create an index of
overstaffing based on average labor productivity in the industry. Specifically, we calculate sales revenue per employee in each given firm and
divide by the average sales per employee in the firm’s three-digit industry. Higher values of the index indicate that the firm has a higher labor
productivity relative to the average firm in the industry. The strategic
burden reflects an industry’s comparative advantage, so we create an
industry-level measure based on the ratio of export sales to total domestic sales. Higher values of this measure indicate that the industry has
strong international sales. Lastly, we control for the competitive squeeze
by including the market share in each three-digit industry of private
firms, foreign-invested enterprises, and centrally affiliated SOEs.

REGRESSION RESULTS
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a linear probability model of the
likelihood that a state enterprise remains active and state controlled by
the end of the period.6 Our dependent variable takes the value of unity
if an initially state-controlled firm remains state controlled, using the
method of classifying enterprises as SOSC described above, until the
last year in the interval. Since China experienced a change of regime
(President Hu took office in December 2002) and reemphasized deepening SOE reform in the 16th CPC Plenary Session, we divide our sample
into two periods. The sample contains 67,509 initially state-controlled
firms for the period 1998–2002 and 40,857 initially state-controlled
firms for the period 2002–2006.
Table 5.1 provides the results of the linear probability estimation,
including only those variables related to firm performance. We use
these results to test the hypothesis that the government was more likely
to retain control of an enterprise that, ceteris paribus, was larger, financially viable, and less profitable. For each period we provide estimates
with and without the inclusion of an industry fixed effect.
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As seen in Table 5.1, all three firm performance indicators are significant determinants of state retention. The estimated coefficient on
enterprise size, normed by average industry output value, is positive
and highly significant in both time periods. The coefficient, when estimated with industry fixed effects, is of very similar magnitude in both
periods. A 1 percent increase in a firm’s output value relative to the
industry average, all else equal, raises the probability that it is retained
by the state by about 5 percentage points.
A firm’s financial viability, measured as the ratio of its assets to its
liabilities, is also a significant determinant of state retention. When we
include industry fixed effects, the estimated coefficient implies that a 1
percent increase in this ratio raises the probability that the state maintains control by about 3 percentage points. This finding is consistent
with the view that the state sold off enterprises that were bankrupt.
Our last indicator of firm performance is ROA, the ratio of firm
revenues to assets. The estimated coefficient is negative and highly
significant, even when we include industry fixed effects. A 1 percent
increase in this revenue ratio reduces the likelihood of state retention
by 2.6 percentage points over the period 1998–2002 and by 1.6 points
over the period 2002–2006. This finding is consistent with state retention of underperforming assets. In the data set, 45 percent of initially
SOSC firms remain state controlled by 2002 and 39 percent by 2006,
so the magnitudes of the marginal effects on retention decisions of all
three firm performance factors appear to be both economically and statistically significant.
We extend our analysis with the results shown in Table 5.3, which
provides coefficient estimates obtained by adding the strategic importance characteristics to our linear probability model. We hypothesize
that the Chinese state was more likely to retain control of an enterprise
that, ceteris paribus, was further upstream in the industrial sector and
was affiliated with a higher level of government. Since our upstream
index is an industry characteristic, we do not include industry fixed
effects in these models.
Surprisingly, we find that the upstreamness of the firm’s industry
is not significantly correlated with the probability of state retention in
either period. Moreover, the level of governmental affiliation has no
significant relation to retained control over the period 1998–2002, during which the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee had the
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Table 5.3 Strategic Centrality: Linear Probability Model of Firm
Remaining State Controlled or State Owned, 1998–2002 and
2002–2006

ln Output value
(normed)
ln Viability
ln Return on assets
Upstream index
Central affiliated
Province affiliated
City affiliated
Observations
Industry fixed effects

1998–2002
(1)
(2)
0.0533***
0.0458***
(0.00270)
(0.00239)
0.0467***
0.0345***
(0.00471)
(0.00291)
−0.0350*** −0.0272***
(0.00439)
(0.00374)
0.0150
−0.00899
(0.0197)
(0.0101)
0.144
(0.150)
0.117
(0.0913)
−0.00493
(0.0488)
43,819
43,819
No
No

2002–2006
(3)
(4)
0.0588***
0.0474***
(0.00399)
(0.00390)
0.0489***
0.0321***
(0.00472)
(0.00393)
−0.0269*** −0.0145***
(0.00410)
(0.00391)
0.0164
−0.00222
(0.0228)
(0.0115)
0.216**
(0.0939)
0.167***
(0.0510)
0.0745
(0.0458)
24,686
24,686
No
No

NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0. 01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if firm
remains state owned or state controlled over full time period. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

political support necessary to issue an official policy statement on the
urgency of reform of state-owned enterprises (Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China 1999). Our results suggest that the party was
then able to align the direction of reform at all levels of government.
During the first years of the Hu administration, however, the level
of state affiliation appears to have become a powerful determinant of
whether a firm remained under state control. Being affiliated with the
central government raised the likelihood of remaining state controlled
by an estimated 21.6 percentage points, while affiliation with a province or provincial-level city raised the likelihood of retention by 16.7
percent, both measured relative to the likelihood of retention of firms
affiliated with city or town governments. These estimated magnitudes
are quite large and suggest that corporatization, rather than privatiza-
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tion, became the mode of choice for higher-level governments seeking
to improve the performance of their state assets. Enterprises associated
with local governments were more likely to be privatized or closed, all
else equal, than those affiliated with higher levels.
Table 5.4 provides additional results that include measures of the
legacy burdens faced by each state-controlled firm. We hypothesize that
an enterprise was more likely to be retained if it bore a larger social
burden, bore a strategic burden related to comparative disadvantage,
and was subject to a competitive squeeze from foreign firms and large
SOEs. Among all these factors, our results suggest that only the social
burden is a significant determinant of state privatization decisions. Estimate coefficients for the strategic burden variable, defined as the export
success of the firm’s industry, and all measures of the competitive
squeeze faced by local SOEs are statistically insignificant in both periods. In contrast, the coefficient for social burden is significant in both
periods. Defined as the firm’s sales per worker relative to the average
sales per worker in the industry, social burden is a measure of relative
labor productivity. Our results indicate that a 1 percent increase in this
ratio reduces the likelihood of state retention by 2.7 percentage points
in the first period, 1998–2002, and by 0.8 points in the second period,
2002–2006. Essentially, firms with better labor productivity were more
likely to be privatized or exit than to remain state controlled. This finding supports the view that restructuring did not discharge all SOE social
burdens and that the state sector continues to some extent to bear the
legacy of social stability goals, as argued by Lin (2012).

STATE RESTRUCTURING AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Our regression analysis indicates that larger, more financially stable
firms, especially those affiliated with higher levels of government, were
more likely to remain under state control. We also find that the state
was less likely to shed enterprises with low labor productivity. These
patterns are consistent with the creation of a state sector comprising
firms with dominant industry positions but possibly weak performance.
Explicit comparison of state firms to nonstate firms, a task that has
recently been undertaken by several groups of researchers, is important
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Table 5.4 Legacy Burdens and Competitive Squeeze: Linear Probability
Model of Firm Remaining State Controlled or State Owned,
1998–2002 and 2002–2006
1998–2002
(1)
(2)
ln Output value
0.0541*** 0.0545***
(normed)
(0.00290)
(0.00296)
ln Viability
0.0387*** 0.0379***
(0.00401)
(0.00391)
ln Return on assets
–0.0155*** –0.0158***
(0.00316)
(0.00339)
Upstream index
–0.00814
–0.00954
(0.0106)
(0.0128)
Central affiliated
0.161
0.132
(0.171)
(0.159)
Province affiliated
0.147
0.134
(0.105)
(0.102)
City affiliated
0.00551
–0.00277
(0.0624)
(0.0611)
Social burden
–0.0273*** –0.0271***
(0.00471)
(0.00471)
Strategic burden
–0.0102
–0.0100
(0.00884)
(0.00902)
Private competition
0.0775
(0.183)
Foreign-invested
0.0132
competition
(0.0839)
State-owned enter0.121*
prise competition
(0.0588)
Observations
40,317
40,317
Industry fixed effects
No
No

2002–2006
(3)
(4)
0.0507*** 0.0508***
(0.00429)
(0.00433)
0.0332*** 0.0324***
(0.00420)
(0.00385)
–0.0111*** –0.0111***
(0.00378)
(0.00384)
–0.00334
0.000485
(0.0126)
(0.0142)
0.205*
0.199***
(0.101)
(0.0559)
0.152***
0.145***
(0.0515)
(0.0514)
0.0669
0.0637
(0.0432)
(0.0386)
–0.00887** –0.00853**
(0.00390)
(0.00363)
0.00196
–0.00130
(0.00570)
(0.00738)
0.0269
(0.0865)
0.0928
(0.0935)
0.0147
(0.132)
24,686
24,686
No
No

NOTE: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent variable takes value of 1 if firm
remains state owned or state controlled over full time period. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the two-digit census industry code.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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because if factor productivity is systematically related to state status,
and if inputs are allocated to state-controlled enterprises in a discriminatory manner, the economy will not perform at its full potential.
Performance gaps between SOEs and other types of firms were
present early in the reform process: Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013) find
significant productivity differences between the state and the nonstate
in nonagricultural sectors from 1985 to 2007. By their estimates, over
the entire period, misallocation of factors between the state and nonstate sectors and across provinces lowered aggregate nonagricultural
total factor productivity (TFP) by an average of 20 percent. Interestingly, given the massive layoffs of state workers beginning in the mid1990s, these losses—after initially declining—increased appreciably as
retrenchment expanded. Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu attribute these trends
almost exclusively to increasing misallocation of capital between state
and nonstate sectors caused by contemporaneous government policies that encouraged investments in state enterprises at the expense of
investments in the more productive nonstate sector.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also emphasize the systematic distortions
caused by preferential access to capital in their assessment of the economic cost of an inefficient state sector. Relying on firm-level data to
calculate total factor productivity, measured by revenue productivity,
for Chinese firms over the period 1998–2005, they find that state-owned
firms exhibit 41 percent lower TFP than nonstate firms, an outcome consistent with the provision of subsidies to these firms to remain active.
These findings agree with Dollar and Wei (2007), who also find lower
productivity at state-owned firms in China during this time.
Misallocation of labor has also been found by researchers using
Chinese microdata. Fleisher et al. (2011) find that the marginal product of both highly and less-educated workers is lower in SOEs than in
domestic private or foreign-invested firms. Kamal and Lovely (2013)
also focus on the allocation of labor across enterprises with a special
emphasis on how SOEs compare to enterprises owned by legal persons,
a category that includes “corporatized” state-owned firms. They calculate the marginal revenue product of labor for all firms in the ASIP
during two periods, 2001–2004 and 2004–2007. They find that labor
productivity varies systematically within industries by ownership type
and that all organizational forms, on average, exhibit higher labor productivities than do SOEs. Indeed, labor in enterprises registered as legal
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persons had a higher average product than labor employed in private
firms. Kamal and Lovely also find that labor productivity differentials
fell over time, with the gap between SOEs and other firm types falling
by about half between the two periods they analyze.
Several recent studies account for the sources of China’s economic
growth, attempting to discern the particular contribution of SOE restructuring. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) estimate TFP at the
firm level using the ASIP for the period 1998–2007. They find that the
main source of growing aggregate TFP is productivity improvement in
continuing firms and the entry of new firms with higher productivity.
They also find that large Chinese firms increased productivity at a faster
than average rate, and the restructuring of large state-owned firms was
one driver for this pattern. The authors identify an important dynamic
as the state sector receded: “The relative success in attracting new input
factors determined relative growth rates. New state firms that appeared
between 1998 and 2007 were able to produce almost five times as much
value-added as disappearing state firms, even though their real capital stock only grew marginally and employment was a quarter lower”
(p. 35). Despite this positive dynamic pattern, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck,
and Zhang suggest that biases in favor of state-connected firms likely
depressed productivity growth after 2007.
Hsieh and Song (2015) measure the quantitative importance of the
restructuring policies pursued from 1998 to 2007 on aggregate productivity growth. They find that reforms were potentially responsible for
20 percent of aggregate output by 2007. Explicitly comparing surviving
state-owned firms to those that were privatized, Hsieh and Song find
that for both types the labor productivity gap with surviving private
firms narrowed, a finding consistent with Kamal and Lovely (2013),
while the capital productivity gap narrowed by much less. Indeed, their
estimates indicate that as late as 2007, capital productivity of stateowned firms was less than 50 percent of private firms.
In light of our estimates, the lower productivity of state-controlled
firms appears a natural consequence of how enterprises were grasped
and released. Our linear probability model estimates suggest that the
state was more likely to retain control of firms that produced low revenues relative to assets and that exhibited relatively low labor productivity. The picture that emerges is one in which the state sector was
shaped by retention of firms that required continued preferential access
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to capital and that suffered from the failure to develop adequate alternative policies for redundant workers. It is not surprising, therefore, that
average state sector productivity continued to lag behind the private
sector, despite innovation in the form of state control.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
After several decades of retrenchment, the Chinese state remains a
dominant player in several strategic industries. State-controlled enterprises provide most of the output in the heavy industries, including
oil production and distribution, minerals and mining, steel, shipbuilding, and transportation equipment. The state also continues to control
important pieces of the service sector: construction, utilities, financial
services, media, and air travel and logistics.
The outlook for the foreseeable future is one in which the Chinese
state continues to play a major role in the economy. Hsieh and Song
(2015) find that after 2005, privatization rates declined on average even
though they increased for small firms. Based on an analysis of industrylevel data, they also suggest that there was little convergence in capital
productivity from 2007 to 2012. This finding suggests a continuing cost
in terms of lost national income, especially since, according to China’s
NBS, “state-owned and controlled enterprises” accounted for 41 percent of fixed asset investment from 2004 to 2012.
A recent study from Goldman Sachs Investment Strategy Group
(2016) also supports the view that the return on state sector assets continues to lag. They report that “about 150,000 SOEs control over $15
trillion of assets in China, which in aggregate and excluding financial
institutions returned 2.4 percent as of 2014” (p. 26). This return on
assets can be compared to a 3.1 percent return estimated for comparable
Chinese listed companies and 6.4 percent for U.S. companies. These
numbers indicate continuing low profitability for Chinese SOEs.
Aside from lost productivity, continued differential investment into
state enterprises may make the goal of macroeconomic rebalancing
more difficult to achieve. To raise consumption, Chinese households
must receive a larger share of aggregate income. However, while some
parts of the state sector are very profitable, almost none of this profit
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is returned to the public for services or to reduce taxes. Rather, it is
reinvested by the state sector. The likely response of households to this
continuing pattern is to continue to hold high savings balances. Because
continued investment in the state sector produces low returns or is nonproductive, households may guard against the effect of future financial
repression by saving for future higher taxes or service cuts. Investment
in the state sector, in this sense, conflicts with the goal of pivoting the
economy toward consumption-led growth.
In 2015, the CPC Central Committee and State Council issued
guidelines for SOE reform emphasizing the desire for “mixed ownership,” with private investors becoming shareholders in state-controlled
firms (Xinhua 2015). Our analysis of the history of grasping and releasing suggests that the state will continue to control the largest firms,
especially those affiliated with higher levels of government, in a variety
of forms. Our review of recent assessments of the role of SOE reform
in China’s growth suggests that significant productivity gains have
stemmed from privatization and corporatization. Despite these gains,
however, SOEs as a whole continue to provide subpar returns on assets
while receiving a disproportionate share of total investment. How much
more their performance can be enhanced by further promotion of mixed
ownership without full privatization remains an open question.

Notes
1. To flag wavering commitment to continued adjustment, a policy directive was
issued in 1999 emphasizing the urgency of continued SOE reforms. See Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (1999).
2. Foreign-owned includes capital from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and all other
foreign sources.
3. Other methods for classifying firms have also been used. For example, Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) use equity shares to classify firms as state,
private, or hybrid.
4. Hsieh and Song (2015) do not select firms based on registration type, whereas we
include registered SOEs as SOSC firms. This difference in method makes only a
minor difference in the resulting state share estimates, as registered capital held by
the state in most registered SOEs exceeds 50 percent.
5. Collective enterprises also declined sharply in number, falling 85 percent over the
period. In contrast, firms registered as private enterprises rose sharply—the number of private firms grew 670 percent and constituted over half of all above-scale
firms by 2006. The number of firms registered as legal persons, most of which are
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shareholding enterprises, rose 160 percent by 2006. See Kamal and Lovely (2013)
for more details.
6. A drawback of the linear probability model is that the estimated coefficients can
imply probabilities outside the unit interval [0,1]. The model also implies constant
marginal effects. We use the linear probability model here because the coefficient
values permit straightforward interpretation. When we use a logit model, our qualitative results remain unchanged.
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Why Exit Rights Are the Key
to the Reduction of Urban-Rural
Income Disparity in China
Guanzhong James Wen
Trinity College

Since the adoption of the “open up and reform” policy in 1978,
China has reached many economic milestones. Until recently, it had
maintained an average growth rate that was not only higher but also
longer than almost any other nation in modern history (Naughton and
Tsai 2015).
China is now the second-largest economy and is poised to become
the largest in a not too distant future. It currently holds the largest foreign reserves, producing almost half of the world’s total steel and coal,
and is the biggest producer of many important industrial products.
However, China also has been facing some challenges. This chapter
discusses the following issues:
• The change in China’s social structure has been lingering much
more slowly behind that in its economic structure, resulting in
relatively impoverished farmers and migrant workers, languorous rural communities, and an inefficient farming sector compared with its urban areas.
• Two institutional barriers will result in a middle-income trap
through exclusive urbanization: the hukou system and the compulsory collective land ownership.
• The reasons it is impossible for China to develop a real land
market under its Constitutional stipulation.
• The essence of market allocation: price mechanism.
• How to balance between efficiency represented by market allocation and control of externalities represented by urban planning
and zoning.
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Toward the end of this chapter, I propose how to reform the land
tenure system in China.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
As mentioned above, China’s growth rate since 1979 has been
ranked among the highest for the longest period for almost any nation
in modern history—a great achievement of China’s open and reform
policy. However, as shown in the next two sections, its income disparity, particularly its urban/rural income ratio, has become one of the
worst in East Asia, and perhaps in the world.
The World Bank (1993) defines the real economic miracle as growth
with equity. There is truth in this definition. Many countries have
achieved high growth, but few have achieved good income distribution.
Among those having achieved relatively equal income distribution, most
found their economic growth stagnated. Few nations have achieved high
growth and relatively equal income distribution at the same time. For
these few, they truly deserve to be crowned as economic miracles.
To achieve this, it is necessary to keep the sectoral share in the total
labor force (defined here as the social structure) close to its sectoral
share in total GDP (defined here as the economic structure). In other
words, the social structure should evolve closely and in the same direction as the economic structure (Wen 2013).
In China’s context, the share of agriculture in the total labor force
should follow the trend of a declining share of agriculture in total GDP.
To achieve this, the rural population must find their way out of the agricultural sector as its share in total GDP falls.
Developed economies have already reached a very low farming
share in GDP (2–5 percent) and a correspondingly low farming share in
total population (2–9 percent). It took several hundred years for them to
achieve both. The other East Asian economies accomplished this much
faster, in roughly 30–40 years, starting from the early 1960s after a land
reform to provide farmers an equal footing in land distribution in the
early 1950s. The rights to free land trading and free rural-urban migrating enabled Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to not only achieve high
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growth but also help prevent the worsening of their urban/rural income
distributions. According to Oshima (1998, Figure 1), the values of the
Gini coefficient in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan never exceeded
0.4 during the period 1955–1995. Since then, their social structures
have been evolving closely to the changes in their economic structure
because without institutional barriers, farmers could freely trade their
land and freely migrate to urban areas and to settle down there.
The Much-Worsened Income Distribution
However, Oshima (1998, Figure 1) shows that, in sharp contrast,
China started with a relatively low Gini coefficient value of around 0.2
in the mid-1960s; this value rose significantly above 0.4 by the mid1990s. Since then, the income distribution has worsened until recently.
According to Wildau and Mitchell (2016), the value of the Gini coefficient in China rose to 0.49 in 2012.
Han, Zhao, and Zhang (2016) put China’s income distribution
inequality in a more global perspective. As Figure 6.1 shows, the value
of China’s Gini coefficient (0.481) was very close to that of the Latin
American average (0.486), and significantly higher than that of several
other continents.
In addition to high values of the Gini coefficient, the urban/rural
ratio in China is also very high. Based on China’s official data (Xinhua
2017), the urban/rural income ratio was 2.72 in 2016.1 Using this ratio,
one can easily see that the average income of people living in rural
areas was only about 36.76 percent of the income of those living in
urban areas. This ratio was once as high as 3.3:1 in 2013; obviously
this indicator is now looking better.2 However, in terms of income gap,
the urban-rural income disparity is still worsening—it increased from
CNY19,758 in 2015 to CNY21,253 in 2016 (Xinhua 2017).

WHY CAN ONLY ENDOGENOUS URBANIZATION BEST
ACCOMMODATE RURAL POPULATION?
Urbanization provides the best channel of social mobility for the
vast majority of the rural population in terms of their income and their
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Figure 6.1 International Comparison of Gini Coefficient Values
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upward movement along the social ladder. This is attributed to opportunities for greater specialization among these laborers, and to the ability
to combine with the huge stock of capital and human capital agglomerated in urban areas.
When urbanization is endogenous—that is, driven by agglomeration effect, not simply by the government—then those who migrate to
urban areas will be able to earn a higher income, and their children
will have a better education than rural residents in general; otherwise,
people will not choose to leave their native villages.
Figure 6.2 shows the determination of population size in an endogenously urbanizing city. The curve MB represents the marginal benefit
of the agglomeration, and the curve MC represents the marginal cost
of agglomeration, such as congestion, pollution, crime, and legal risks.
The last one is conspicuously significant because of the insecure property rights and seriously distorted land and housing prices. The intersec-
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Figure 6.2 The Agglomeration Effect of Urbanization and the
Deadweight Loss
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tion of the two curves C, or the corresponding point N on the horizontal
axis, indicates the natural population size of the city. The space on its
left, where the MB curve is still above the MC curve, implies that the
net agglomeration is still positive, and the city can generate net gains by
attracting additional migrants.
In other words, positive agglomeration effect can only be exhausted
through trial and error by marginal migrants. To try out this population
boundary of a city, rural residents must have the right to freely relocate
themselves and to freely trade their land in case they decide to settle
down in a city.

THE FIRST TRAP: HUKOU AND LOW SOCIAL MOBILITY
Two institutions stand out as the most important barriers for the
rural population to legally share urban prosperity and to accumulate
wealth on equal footing: the hukou system and the land tenure system.3
China’s hukou system has resulted in urbanization of land much faster
than the growth of the rural population.
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The hukou system, represented by line KD, artificially limits the
size of urban population to OK (O refers to the origin of the graph).
Therefore, population measured by KN is excluded from the benefit of urbanization. The triangle CDE measures the deadweight loss
caused by the hukou system. As mentioned above, for income distribution between urban and rural areas not worsening, the social structure
should evolve in the same direction as a nation’s economic structure
and at a similar pace.
China’s agricultural share in its total GDP has fallen to less than
10 percent, representing a great achievement for China in its effort to
develop its economy. However, given this rapid drop in its agricultural
share in GDP, it is more urgent to reduce the share of its rural population in its total population. It is not a good sign to see that more than 60
percent of its total population is still holding rural hukou, and around 48
percent of its total population is still living in rural areas.
Migrant workers are forbidden to legally settle in urban areas,
although they are legally allowed to work there temporarily, and their
children—some 60 million—are left behind in rural areas. The lack of
educational opportunities in rural areas dictates that most migrant children will have limited human capital and will have low social mobility
and low incomes in the future. If this situation continues, the prospect
for China to improve its urban-rural income distribution is severely
clouded.

THE GOOD NEWS
The central government is gradually dismantling the hukou system.
Although big cities will remain closed to most migrant workers, towns
and small cities are urged to open up to rural migration. Only time will
tell how effective and how soon China can ultimately eliminate the control over free migration and free settlement. It remains to be seen if
the rural population in the Western region is allowed to freely settle in
towns and small cities in China’s prosperous coastal region. If such free
migration and settlement between regions are allowed, the policy will
represent a significant breakthrough.
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THE SECOND TRAP—LAND TENURE SYSTEM
Compared with the hukou system, the land tenure system is an even
bigger trap for the following reasons:
• It gives local governments either a legal basis or an excuse by
misinterpreting Article 10 of China’s Constitution to take rural
land for urban development.
• It prevents the growth of a true land market by prohibiting all
land trading except by the government. The government under
this system becomes a monopsony in buying farmers’ land and
a monopoly in auctioning the leaseholds to developers. The land
price is seriously distorted, either inflated or suppressed.
• The monopolized and seriously distorted land markets have
almost totally ignored the strong demand of migrant workers for
affordable housing thus far. Affordable houses have been supplied by suburban farmers, but they are illegal under the land
system, frequently facing demolition risk, making the permanent
settlement of migrant workers impossible.
In the absence of a true land market, the current land system is
still allocating land through issuing land quotas to provinces and cities, a practice typically seen under the Central Planning System. However, these land quotas are not based on equilibrium land prices, hence,
excess supply and rampant shortage coexist without an automatic correcting mechanism. On one side, ghost towns, idling apartment buildings, and deserted industrial parks are emerging everywhere, especially
in China’s vast inland, but in its coastal areas, housing prices are skyrocketing; on the other side, most of the 2.6 hundred million migrant
workers are living in shelters, slums, ghettos, or urban villages, which
are being bulldozed by the local governments, aggravating the shortage
of affordable housing.
Clearly the current land tenure system has shifted upward the marginal cost of living in an urban area by making housing and rental prices
prohibitively expensive in coastal areas where most migrant workers
could find jobs. Figure 6.2 shows that when the marginal cost curve
shifts up, the size of the city population reduces from point N to point
A, causing another deadweight loss measured by triangle ABC.
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In summary, the current land tenure system has failed to allocate both rural and urban land efficiently, and it has failed to convert
rural land into urban land efficiently and fairly. The last point will be
explained shortly.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING A TRUE LAND
MARKET UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION
Article 10 of China’s Constitution makes it impossible to nurture a
true land market. According to this article,
land in the cities is owned by the State. Land in the rural and
suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions
which belong to the State as prescribed by law; house sites and
privately farmed plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned
by collectives.
The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law,
expropriate or requisition land for its use and make compensation
for the land expropriated or requisitioned.
No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means. The right to
the use of land may be transferred according to law. All organizations and individuals using land must ensure its rational use.

Why is it impossible to develop a real land market under such Constitutional stipulations? First, let’s review the definition of what is a
market economy. According to the MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (Pearce 1992, p. 267), “An economic system in which decisions
about the allocation of resources and production are made on the basis
of prices generated by voluntary exchanges between producers, consumers, workers and owners of factors of production. Decision making in such an economy is decentralized—decisions are made independently by groups and individuals in the economy rather than by central
planners. Market economies usually also involve a system of private
ownership of the means of production—i.e., they are ‘capitalist’ or ‘free
enterprise’ economies.”
Here, voluntary exchanges are most crucial to a market economy.
However, the collective land ownership observed in China is established
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on an involuntary basis. Rural collectives are not allowed to trade land
among themselves, let alone the individual farmers. Even if a collective
is totally inefficient or corrupt, or its leaders are abusive, members are
not allowed to exit with their share of land to regroup a new collective
on a truly voluntary basis. This means that collectives in China are compulsory against the market principle of voluntarism.
This system plays the function of permanently trapping those who
want to leave their native village. They are not allowed to sell their
land for market compensation. The rental market is underdeveloped
and insecure because tenancy is not protected and leasing contracts are
mostly verbal. Some peasants would rather keep their land vacant than
return land to collectives or rent it out. This means that those who are
determined to stay in the farming sector cannot steadily expand their
land scales or significantly increase their incomes because of smallscale land operation. Because they do not own their land, they cannot
use it as collateral when seeking financial services.
Therefore, the land tenure system in its current form is preventing
the emergence of a real land market and consequently is preventing
China’s agriculture from being modernized and more efficient.

WHY IS EQUILIBRIUM LAND PRICE CRUCIAL?
In the absence of a true land market, land prices are not generated
by the forces of supply and demand. Therefore,
• We do not know the opportunity cost of each piece of land in
order to put it to the most valuable (efficient) use.
• We do not know how to fairly compensate those whose land is
taken away by the government.
• We do not know what should be the fair base for property, housing, and capital gains taxes. Without tax revenues from land
properties, governments at all localities will continue to be
addicted to land financing.
• We do not know how to allocate land of different uses in the correct
proportions, because such price information can only be generated
through arbitrage among land of different uses in land markets.
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• We do not know whether the decision on setting 1.8 billion mu
of arable land as a red line is scientifically based.
• We do not know whether estate-based mortgages are overleveraged, leading to housing bubbles and financial crises.
• Urbanization cannot be an endogenous process and cannot sustain because of the distortion in land and housing prices. The
service sector is doomed to be underdeveloped because of the
prohibitively high rentals.
• Ghost towns are mushrooming everywhere, when hundreds of
millions of migrant workers desperately need affordable housing
in the urban areas where they are working and living. Unfortunately, the misallocation of land and housing forces them to live
in slums, shelters, and urban villages.

FREE EXIT RIGHTS ARE THE KEY
Based on the discussion of the hukou and land systems above, we
can see that it is urgent and necessary to thoroughly reform the two systems. In what follows, I want to focus on how to reform the current land
system. To facilitate discussion, we divide all the land in China into
three basic zoning categories conceptually in terms of their relationship
to urbanization:
1) nonurban land—pure farmland and nonfarmland located far
away from any urban areas, thus unlikely to be urbanized in
the foreseeable future;
2) urban land—built-up land located in existing urban areas, thus
fully urbanized;
3) suburban land—the farmland and nonfarmland located close
to urban centers that is yet to be urbanized.
To nurture a true land market, the boundaries of all the plots must be
clearly marked and recorded and their property rights registered before
they can be traded at market without disputes. As a very encouraging
development in this direction, local governments in China have been
certifying land use rights of each farmer by delineating the borders of
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each plot and its legal users. Obviously, the completion of this task
is conducive to the establishment of a true open and competitive land
market.
All the land, however, is either owned by the state (all the urban
land) or collectives (almost all the farmland, including the suburban
land). Individual farmers and urban citizens are not allowed to trade
land. As we mentioned above, the land market in its current form is
monopsonistic because the state is the only legal buyer of land, and
also monopolistic because the state is the only legal supplier of urban
land, far from being a typical land market that is open to everyone on a
competitive level.
To widen participation in a land market to make it open and competitive, it is necessary to allow all plots to be tradable and all the farmers
to participate as sellers or buyers of land. For this reason, the exit rights
must be returned to farmers. As mentioned earlier, the current collective
land ownership was imposed on farmers in the 1950s without necessary consent from farmers. Such imposition was not only a violation of
voluntarism, a principle allegedly cherished by the Chinese Communist
Party, but it also led to rampant inefficiency and frequent power abuse.
In the spirit of voluntarism, farmers should be given the choice to stay
in their current collectives if they like them, to exit to form new collectives on their own initiatives, or to return to family-based farming,
which is the prevailing form of farming in the rest of the world. In other
words, land privatization should be permitted if the party truly respects
initiatives from farmers themselves. In this sense, certifying and documenting all the plots, pushed by the party and government, are correct
and necessary steps toward this direction.
Above I divided all the land into three basic zoning categories. Now
I briefly examine how a true land market will affect each of them. The
long-standing mismatches between demand for and supply of land in
different categories under the current land system will gradually be corrected. First, in urban areas, trading land with different uses will generate the information required for adjusting zoning by observing the
relative prices of industrial, residential, commercial, and infrastructural
land. By gradually easing the restriction on arbitrage among land of
different uses, efficiency in allocating the existing urban land can be
significantly improved. The excess supply of certain types of land, such
as land originally designated as industrial, will be corrected by its fall-
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ing price, and the undersupplied land of another type, such as the land
originally designated as residential, will be corrected by rising price.
Second, by allowing suburban farmland to enter the land market by
farmers’ own initiative without changing zoning categories, China can
avoid the possible chaotic situation that resulted from zoning violations.
At the same time, local governments are not allowed to requisition suburban land unless for the pursuit of public interest. This will immediately lead to the short supply of urban land and increased land prices
where urban areas are growing. The increasing price sends a signal to
zoning authorities to speed up converting suburban farmland into urban
land. The suburban land market is crucially important because it connects urban and rural areas, unifying the whole nation’s land market, and
also helps determine the natural border between rural and urban areas.
Third, more efficient farmers now can expand the operation scale
of their farms through acquiring land at land market, and larger and
modern farms will emerge from such transactions. Those who want to
permanently migrate to urban areas will get compensated when they
sell their land.
As stated earlier, to avoid disorder in land and housing markets, neither sellers nor buyers of any type of land should be allowed to change
the current zoning categories of their land for the time being unless they
first obtain approvals from the government. Under this condition, free
land trade will not trigger a collapse of the land and housing markets.
The fear of a possible collapse of land and housing markets is a main
source of government hesitation in land system reform, a serious concern often cited by those who are opposed to the market-oriented land
reform as a main argument. To remove government’s fear, the current
zoning categories should be kept for a certain period. The planning and
zoning office should gradually adjust zoning categories by designating
more land in suburban areas as urban land if the land price there is rising, and designating less land as urban land in urban areas where the
land price is declining.
To reduce manipulation and interference in the land market, the
government should stop acquisitioning land from local farmers for
nonpublic purposes, as Article 10 of China’s Constitution stipulates.
This means that the role of planning and zoning in China should be
fundamentally reformed; its rise in market economies was, and is still,
a necessary response to the increasing need to address market failure,
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represented by negative externalities and lack of public space due to
urbanization (Wen 2014). However, in China, different from playing a
complementary role in market allocation, as is seen in developed market economies, planning and zoning are a main remnant of its dismantled Central Planning System, and the government has been directly
allocating land by arbitrarily determining land zoning and prohibiting
non-state-owned land to enter land market with equal rights. It is worth
noting that China’s urban planning and zoning are selectively regulating market failures, depending on the type of land ownership, as the
case of the urban village shows.
After establishing a true land market, the main target of planning
and zoning should focus on filtering negative externalities and securing
land of public use, not on filtering out the non-state-owned land. The
thorny issue of urban villages and housing with few property rights will
be resolved accordingly. Since they are either surrounded by or adjacent to urban areas, they should be part of urban land. Therefore, the
local government has the same responsibilities to provide better planning and zoning regulation to all the urban villages and housing with
few property rights, and better infrastructures such as sanitation, clean
water, public toilets, schools, and clinics. In return, the owners in urban
villages and owners of housing with few property rights have full obligation to pay all kinds of property taxes and capital gains taxes. If this
proposal is accepted and enforced, the issue of urban village and housing with few property rights will be an issue of enforcing planning and
zoning instead of an issue of discriminating against nonstate ownership.
Finally, the government should stop relying on land financing and
instead levy property, housing, and capital gains taxes, in addition to
issuing local public bonds to finance local infrastructure, using future
land taxes to pay off. Land taxes are recurrent compared with one-time
land financing. The latter will dry up sooner or later when urbanization
nears an end.

CHINA IS AT A CROSSROADS
China’s urban-rural income disparity is among the worst in the
world. Historical experiences from developed nations and from China’s
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East Asian neighbors eloquently demonstrate that to reduce this disparity, China must rapidly reduce its rural population. Only when a nation’s
social structure matches its economic structure can it achieve the goal
of narrowing its urban/rural income gap. However, not only does 48
percent of China’s total population live in rural areas while its agriculture’s share in total GDP is less than 10 percent, but also 2.6 hundred
million migrant workers remain unsettled in urban areas because of the
hukou system, and because of the prohibitively high housing prices as
a result of the current land tenure system.
As Figure 6.2 shows, the hukou and land systems are causing two
types of deadweight loss—if they can be eliminated, then China can
easily accommodate hundreds of millions of migrant workers and their
families in urban areas. To make its urbanization more efficient and
inclusive, China should focus on urbanizing its rural population rather
than its rural land. If China decides to nationalize all the urban land, as
advocated by some, then it will lose its last chance to develop a land
market. If China is serious about nurturing a true competitive land market, it needs to give farmers the exit rights from compulsory collective
land ownership and legalize land trading as long as the land use is not
changed by users themselves.
China should also unify its land market nationwide. To avoid permanently fragmenting its rural land market, it should not consolidate
the exclusively community-based collective land ownership. China
should also abolish its hukou system as soon as possible. Only when it
implements these two reforms can the country accelerate the absorption
of rural surplus labor. Such an endogenous urbanization will soon significantly improve its urban-rural income disparity, as the experiences
from China’s East Asian neighbors have demonstrated.
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Notes
1. According to this official news agency, “Urban and rural per capita disposable
income reached 33,616 yuan and 12,363 yuan in 2016, up 5.6 percent and 6.2
percent in real terms, respectively, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.”
Based on these two numbers, we can calculate the urban-rural income ratio (See
Xinhua 2017).
2. According to the 2013 data released from the China State Statistical Bureau, in
2012 China’s urban-rural income ratio reached its highest since 1978. In 2012,
urban average income was 17,175 yuan, while it was 5,153 yuan in rural areas,
and the urban-rural income ratio was 3.33:1, compared to 3.32:1 and 3.31:1 in
2007 and 2008, respectively. If we include the hidden benefits received by residents with formal urban hukou, this ratio could rise to 6:1. See http://wenda
.so.com/q/1363044987065138 (in Chinese; accessed June 21, 2017).
3. In 1958, the Chinese government officially promulgated the family register system to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals
were broadly categorized as a rural or urban worker. A worker seeking to move
from the country to urban areas to take up nonagricultural work would have to
apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make
such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers would require six passes to
work in provinces other than their own. People who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employerprovided housing, or health care.
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Trade, Migration, and Growth
Evidence from China
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Citizens in rich countries such as the United States and those in the
European Union have enjoyed two fundamental economic freedoms:
free movement of goods and movement of people. This has not been the
case, however, for citizens in many developing countries, where governments often impose significant restrictions on internal movements of
both goods and people. Economists have argued that these restrictions
create distortions that result in lower income and welfare for the citizens in these countries. Restrictions on free movement of goods shield
inefficient producers from competition and therefore lower the average
productivity of firms and raise the costs of goods faced by consumers. Restrictions on movement of people prevent workers from seeking more productive opportunities and households from moving to
high-income regions, which leads to persistent labor misallocation and
regional income inequality. Removing these restrictions can improve
citizens’ welfare in these countries by increasing product market competition and reducing labor misallocation, which leads to higher aggregate productivity.
In this chapter I use the period 2000–2005 in China as a case study
of the benefits of reducing restrictions on movements of goods and people in an economy. In 2000, China had significant restrictions on internal trade, as well as severe restrictions on movement of people within
the country because of a very stringent household registration system
called hukou. Both restrictions were relaxed between 2000 and 2005.
China also joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of
2001, which required China to reduce its international trade barriers,
especially the import barriers.
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During the same period, China’s real GDP grew more than 11 percent per year. How much of the GDP growth can be attributed to the
reductions in restrictions on movements of goods and people? I will
provide a quantitative answer to this important question.
For background, I first discuss the state of the Chinese economy in
year 2000 and some important changes that happened between 2000
and 2005. I focus my discussion on three aspects: 1) regional income
inequality, 2) internal migration, and 3) trade.

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND
INTERNAL MIGRATION
The cross-province differences in real income have been large in
China. In 2000, the ratio of average real GDP per capita of the top five
provinces to that of the bottom five was almost 4 to 1. Figure 7.1 plots
the spatial distribution of real incomes across the Chinese provinces.
The provinces of the coastal regions in the east generally had substantially higher levels of real income than provinces in the central and
western regions.
Despite the large cross-province income differences, the percentage
of workers who moved between provinces was very low because of a
hukou registration system, which was introduced by the Chinese government in 1958 to control population mobility and urbanization. Under
this system, each Chinese citizen is assigned a hukou (registration status), classified as “agricultural” (rural) or “nonagricultural” (urban) in
a specific administrative unit that is at or lower than the county/city
level. Approvals from local governments are needed for an individual
to change the category (agricultural or nonagricultural) or location of
hukou registration, and it is extremely difficult to obtain such approvals. Before the economic reform started in 1978, working outside one’s
hukou registration location/occupation category was prohibited. This
prohibition was relaxed in the 1980s, and China started to have migrant
workers who worked outside their hukou registration locations. However, prior to 2003 migrant workers were required to apply for a temporary residence permit, which was difficult to obtain. As a result, many
migrant workers were without a permit and faced the dire consequence
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Figure 7.1 Real GDP per Capita (relative to mean), 2000
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of being arrested and deported by the local authorities. Even with a
temporary residence permit, migrant workers without local hukou had
very limited access to local public services and faced much higher costs
for health care and for their children’s education. As the demand for
migrant workers in manufacturing, construction, and labor-intensive
service industries increased, many provinces, especially the coastal
provinces, eliminated the requirement of a temporary residence permit for migrant workers, and by 2003 all provinces had eliminated the
requirement. This policy change helped ease migration, but migrant
workers still face the costs of having only very limited access to local
public services. More importantly, migrant workers always face these
costs as long as they do not have local hukou. Because of these costs,
most migrant workers are young and without children, and their migration is temporary. In 2000, for example, 70 percent of migrant workers
were without children, and 70 percent of them moved within the last
four years. Most of them had agricultural hukou but were working in
the nonagricultural sector.
As Table 7.1 shows, in 2000, there were 26.5 million migrant
workers who worked outside the province of their hukou registration
provinces. As the restrictions on migrant workers relaxed, the number
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Table 7.1 Stock of Migrant Workers in China
Interprovincial
2000
2005
Total stock (millions)
26.5
49.0
Share of total employment (%)
4.2
7.2

Intraprovincial
2000
2005
90.1
120.4
14.3
17.7

NOTE: Migrants are defined based on their hukou registration location. Interprovincial
migrants are workers registered in another province from where they are employed.
Intraprovincial migrants are workers registered in the same province where they are
employed, but are either nonagricultural workers holding agricultural hukou or vice
versa.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

increased to 49 million in 2005. These are enormous numbers; however,
they only represent 4.2 and 7.2 percent of China’s total employment in
2000 and 2005, respectively. The majority of migrant workers in China
are those who move within a province. The numbers of within-province
migrant workers were around 90 million in 2000 and 120 million in
2005, representing 14.3 and 17.7 percent of China’s total employment
in 2000 and 2005, respectively.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRADE
It has been well documented that internal trade costs in China
in the 1990s were high (Poncet 2005; Young 2000). It has also been
documented that the degree of local market protection in a province
was directly related to the size of the state sector in that province (Bai
et al. 2004). Since 2000, these trade barriers have been reduced significantly. Some of the reduction was a result of the deliberate policy
reforms undertaken by the government. For example, the state council under the then premier Zhu Rongji issued a directive in 2001 that
prohibits local government from engaging in local market protections.
More importantly, as a result of various state-owned enterprise reforms,
the size of the state sector has declined significantly and consequently
lowered local government incentives to engage in local market protections. Improved transport infrastructure and logistics also helped lower
internal trade cost.
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The province-level trade data, both between province pairs and
internationally, are taken from the regional input-output tables for 2002
and 2007. Table 7.2 reports the aggregate bilateral flows between the
eight regions and each other and the rest of the world. To ease comparisons, we normalize all flows by the importing region’s total expenditures. In addition to the bilateral trade flows, we also report in the last
column the share of a region’s expenditures that are spent on goods
from all other regions within China. A useful measure of a region’s
trade openness is the fraction of its expenditures allocated to its own
producers—that is, its “home share.” The diagonal elements in Table
7.2 provide these values for each region. Interior regions of China have
a much higher home share than coastal regions. In 2002, the central
region’s home share is 0.88 compared to only 0.72 for the south coast
and 0.63 for Beijing and Tianjin.
While regions in China generally import more from abroad than from
any particular region within China, the total imports from the rest of
China are still higher than imports from abroad for most of the regions.
The Central Coast and South Coast regions are the exceptions. In 2002,
their imports from abroad were significantly higher than imports from
the rest of China; they also had substantial international exports.

TRADE AND MIGRATION COSTS IN CHINA
Tombe and Zhu (2015) use a structural model combined with the
data on trade and migration flows to estimate costs of trade and migration. The model generates gravity equations that relate the trade flow
between two regions to the real GDP of the two regions and the trade
cost between the two regions, and the migration flow between two
regions to the real incomes of the two regions and the cost of migration
between two regions.
Trade flow between regions A and B = F(GDP of region A, GDP of
region B, distance, trade cost)
Migration flow from regions A to B = G(income of region A, income of
region B, distance, migration cost)

Importer
Year 2002
Northeast
Beijing/Tianjin
North Coast
Central Coast
South Coast
Central Region
Northwest
Southwest
Abroad
Year 2007
Northeast
Beijing/Tianjin
North Coast
Central Coast
South Coast
Central Region
Northwest
Southwest
Abroad
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Table 7.2 Internal and External Trade Shares of China
Northeast

Beijing/
Tianjin

North
Coast

Central
Coast

Exporter
South
Coast

Central
Region

87.9
3.9
1.8
0.2
0.5
0.6
2.0
0.9
0.0

0.7
63.4
3.3
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.8
0.3
0.0

1.0
9.4
79.8
0.6
0.5
1.1
2.1
0.4
0.0

0.8
3.0
3.4
81.0
2.6
4.8
3.3
1.8
0.1

1.3
2.6
1.8
1.5
72.3
2.3
4.5
4.3
0.2

1.1
3.3
3.8
2.4
1.9
87.8
3.6
1.4
0.0

0.8
1.4
0.9
0.5
0.4
0.7
77.4
0.9
0.0

78.7
3.8
2.1
1.1
1.5
1.7
2.3
1.6
0.0

2.0
62.3
5.8
0.7
0.9
1.4
2.2
1.2
0.1

2.0
10.1
76.8
1.4
1.7
4.5
4.8
1.7
0.1

0.9
1.5
1.5
76.8
5.2
4.9
2.7
1.7
0.4

2.7
2.4
1.5
1.8
68.5
4.0
5.5
8.4
0.2

1.0
1.8
3.7
4.8
3.6
73.0
3.6
1.9
0.0

1.4
2.1
2.3
1.7
1.8
2.9
65.6
3.2
0.0

Abroad

Total other
prov.

0.9
1.2
0.8
0.5
1.5
0.7
3.8
88.0
0.0

5.5
11.9
4.4
13.3
19.8
1.8
2.6
2.0
99.6

6.6
24.8
15.8
5.7
7.9
10.4
20.0
10.0
–

0.9
0.7
0.8
0.9
2.8
1.8
3.6
73.8
0.0

10.4
15.5
5.5
10.8
14.1
5.9
9.8
6.6
99.1

10.9
22.2
17.7
12.4
17.4
21.1
24.6
19.6
–

Northwest Southwest

NOTE: The table displays the share of each importing region’s total spending allocated to each source region. See Tombe and Zhu (2015,
Appendix A) for the mapping of provinces to regions. The column “Total other prov.” reports the total spending share of each importing
region allocated to producers in other provinces of China. The diagonal elements (the “home share” of spending”), the share imported
from abroad, and the share imported from other provinces will together sum to 100%.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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With data on GDP, income, distance, and trade and migration flows,
the trade and migration costs can be estimated as residuals.
Migration Costs
We measure the migration cost as a factor that deflates a migrant’s
real income so that she is indifferent between migrating or staying in
her hukou location. The cost may vary across the sector-location pairs.
For example, if the cost of migrating to a destination is 3, then an individual will migrate to the destination if and only if the real income in
the destination is at least three times as high as the real income the
individual can earn by staying at her hukou location. We summarize
these costs, their changes, and the initial migration flows in Table 7.3.
Overall, migration costs are largest for migrants switching both sectors
and provinces, with an average initial cost of nearly 38. In contrast,
switching sectors within one’s home province incurs average migration
costs of 2.9. When estimating the migration costs by migrant worker’s age, the costs are much higher for older workers. These patterns
of migration costs are consistent with our discussion earlier that the
most important source of the migration costs is the lack of access to
local public services at the migration destination. This is clearly more
important for older migrant workers and workers who are farther away
from their hukou location.
Table 7.3 also reports the change in average migration costs between
2000 and 2005 in the last column. Overall, migration costs declined to
84 percent of their initial level. Costs to switch provinces fell the most,
from 32.6 to 19.8. Sectoral switches within a worker’s home region also
fell, from 2.9 to 2.4.
Trade Costs
The trade cost we estimate is a comprehensive measure of barriers
to trade that includes tariffs, transportation costs, and other nontariff
barriers, such as local protection policies. It is represented as an iceberg
cost. For example, if the export cost is 3, then for one unit of good
to reach the export destination, it will cost the exporter three units of
goods. For a typical province in China in 2002, the average trade cost
was 3 in agriculture and 2 in nonagriculture, and the magnitudes of
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Table 7.3 Migration Rates and Average Costs, by Sector and Province
Migration costs
Initial share of Level in Level in Relative
employment
2000
2005
change
Agriculture to nonagriculture
migration cost changes
Overall
0.16
3.4
2.9
0.84
Within province
0.13
2.9
2.4
0.84
Between province
0.03
37.8
23.2
0.61
Between provinces migration
cost changes
Overall
0.04
32.6
19.8
0.61
Within agriculture
0.003
71.9
63.7
0.89
Within nonagriculture
0.01
21.3
12.4
0.58
Overall
0.174
3.6
3.0
0.84
NOTE: Displays migration-weighted harmonic means of migration costs in 2000 and
2005. We use initial (year 2000) weights to average the 2005 costs to ensure the displayed change reflects changes in costs and not migration patterns.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

internal and external trade costs are similar. So, trade costs were quite
high in 2002. Overall, we find that poor regions face the highest export
costs—consistent with existing cross-country evidence.
Table 7.4 presents the relative change in the nonagricultural trade
costs for eight regions in China between 2002 and 2007. Some notable
patterns emerge. Within China, trade costs were largely decreasing,
with trade-weighted change in trade costs within China of −11 percent.
For trade between China and the world, the average change in trade
costs was −8 percent. Poor regions such as Central, Northwest, and
Southwest experienced much larger reductions in export costs than rich
regions did. Also, the reductions in China’s costs of importing from the
rest of the world were much larger than the reductions in China’s costs
of exporting to the rest of the world. These numbers suggest that around
the time when China joined the WTO, there were significant reductions
in China’s internal trade costs and import costs and only modest reductions in China’s export costs.
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Table 7.4 Percent Change in Trade Costs, 2002–2007
Exporter
Importer

North- Beijing/ North Central South Central North- Southeast Tianjin Coast Coast Coast Region west
west World

Northeast
Beijing/Tianjin −14.2
North Coast
−5.7
Central Coast −16.4
South Coast
−18.4
Central Region −6.6
Northwest
−4.0
Southwest
−3.8
World
−3.8

−11.8
−1.0
−5.2
−4.0
−5.2
−10.6
−1.2
−0.2

−16.7
−15.0
−4.5
−15.1
−15.1
−20.0
−17.5
−6.5

−23.5
−15.5
−1.0
−12.0
−6.7
−12.0
−5.4
−1.6

−24.7
−13.8
−11.2
−11.2
−11.2
−18.6
−13.8
9.7

−23.0
−23.9
−20.7
−15.9
−20.7
−21.9
−19.1
−21.0

−18.0
−25.7
−22.6
−17.9
−24.7
−19.1
−17.2
−29.4

−18.5
−18.5
−20.7
−12.4
−20.8
−16.8
−17.8
−18.5

−27.7
−26.9
−20.3
−19.1
−10.6
−27.9
−37.8
−27.7

SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

THE EFFECT OF MEASURED COSTS CHANGES
In Tombe and Zhu (2015) we use a general equilibrium model to
quantify the effect of the changes in trade and migration costs. In the
quantitative analysis, we fit the initial equilibrium of our model to the
Chinese data in 2002 and then quantify the impacts on aggregate productivity and welfare of various changes in trade and migration costs. I
summarize the main results here.
The Effect of Lower Trade Costs
Table 7.5 displays the change in trade and migration flows, aggregate productivity, and welfare, and various other outcomes as a result
of the changes in trade costs. Changes in trade shares are expenditureweighted average changes across all provinces and sectors. Lower internal trade costs, not surprisingly, decrease the amount of international
trade as households and firms reorient their purchase decisions toward
domestic suppliers. The share of expenditures allocated to producers in
another province typically increases by over 9 percentage points, while
the share allocated to international producers falls by almost 1 percentage point. Lower external trade costs reveal the opposite pattern. In
both cases, home shares fall.
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Table 7.5 Effects of Trade Cost Changes
Percentage point
change in
Migrant stock (%)
Internal External
Within
Between Real GDP Aggregate
trade
trade
province province
(%)
welfare (%)
Internal trade
9.2
−0.7
0.8
−2.0
10.7
10.7
External trade −0.7
3.9
1.8
2.4
3.8
2.6
All trade
8.2
2.9
2.5
0.3
14.4
13.2
NOTE: Displays aggregate response to various trade cost changes. All use trade cost
changes as measured. The migrant stock is the number of workers living outside their
hukou registration location or sector.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

In terms of migration, improved internal trade costs actually resulted
in fewer workers living outside their home province. The total stock of
migrants declined by over 2 percent (equivalent to approximately 0.5
million workers). Intuitively, declining internal trade costs disproportionately lower goods prices in poor, interior regions. This increase in
real income means that fewer workers living in other provinces were
willing to continue to do so. On the other hand, a greater fraction of
workers switched sectors within their home province. With lower international trade costs, richer coastal regions disproportionately benefit,
so more workers relocate there in addition to more workers switching
sectors within their home province.
The change in income, goods and land prices, and workers’ location decisions all have implications for aggregate welfare. We report the
change in welfare and productivity (aggregate real GDP) in the last columns of Table 7.5. In response to lower internal trade costs, aggregate
welfare dramatically increased by nearly 11 percent. In contrast, external trade cost reductions resulted in a much smaller gain of only 3.1 percent. As in our earlier analysis, internal trade costs reductions appear to
be significantly more important for aggregate outcomes. The differential impacts are not due to any significant differences in the magnitude
of cost reductions. The main reason for the larger welfare gains from
internal cost reductions is that most provinces allocate a larger fraction
of their spending to goods from other provinces than from abroad.
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The Effect of Lower Migration Costs
Trade liberalization accounts for only a limited amount of migration. Not surprisingly, lower migration costs lead to substantially more
workers living outside their home province-sector. As before, we simulate the effect of lower migration cost changes and report the effects in
Table 7.6.
The stock of migrants increases dramatically when the cost of
migration declines as measured. The number of interprovincial migrants
increases by more than 80 percent. Within provinces, there are also substantial moves from agriculture to nonagriculture. The stock of workers
with agricultural hukou that have nonagricultural employment within
their home province increases by nearly 15 percent. Clearly, the measured changes in migration costs are extremely important determinants
of worker location decisions. The large flows are also beneficial for
China as a whole; real GDP and welfare rise 4.8 and 8.5 percent, respectively. Changes that facilitate the movement of workers from agriculture to nonagriculture sectors, whether within or between provinces,
account for most of the increases in aggregate GDP and welfare.
While migration flows and real incomes respond greatly to the
changes in migration costs, the effect on aggregate trade flows is muted.
International and internal trade shares increase by only 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points, respectively.
Table 7.6 Effects of Various Migration Cost Changes
Percentage
point change

All

Internal
trade
0.1

External
trade
0.2

Migrant stock
Within Between
province province
(%)
(%)
14.5
82.4

Real
GDP
(%)
4.8

Aggregate
welfare
(%)
8.5

Agriculture to nonagriculture migration cost changes
Overall
0.1
0.1
15.3
54.0
4.4
7.2
Within province
0.0
−0.1
22.8
−9.6
2.0
4.8
Between province
0.1
0.2
−7.0
71.0
2.9
2.7
NOTE: Displays aggregate response to various migration cost changes. All use migration cost changes as measured. The migrant stock is the number of workers living
outside their hook registration location or sector.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Decomposing China’s Growth between 2000 and 2005
While the results above show that the reductions in trade and migration costs have a large effect on the aggregate GDP growth, they cannot
account for all the observed growth in China between 2000 and 2005.
Other factors, such as technology improvements and reforms within
each province and sector may also contribute to the aggregate GDP
growth during that period. In Tombe and Zhu (2015), we summarize
the contribution of these factors by a residual productivity growth term
for each province and sector so that the combination of the productivity growth and the measured changes in trade and migration costs can
generate a GDP growth rate in our quantitative model that matches the
actual GDP growth rate in that province and sector. By construction,
the quantitative model with the measured cost changes and the implied
residual productivity growth also matches the aggregate GDP growth
exactly. The model can then be used to decompose China’s overall
growth into one of four components: productivity growth, lower internal
trade costs, lower international trade costs, and lower internal migration
costs. The result of the decomposition is reported in Table 7.7.
Overall, reductions in trade and migration frictions account for
about one-third of China’s overall growth. Reductions in internal trade
and migration costs contribute roughly one quarter (15.3 percent of
the 57.1 percent). In stark contrast, international trade cost reductions
account for only 7 percent of the overall growth (4.2 percent of the 57.1
percent).
Potential Gains from Further Reform
Our decomposition shows that reductions in trade and migration
frictions and the resulting reduction in misallocation of labor played a
major role in China’s growth between 2000 and 2005. How much additional scope is there for further reductions in trade and migration costs?
In Tombe and Zhu (2015), we use the quantitative model to evaluate
the effect of two potential reforms: 1) lowering the internal trade costs
to the average level observed in Canada, and 2) lowering the internal
migration costs so that the average interprovincial migration rate in
China is the same as the interstate migration rate in the United States.
The results are reported in Table 7.8 and show that China’s real GDP
and welfare could increase by a further 10.9 percent and 11.8 percent
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Table 7.7 Decomposing China’s Overall Real GDP Growth
Marginal effects
Real GDP growth (%)
Share of growth
Overall (all changes)
57.1
—
Productivity changes
37.9
0.66
Internal trade cost changes
9.7
0.17
External trade cost changes
4.2
0.07
Migration cost changes
5.6
0.10
NOTE: Decomposes the change in real GDP into contribution from productivity, internal trade cost changes, external trade cost changes, and migration cost changes.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

Table 7.8 Potential Gains of Further Trade and Migration Liberalization
Relative to 2005
Change in
Aggregate
Real GDP (%)
welfare (%)
Average internal trade costs as in Canada
10.9
11.8
22.8
15.0
Between-province migration as in U.S.
Both changes together
37.0
30.5
NOTE: Reports the change in real GDP and welfare that result from changing China’s
internal trade and migration costs such that average internal costs equal Canada’s (by
sector) or such that the between-province migration flows match the U.S. Percentage
changes are expressed relative to the Chinese economy in 2005.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

if average internal trade costs fell to Canada’s level, and an additional
22.8 percent and 15 percent if the average migration rate in China was
the same as that in the United States. The scope for and gains from
further policy reforms are therefore large. Both changes together would
deliver real GDP gains of 37 percent and welfare gains of nearly 31
percent.

CONCLUSION
China experienced rapid GDP growth between 2000 and 2005, and
many believe it is because of the external trade liberalization associ-
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ated with China’s joining the WTO in 2001. This resulted in export
expansion supported by a large increase in the supply of cheap migrant
workers, hence the growth. Internal policy reforms undertaken by the
Chinese government during the same period have not received as much
attention. However, their contribution to China’s growth during that
period is much more important than the contribution of the external
trade liberalization. Reductions in internal trade and migration costs
account for 27 percent of the aggregate GDP growth in China between
2000 and 2005. In contrast, reductions in external trade costs account
for only 7 percent of the aggregate GDP growth during the same period.
Despite the reductions, internal trade and migration costs in China are
still much higher than those in developed countries such as Canada and
the United States. Further reforms that lower these costs to developed
country levels could yield substantial increases in China’s aggregate
GDP and welfare in the future.

Note
This chapter is largely based on my joint paper with Trevor Tombe (Tombe and
Zhu 2015). I thank the Department of Economics at Western Michigan University for
inviting me to present this paper at the 2015–2016 Werner Sichel Lecture Series.
The data on regional income are constructed based on the GDP and employment
series provided by Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013); the data on trade are from the InterProvince Input-Output table provided by Li (2010) and the Inter-Regional Input-Output
table provided by Zhang and Qi (2012); and the data on migration are from the 1 percent sample of the 2000 China Population Census and the 20 percent sample of the
China 2005 1 Percent Population Survey.
There is no regional input-output table for 2000 in China, so we use trade shares
from the 2002 China Regional Input-Output Tables to approximate trade shares in 2000.
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